Et1927 


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Sample page of the New Students’ Interlinear Translation 
of Caesar 


THE COMMENTARIES OF 
CAIUS JULIUS GAneae 


ON THE 


GALLIG WAR 


FIRST BOOK 


Ceesar, in recounting the events of the war which he waged in. 
Gaul, first describes Gaul itself, then tells of two battles against the 
Helvetians and then of one against the Germans, 


1, Omnis! Gallia est divisa in tres partes: unam 
All Gaul 1s divided into three parts: one 


quarum Belge incdlunt; aliam Aquitani; tertiam, 
of wnich the Belgze inhabit; another the Aquitani; the third, 


qui lingua ipsorum appellantur 
(those) who in (the) language of themselves are called 


Celtz, nostra, Galli. Omnes_ hi différunt inter 
Celtze, in ours, Gauls. All these differ between 


se lingua, _institutis, legibus. Flumen 
themselves inlanguage, ininstitutions, (and) inlaws. The river 


Garumna dividit Gallos ab Aquitanis, 


Garonne divides the Gauls from the Aquitani, 


Matrona et Sequana 4 _ Belgis. Belge sunt 


the Marne and _ Seine from the Belge. The Belgz are 


fortissimi omnium horum, propteréa quod absunt 
the bravest of all these, because (that) they are distant 


longissImé Aa cultu atque humanitate 
farthest from the cultivation and humanity [refinement] 


Provincle ; que mercatores minimé szepe 
of the Province [Provence]; and merchants least often 


Copyright 1921, by TRANSLATION PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. 


CASAR’S COMMENTARIES 


ON THE 


GALLIC WAR 


LITERALLY TRANSLATED 


THE TRANSLATION PUBLISHING COMPANY 
76 Fifth Avenue New York City 


_ TRANSLATION PUBLISHING C 


i i "et 


THE COMMENTARIES OF C, JULIUS CESAR 


ON HIS 


Peary LNT ke) 


BOOK I. 


THE ARGUMENT. 


[. Description of Gaul and its divisions. —II.-IV. The ambi 
tious designs of the Helvetii under Orgetorix, and the suspi- 
cious death of the latter.—V.,VI. The Helvetii still 
proceed to carry out their designs.—VIII.-XI. Czsar’s 
opposition .and measures.— XII. The battle at the river 
Arar.— XIII. The Helvetii send ambassadors to sue for 
peace. —XIV. Czesar’s politic answer.—XV. Another 
engagement with the Helvetii.- XVI. Czsar’s reproof of 
the Adui for not sending him the promised supplies. — 
XVII.-XIX. The disclosures of Liscus respecting Dum- 
norix.— XX. Divitidcus, his brother, pleads for Dumnorix. 
—XXI.-XXVI. Various eventsin the war between Cesar 
and the Helvetii.—XXVII. The Helvetii, being worsted, 
offer a surrender, but some clandestinely return home. — 
XXVIII., XXTX. The numbers of the several Helvetian 
forces before and after the war.— XXX. Certain parts of 
Gaul congratulate Cesar and request a council.— XXXI, 
Complaints are there made against Ariovistus.—XXXII.- 
XXXVI. Czsar’s message to Ariovistus and the bold 
answer of the latter. —XXXVII.-XXXIX. A panic in the 
Roman camp.— XL. Cesar’s speech on that occasion. — 
XLI. Its effects.—XLII-XLVI. Conference between 
Cesar and Ariovistus. —XLVII.-LII. Which terminates 
in war.—LIII. The overthrow of the Germans and their 
flight from Gaul.— LIV. Cesar, having sent his army into 
winter quarters amongst the Sequdni, proceeds to perform 
the civil duties of his proconsular office. 


Cnapr. I.— All Gaul is divided into three 
parts, one of which the Below inhabit, the 
Aquitani another, those who in their own lan- 
guage are called Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. 


* CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


All these differ from each other in language, 
customs, and laws. The river Garonne sepa- 
rates the Gauls from the Aquitani; the Marne 
and the Seine separate them from the Belge. 
Of all these, the Belge are the bravest, be- 
cause they are farthest from the civilization 
and refinement of [our] Province, and mer- 
chants least frequently resort to them, and im- 
port those things which tend to effeminate the 
mind; and they are the nearest to the Ger- 
mans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom _ 
they are continually waging war; for which 
reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the 
Gauls in valor, as they contend with the Ger- 
mans in almost daily battles, when they either 
repel them from their own territories, or them- 
selves wage war on their frontiers. One part 
of these, which it has been said that the Gauls 
occupy, takesits beginning at the river Rhone : 
it is bounded by the river Garonne, the ocean, 
and the territories of the Belgze: it borders, 
too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helve- 
tii, upon the river Rhine, and stretches towards 
the north. The Belge rise from the extreme 
frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of 
the river Rhine; and look towards the north 
and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from 
the river Garonne to the Pyrenean mountains 
and to that part of the ocean which is near 
Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun 
and the north star. 

Cuap. II. — Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix 
was by far the most distinguished and wealthy. 
He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 5 


were consuls, incited by lust of sovereignty, 
formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and 
persuaded the people to go forth from their 
territories with all their possessions, [saying ] 
that it would be very easy, since they excelled 
all in valor, to acquire the supremacy of the 
whole of Gaul. To this he the more easily 
persuaded them, because the Helvetii are con- 
fined on every side by the nature of their sit- 
uation : on one side by the Rhine, a very broad 
and deep river, which separates the Helvetian 
territory from the Germans; on a second side 
by the Jura, a very high mountain, which is 
[situated] between the Sequani and the Helve- 
tii; on a third by the Lakeof Geneva, and by 
the river Rhone, which separates our Province 
from the Helvetii. From these circumstances 
it resulted, that they could range less widely, 
and could less easily make war upon their 
neighbors ; for which reason men fond of war 
[as they were | were affected with great regret. 
They thought, that considering the extent of 
their population, and their renown for warfare 
and bravery, they had but narrow limits, 
although they extended in length 240, and in 
breadth 180 [Roman] miles. ° 

Cuap. III.—Induced by these considera- 
tions, and influenced by the authority of Orge- 
torix, they determined to provide such things 
as were necessary for their expedition ; to buy 
up as great a number as possible of beasts of 
burden and wagons; to make their sowings 
as large as possible, so that on their march 
plenty of corn might be in store; and to estab- 


6 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


lish peace and friendship with the neighbor- 
ing states. They reckoned that a term of 
two years would be sufficient for them to exe- 
cute their designs; they fix by decree their. 
departure for the third year. Orgetorix is 
chosen to complete these arrangements. He 
took upon himself the office of ambassador to 
the states: on this journey he persuades Casti- 
cus, the son of Catamantalédes, (one of the 
Sequani, whose father had possessed the soy- 
ereignty among the people for many years, 
and had -been styled ‘* friend” by the senate 
of the Roman people,) to seize upon the sov- 
ereignty in his own state, which his father had 
held before him, and he likewise persuades 
Dumnorix, an /Eduan, the brother of Diviti- 
Acus, who at that time possessed the chief 
authority in the state, and was exceedingly 
beloved by the people, to attempt the same, 
and gives him his daughter in marriage. He 
proves to them that to accomplish their at- 
tempts was a thing very easy to be done, 
because he himself would obtain the govern- 
ment of his own state ; that there was no doubt 
that the Helvetii were the most powerful of 
the whole of Gaul; he assures them that he 
will, with his own forces and his own army, 
acquire the sovereignty for them. Incited by 
this speech, they give a pledge and oath to 
one another, and hope that, when they have 
seized the sovereignty, they will, by means of 
the three most powerful and valiant nations, 
be enabled to obtain possession of the whole 
of Gaul. 


CMAiSAR’S COMMENTARIES. vi 


Cuap. IV.— When this scheme was dis- 
closed to the Helvetii by informers, they, 
according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix 
to plead his cause in chains; it was the law 
that the penalty of being burned by fire should 
await him if condemned. On the day appointed 
for the pleading of his cause, Orgetorix drew 
together from all quarters to the court, all his 
vassals to the number of ten thousand persons ; 
and led together to the same place all his 
dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he 
had agreat number ; by means of these he res- 
cued himself from [the necessity of] pleading 
his cause. While the state, incensed at this 
act, was endeavoring to assert its right by 
arms, and the magistrates were mustering a 
large body of men from the country, Orgetorix 
died ; and there is not wanting a suspicion, as 
the Helvetii think, of his having committed 
~ suicide. 

Cuap. V.— After his death, the Helvetii 
nevertheless attempt to do that which they had 
resolved on, namely, to go forth from their terri- 
tories. When they thought that they were at 
length prepared for this undertaking, they set 
fire to all their towns, in number about twelve, 
to their villages about four hundred, and 
to the private dwellings that remained; they 
burn up all the corn, except what they intend 
to carry with them; that after destroying the 
hope of a return home, they might be the more 
ready for undergoing all dangers. They order 
«very one to carry forth from home for himself 
provisions for three months, ready ground. 


8 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


They persuade the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, 
and the Latobrigi, their neighbors, to adopt 
the same plan, and after burning down their 
towns and villages, to set out with them: and 
they admit to their party and unite to the- 
selves as confederates the Boii, who had dwelt 
on the other side of the Rhine, and had crossed 
over into the Norican territory, and assaulted 
Noreia. 

Cuap. VI. — There were in all two routes, 
by which they could go forth from their coun- 
try —one through the Sequani, narrow and 
difficult, between Mount Jura and the river 
Rhone, (by which scarcely one wagon at a 
time could be led ; there was, moreover, a very 
high mountain overhanging, so that a very 
few might easily intercept them;) the other, 
through our Province, much easier and freer 
from obstacles, because the Rhone flows be- 
tween the boundaries of the Helvetii and those — 
of the Allobroges, who had lately been sub- 
dued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. 
The farthest town of the Allobroges, and the 
nearest to the territories of the Helvetii, is 
Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to 
the Helvetii. They thought that they should 
either persuade the Allobroges, because they 
did not seem as yet well-affected towards the 
Roman people, or compel them by force to 
allow them to pass through their territories. 
Having provided everything for the expedition, 
they appoint a day. on which they should all 
meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was 
the fifth before the kalends of April, J7. e., 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 9 


the 28th of March,] in the consulship of Lucius 
Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B. C. 58]. 

Cuap: VII. — When it was reported to Cx- 
sar, that they were attempting to make their 
route through our Province, he hastens to set 
out from the city, and, by as great marches as 
he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and arrives 
at Geneva. He orders the whole Province [to 
furnish | as great a number of soldiers as pos- 
sible, as there was in all only one legion in 
Further Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva 
to be broken down. When the Helvetii are 
apprised of his arrival, they send to him, ag 
ambassadors, the most illustrious men of their 
state, (in which embassy Numeius and Veru- 
doctius held the chief place,) to say *‘ that it 
was their intention to march through the Prov- 
ince without doing any harm, because they 
had” [according to their own representa- 
tions| ‘‘no other route; that they requested 
they might be allowed to do so with his 
consent.” Ceesar, inasmuch as he kept im 
remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, 
had been slain, and his army routed and made 
to pass under the yoke by the Helvetii, did not 
think that [their request] ought to be granted ; 
hor was he of opinion that men of hostile 
disposition, if an opportunity of marching 
through the Province were given them, would 
abstain from outrage and mischief. Yet, in 
order that a period might intervene, until the 
soldiers whom he had ordered [to be fur. 
nished] should assemble, he replied to the 
ambassadors, that he would take time to delib- 


10 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


erate; if they wanted anything, they might 
return on the day before the ides of April [on 
April 12th]. 

Cuap. VIII. — Meanwhile, with the legion 
which he had with him and the soldiers who 
had assembled from the Province, he carries 
along for nineteen [ Roman, not quite eighteen 
English] miles a wall, to the height of six- 
teen feet, and a trench, from the Lake of Gene- 
va, which flows into the river Rhone, to Mount 
Jura, which separ:tes the territories of the 
Sequani from those of the Helvetii. When 
that work was finished, he distributes garrisons, 
and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he 
may the more easily intercept them, if they 
should attempt to cross over against his will. 
When the day which he had appointed with 
the ambassadors came, and they returned to 
him, he says, that he cannot, consistently 
with the custom and precedent of the Roman 
people, grant any one a passage through the 
Province; and he gives them to understand, 
that, if they should attempt to use violence, 
he would oppose them. The Helvetii, disap- 
pointed in this hope, tried if they could force 
2 passage, (some by means of a bridge of 
boats and numerous rafts constructed for the 
purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, 
where the depth of the river was least, some- 
times by day, but more frequently by night, ) 
but being kept at bay by the strength of our 
works, and by the concourse of the soldiers, 
and by the missiles, they desisted from this 
attempt. 


-CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 11 


Cuap. IX.—There was left one way, 
[namely] through the Sequani, by which, on 
account of its narrowness, they could not pass 
without the consent of the Sequani. As they 
could not of themselves prevail on them, they 
send ambassadors to Dumnoérix the A*duan, 
that through his intercession they might ob- 
tain their request from the Sequani. Dumno- 
rix, by his popularity and liberality, had great 
influence among the Sequani, and was friendly 
to the Helvetii, because out of that state he 
had married the daughter of Orgetorix ; and, 
incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for 
a revolution, and wished to have as many states 
as possible attached to him by his kindness 
towards them. He, therefore, undertakes the 
affair, and prevails upon the Sequani to allow 
the Helvetii to march through their territories, 
and arranges that they should give hostages to 
each other, — the Sequani not to obstruct the 
Helvetii in their march; the Helvetii, to pass 
without mischief and outrage. 

Cuar. X. — It is again told Cesar, that the 
Helvetii intend to march through the country 
of the Sequani and the £dui into the terri- 
tories of the Santénes, which are not far dis- 
tant from those boundaries of the Tolosates, 
which [viz., Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the 
Province. If this took place, he saw that it 
would be attended with great danger to the 
Province to have warlike men, enemies of the 
Roman people, bordering upon an open and 
very fertile tract of country. For these rea- 
sous he appointed Titus Labienus, his lieuten- 


12 CH4SAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


ant, to the command of the fortification which 
he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy 
by forced marches, and there levies two legions, 
and leads out from winter quarters three which 
were wintering around Aquileia, and with 
these five legions marches rapidly by the near- 
est route across the Alps into Further Gaul. 
Here the Centrones and the Graiocéli and the 
Caturiges, having taken possession of the higher 
parts, attempt to obstruct the army in their 
march. After having routed these in several 
battles, he arrives in the territories of the Vo- 
contii in the Further Province on the seventh 
day from Océlum, which is the most remote 
town of the Hither Province; thence he leads 
his army into the country of the Allobroges, 
and from the Allobréges to the Segusiani. 
These people are the first beyond the Province 
on the opposite side of the Rhone. 

Cuap. XI. — The Helvetii had by this time 
led their forces over through the narrow defile 
and the territories of the Sequani, and had 
arrived at the territories of the dui, and 
were ravaging their lands. The A‘dui, as they 
could not defend themselves and their posses- 
sions against them. send ambassadors to Cex- 
sar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they had 
at all times so well deserved of the Roman 
people, that their fields ought not to have been 
laid waste, their children carried off into sla- 
very, their towns stormed, almost within sight 
of our army. At the same time the Am- 
barri, the friends and kinsmen of the A‘dui, 
apprise Ceesar, that it was not easy for them, 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 13 


now that their fields had been devastated, to 
ward off the violence of the enemy from their 
towns: the Allobroges likewise, who had vil- 
lages and possessions on the other side of the 
Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Ceasar, 
and assure him, that they had nothing remain- 
ing, except the soil of their land. Ceesar, in- 
duced by these circumstances, decides, that 
he ought not to wait until the Helvetii, after 
destroying all the property of his allies, should 
arrive among the Santones. 

Cuap. XII.— There is a river [called] the 
Sadne, which flows through the territories of 
the A*dui and Sequani into the Rhone with 
such incredible slowness, that it cannot be de- 
termined by the eye in which direction it flows. 
This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and 
boats joined together. When Cesar was in- 
sormed by spies that the Helvetii had already 
conveyed three parts of their forces across 
that river, but that the fourth part was left 
behind on this side of the Saédne, he set out 
from the camp with three legions during the 
third watch, and came up with that division 
which had not yet crossed the river. Attack- 
ing them, encumbered with baggage, and not 
expecting him, he cut to pieces a great part of 
them ; the rest betook themselves to flight, and 
concealed themselves in the nearest woods 
That canton [which was cut down] was called 
the Tigurine ; for the whole Helvetian state is 
divided into four cantons. This single canton 
having left their country, within the recollec- 
tion of our fathers, had slain Lucius Cassius 


14 CAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


the consul, and had made his army pass under 
the yoke [B. C. 107].  ~Thus, whether by 
chance, or by the design of the immortal gods, 
that part of the Helvetian state which had 
brought a signal calamity upon the Roman peo- 
ple, was the first to pay the penalty. In this 
Cesar avenged not only the public, but also 
his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini 
had slain Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cas- 
sius], the grandfather of Lucius Calpurnius 
Piso, his [Ceesar’s] father-in-law, in the same 
battle as Cassius himself. 

Cuap. XIII.— This battle ended, that he 
might be able to come up with the remaining 
forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to 
be made across the Sadne, and thus leads his 
army over. The Helvetii, confused by his 
sudden arrival, when they found that he had ef- 
fected in one day what they themselves had with 
the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty, 
namely, the crossing of the river, send ambas. 
sadors to him; at the head of which embassy 
was Divico, who had been commander of the. 
Helvetii, in the war against Cassius. He thus 
treats with Cesar: — that, ‘‘if the Roman 
people would make peace with the Helvetii 
they would go to that part and there remain, 
where Ceesar might appoint and desire them to 
be; but if he should persist in persecuting them 
with war, that he ought to remember both the 
ancient disgrace of the Roman people and 
the characteristic valor of the Helvetii. As to 
his having attacked one canton by surprise, 
[at a time] when those who had crossed 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 15. 


the river could not bring assistance to their 
friends, that he ought not on that account to 
ascribe very much to his own valor, or despise 
them ; that they had so learned from their sires 
and ancestors, as to rely more on valor than 
on artifice or stratagem. Wherefore let him 
not bring it to pass that the place, where they 
were standing, should acquire a name, from 
the disaster of the Roman people and the de- 
struction of their army or transmit the remem- 
brance [of such an event to posterity |.” 
Cuap. X1V.— To these words Cesar thus 
replied : — that ‘¢ on that very account he felt 
less hesitation, because he kept in remem- 
brance those circumstances which the Helve- 
tian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he 
felt the more indignant at them, in proportion 
as they had happened undeservedly to the 
Roman people: for if they had been conscious 
of having done any wrong, it would not have 
been difficult to be on their guard, but for that 
very reason had they been deceived, because 
neither were they aware that any offence had 
been given by them, on account of which they 
should be afraid, nor did they think that they 
ought to be afraid without cause. But even if 
he were willing to forget their former outrage, 
could he also lay aside the remembrance of the 
late wrongs, in that they had against his will 
attempted a route through the Province by 
force, in that they had molested the A¢dui, the 
Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That as to 
their so insolently boasting of their victory, 
and as to their being astonished that they had 


16 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


so long committed their outrages with impu- 
nity. [both these things] tended to the same 
point ; for the immortal gods are wont to allow 
those persons whem they wish to punish for 
their guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and 
longer impunity, in order that they may suffer 
the more severely from a reverse of circum- 
stances. Although these things are so, yet, if 
hostages were to be given him by them in order 
that he may be assured they will do what they 
promise, and provided they will give satisfac- 
tion to the AXdui for the outrages which they 
had committed against them and their allies, 
and likewise to the Allobroges. he [Czesar] 
will make peace with them.” Divico replied, 
that ** the Helvetii had been so trained by their 
ancestors, that they were accustomed to re- 
ceive, not to give, hostages; of that fact the 
Roman people were witness.” Having given 
this reply, he withdrew. 

Cuap. XV.—On the following day they 
move their camp from that place ; Caesar does 
the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to 
the number of four thousand, (which he had 
drawn together from all parts of the Province 
and from the /£dui and their allies,) to observe 
towards what parts the enemy are directing 
theirmarch. These, having too eagerly pursued 
the enemy’s rear, come to a battle with the cay- 
alry of the Helvetii in a disadvantageous place, 
and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated 
with this battle, because they had with five 
hundred horse repulsed so large a body of horse, ° 
began to face us more boldly, sometimes too 


CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 17 


from their rear to provoke our men by an 
attack. Ceesar [however] restrained his men 
from battle, deeming it sufficient for the pres- 
ent to prevent the enemy from rapine, forage, 
and depredation. They marched for about 
fifteen days in such a manner that there was 
not more than five or six miles between the 
enemy’s rear and our van. 

Cuap. XVI. — Meanwhile, Ceesar kept daily 
importuning the A<dui for the corn which they 
had promised in the name of their state; for, 
in consequence of the cold, (Gaul being, 
as before said, situated towards the north,) 
not only was the corn in the fields not ripe, 
but there was not in store a sufficiently large 
quantity even of fodder: besides he was unable 
to use the corn, which he had conveyed in ships 
up the river Sadne, because the Helvetii, from 
whom he was unwilling to retire, had diverted 
their march from the Saédne. The A¢dui kept 
deferring from day to day, and saying that it 
was being ‘‘ collected— brought in— on the 
road.” When he saw that he was put off too 
long, and that the day was close at hand on 
which he ought to serve out the corn to his 
soldiers, having called together their chiefs, 
of whom he had a great number in his camp, 
among them Divitiacus, and Liscus who was 
invested with the chief magistracy.(whom the 
/Edui style the Vergobretus, and who is elected 
annually, and has power of life and death over 
his countrymen.) he severely reprimands them, 
because he is not assisted by them on so urgent 
an occasion, when the enemy were so close at 


18 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


hand, and when [ corn | could neither be bought, 
nor taken from the fields, particularly as, in a 
great measure urged by their prayers, he had 
undertaken the war ; much more bitterly, there- 
fore, does he complain of his being forsaken. 

Cuap. XVII.—Then at length Liscus, moved 
by Ceesar’s speech, discloses what he had 
hitherto kept secret :— that ‘‘ there are some 
whose influence with the people is very great, 
who, though private men, have more power 
_ than the magistrates themselves: that these by 
seditious and violent language are deterring 
the populace from contributing the corn which 
they ought to supply; [by telling them] that 
if they cannot any longer retain the supremacy 
of Gaul, it were better to submit to the gov- 
ernment of Gauls than of Romans, nor ought 
they to doubt that, if the Romans should over- 
power the Helvetii, they would wrest their 
freedom from the Audui together with the 
remainder of Gaul. By these very men, [said 
he, | are our plans, and whatever is done in 
the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that. they 
could not be restrained by him: nay more, he 
was well aware, that though compelled by 
necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Cesar, 
at how great arisk he had done it; and for 
that reason, he had been silent as long as he 
could.” 

Cuap. XVIII. — Cesar perceived that, by 
this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the brother 
of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was 
unwilling that these matters should be dis- 
cussed while so many were present, he speed- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 13 


ily dismisses the council, but detains Liscus : 
he inquires from hin. when alone, about those 
things which he had said in the meeting. He 
[Liscus ] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. 
He [Cesar] makes inquiries on the same 
points privately of others, and discovers that 
it is all true; that ‘* Dumnorix is the person, 
a man of the highest daring, in great favor 
with the people on account of his liberality, a 
man eager for arevolution: that for a great 
many years he has been in the habit of con- 
tracting for the customs and all the other taxes 
of the AXdui at a small cost, because when he 
bids, no one dares to bid against him. By 
these means he has both increased his own 
private property, and amassed great means 
for giving largesses; that he maintains con- 
stantly at his own expense and keeps about 
his own person a great number of cavalry, and 
that not ouly at home, but even among the 
neighboring states, he has great influence, 
and for the sake of strengthening this influence 
has given his mother in marriage among the 
Bituriges to a man the most noble and most 
influential there ; that he has himself taken a 
wife from among the Helvetii, and has given 
his sister by the mother’s side and his female 
relations in marriage into other states ; that he 
favors and wishes well to the Helvetii on ac- 
count of this connection; and that he hates 
Cesar and the Romans, on his own account, 
because by their arrival his power was weak- 
‘ened, and his brother, Divitiacus, restored to 
his former position of influence and dignity: 


20 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


that, if anything should happen to the Romans, 
he entertains the highest hope of gaining the 
sovereignty by means of the Helvetii, but that 
under the government of the Roman people 
he despairs not only of royalty, but even of 
that influence which he already has.” Cesar 
discovered too, on inquiring into the unsuc- 
cessful cavalry engagement which had taken 
place a few days before, that the commence- 
ment of that flight had been made by Dumnorix 
and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was in com- 
mand of the cavalry which the /&dui had 
sent for aid to Cesar); that by their flight 
the rest of the cavalry was dismayed. 

Cuap. XIX. — After learning these circum- 
stances, since to these suspicions the most un- 
equivocal facts were added, viz., that he had 
led the Helvetii through the territories of the 
Sequani; that he had provided that hostages 
shoald be mutually given; that he had done 
all these things, not only without any orders of 
his [Czesar’s] and of his own state’s, but even 
without their [the Aidui] knowing anything 
of it themselves; that he [Dumnérix] was 
reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of the 
/Kidui; he [Ceesar] considered that there was 
sufficient reason, why he should either punish 
him himself, or order the state to do so. 
One thing [however] stood in the way of all 
this —that he had learned by experience his 
brother Divitiacus’s very high regard for the 
Roman people, his great affection towards 
him, his distinguished faithfulness, justice,’ 
and moderation ; for he was afraid lest by the 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 2. 


punishment of this man, he should hurt the 
feelings of Divitiacus. Therefore, before he 
attempted anything, he orders Divitiaicus to 
be summoned to him, and. when the ordinary 
interpreters had been wit!idrawn, converses 
with him through Caius Valerius Procillus, 
chief of the province of Gaul, an intimate 
friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest 
contidence in everything ; at the same time he 
reminds him of what was said about Dumnorix 
in the council of the Gauls, when he himself 
was present, and shows what each had said of 
him privately in his [Ceesar’s] own presence ; 
he begs and exhorts him, that, without offence 
to his feelings, he may either himself pass 
judgment on him [Dumnirix] after trying the 
case, or else order the [ A.duan] state to do so. 

Cuap. XX.— Divitidcus, embracing Cesar, 
begins to implore him, with many tears, that 
‘he would not pass any very severe sentence 
upon his brother; saying, that he knows that 
those [charges] are true, and that nobody 
suifered more pain on that account than he 
himself did; for when he himself could effect 
a very great deal by his influence at home 
and in the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] 
very little on account of his youth, the latter 
had become powerful through his means, 
which power and strength he used not only to 
the lessening of his [Divitacus’] popularity, 
but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was 
influenced both by fraternal affection and by 
public opinion. But if anything very severe 
from Ceesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no 


22 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


one would think that it had been done without 
his consent, since he himself held such a place 
in Ceesar’s friendship; from which circum- 
stance it would arise, that the affections of 
the whole of Gaul would be estranged from 
him.” As he was with tears begging these 
things of Cesar in many words, Cesar takes 
his right hand, and, comforting him, begs him 
tomake an end of entreating, and assures him 
that his regard for himis so great, that he for- 
gives both the injuries of the republic and his 
private wrongs, at his desire and prayers. 
He summons Dumnorix to him; he brings in 
his brother; he poiuts out what he censures in 
him; he lays before him what he of himself 
perceives, and what the state complains of ; 
he warns him for the future to avoid all 
grounds of suspicion; he says that he pardons 
the pust, for the sake of his brother, Divitia- 
cus. He sets spies over Dumnorix that he 
may be able to know what he does, and with 
whom he communicates. 

Cuap. XXI.—Being on the same day in- 
formed by his scouts, that the enemy had en- 
camped at the foot of a mountain eight miles 
from his own camp, he sent persons to ascer- 
tain what the nature of the mountain was, and 
of what kind the ascent on every side. Word 
was brought back, that it was easy. During 
the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his 
lieutenant with pretorian powers, to ascend ta 
the highest ridge of the mountain with two 
legions, and with those as guides who had ex- 
amined the road; he explains what his plan is. 


CAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 23 


He himself during the fourth watch hastens to 
them by the same route by which the enemy 
had gone, and sends on all the cavalry before 
him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to 
be very experienced in military affairs, and 
had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and 
afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent ° 
forward with the scouts. 

Cuap XXII.— At daybreak, when the 
summit of the mountain was in the possession 
of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not 
farther off than a mile and a half from the 
enemy's camp, nor, as he afterwards ascer- 
tained from the captives, had either his arrival 
or that of Labienus been discovered; Consi- 
dius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to 
him ; says that the mountain which he [Cesar] 
wished should be seized by Labienus, is in 
possession of the enemy; that he has discoy- 
ered this by the Gallic arms and ensigns. 
Cesar leads off his forces to the next hill, 
[and] draws them up in battle order. Labie- 
nus, as he had been ordered by Cesar not to 
_ come to an engagement unless [Ceesar’s] own 
forces were seen near the enemy’s camp, that 
the attack upon the enemy might be made on 
every side at the same time, was, after having 
taken possession of the mountain, waiting for 
our men, and refraining from battle. When, 
at length, the day was far advanced, Cesar 
learned through spies, that the mountain was 
in possession of his own men, and that the 
Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Con- 

sidius, struck with fear, had reported to him, 


24 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


us seen, that which he had not seen. On that 
day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, 
and pitches his camp three miles from theirs. 
Cuar. XXIII.— The next day, (as there 
remained in all only two days’ space [to the 
time] when he must serve out the corn to his: 
army, and as he was not more than eighteen 
miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and 
best-stored town of the /idui,) he thought 
that he ought to provide for a supply of corn ; 
and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and 
advanced rapidly to Bibracte. This circum- 
stance is reported to the enemy by some de- 
serters from Lucius i milius, a captain, of the 
Gallic horse. The Helvetii, either because 
they thought that the Romans, struck with ter- 
ror, were retreating from them, the more so. 
as the day before, though they had seized on 
the higher grounds, they had not joined battle, 
or because they flattered themselves that they 
might be cut off from the provisions, altering 
their plan and changing their route, began to 
pursue, and to annoy our men in the rear. 
Cuap. XXIV. —Cesar, when he observes 
this, draws off his forces to the next hill, and 
sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the 
enemy. He himself, meanwhile, drew up on 
the middle of the hill a triple line of his four 
veteran legions in such a manner, that he 
placed above him on the very summit the two 
legions, which he had lately levied in Hither 
Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered 
that the whole mountain should be covered 
with men, and that meanwhile the baggage 


CH4ISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 25 


should be brought together into one place, and 
the position be protected by those who were 
posted in the upper line. The Helvetii, hav- 
ing followed with all their wagons, collected 
their baggage into one place: they themselves, 
after having repulsed our cavalry and formed 
a@ phalanx, advanced up to our front line in 
very close order. 

Cuar. XXV.— Cesar, having removed out 
of sight first his own horse, then those of all, 
that he might make the danger of all equal, 
and do away with the hope of flight, after en- 
couraging his men, joined battle. His soldiers, 
hurling their javelins from the higher ground, 
easily broke the enemy’s phalanx. That being 
dispersed, they made a charge on them with 
drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to 
the Gauls in fighting, that, when several of 
their bucklers had been by one stroke of the 
(Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned 
fast together, as the point of the iron had bent 
itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with 
their left hand entangled, fight with sufticient 
_ ease; so that many, after having long tossed 
their arm about, chose rather to cast away the 
buckler from their hand, and to fight with their 
person unprotected. At length, worn outwith 
wounds, they began to give way, and, as there 
was in the neighborhood a mountain about a 
mile off, to betake themselves thither. When 
the mountain had been gained, and our men 
were advancing up, the Boii and Tulingi, who 
with about 15,000 men closed the enemy’s 
line of march and served as a guard to their 


26 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES, - 


rear, having assailed our men on the exposed 
flank as they advanced [prepared ]| to surround 
them; upon seeing which, the Helvetii, who 
had betaken themselves to the mountain, began 
to press on again and renew the battle. he 
Romans having faced about, advanced to the 
attack in two divisions: the first and second 
line, to withstand those who had been defeated 
and driven off the field; the third tv receive 
those who were just arriving. 

Cuar. XXVI.— Thus was the contest long 
and vigorously carried on with doubtful suc- 
cess. When they could no longer withstand 
the attacks of our men, the one division, as 
they had begun to do, betook themselves to 
the mountain; the other repaired to their bag- 
gage and wagons. For during the whole of 
this battle, although the fight lasted from the 
seventh hour [7/. e., 12 (noon) —1P. m.] to 
eventide, no one could see an emeny with 
his back turned. The fight was carried on 
also at the baggage till late in the night, for 
they had set wagons in the way as a rampart, 
and from the higher ground kept throwing 
weapons upon our men, as they came on, and 
some from between the wagons and the 
wheels kept darting their lances and javelins 
from beneath, and wounding our men. After 
the fight had lasted some time, our men gained 
possession of their baggage and camp. There 
the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix 
were taken. After that battle about 130,000 
men [of the enemy] remained alive, who 
marched incessantly during the whole of that 


CHiSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 27 


night ; and after a march discontinued. for no 
part of the night, arrived in the territories of 
the Lingones on the fourth day, whilst our 
men, having stopped for three days, both on 
account of the wounds of the soldiers and the 
burial of the slain, had not been able to follow 
them. Cesar sent letters and messengers to 
the Lingones [with orders] that they should 
not assist them with corn or with anything 
else; for that if they should assist them, he 
would regard them in the same light as the 
Helvetii. After the three days’ interval he 
began to follow them himself with all his 
forces. 

Cuap. XXVII.—The Helvetii, compelled 
by the want of everything, sent ambassadors 
to him about a surrender. When these had 
met him on the way and had thrown them- 
selves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant 
tone had with tears sued for peace, and 
[when] he had ordered them to await his 
arrival in the place where they then were, 
they obeyed his commands. When Cesar 
- arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, 
their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to 
them. Whiist those things are being sought 
for and got together, after a night’s interval, 
about 6,000 men of that canton which is called 
the Verbigene, whether terrified by fear, lest, 
after delivering up their arms, they should 
suffer punishment, or else induced by the hope 
of safety, because they supposed that, amid so 
vast a multitude of those who had surrendered 
themselves, their flight might either be con- 


28 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


cealed or entirely overlooked, having at night. 
fall departed out of the camp of the Helvetii, 
hastened to the Rhine and the territories of the 
Germans. | 

Cuapr. XXVIII. — But when Cesar discov- 
ered this, he commanded those through whose 
territories they had gone, to seek them out and 
to bring them back again, if they meant to 
be acquitted before him; and consider them, 
when brought back, in the light of enemies ; he 
admitted all the rest to a surrender, upon their 
delivering up the hostages, arms, and desert- 
ers. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, 
and the Latobrigi to return to their territories 
from which they had come, and as there was 
at home nothing whereby they might support 
their hunger, all the productions of the earth 
having been destroyed, he commanded the 
Allobroges to let them have a plentiful supply 
of corn; and ordered them to rebuild the 
towns and villages which they had burnt. 
This he did, chiefly, on this account, because 
he was unwilling that the country, from which 
the Helvetii had departed, should be unten. 
anted, lest the Germans, who dwell on the 
other side of the Rhine, should, on account of 
the excellence of the lands, cross over from 
their own territories into those of the Helvetii, 
and become borderers upon the province of 
Gaul and the Allobréges. He granted the 
petition of the AZdui, that they might settle the 
Boii, in their own (7. e., in the Auduan) territo- 
ries, as these were known to be of distinguished 
valor, to whom they gave lands, and whom 


CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 29 


they afterwards admitted to the same state of 
rights and freedom as themselves. 

Cuip. XXIX.—JIn the camp of the Hel- 
vetii, lists were found, drawn up, in Greek 
characters, and were brought to Cesaz, in 
which an estimate had been drawn up, name 
by name, of the number which had gone forth 
from their country of those who were able to 
bear arms; and likewise the boys, the old 
men, and the women, separately. Of all which 
items the total was : — 


Of the Helvetii [lit. of the heads of the 


Helvetii] . ‘ 263,000 
APM La sis RN ey coe 5) ok 2 BE OOD 
CER OUTIFU Rr oro a eS OS ee Sih 14 000 
ESM AMR ACB Tce sd) es" vay) bee eter die 28-000 
RUN CR TOL Bare Prigiik ay ty oh ee ew ok eso B2{000 


The sum of all amounted to . . 368,000 


Out of these, such as could bear arms 
[amounted ] to about 92,000. When the census 
of those who returned home was taken, as 
Cesar had commanded, the number was found 
to be 110,000. 

Cuar. XXX.— When the war with the 
Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from 
almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, 
assembled to congratulate Cesar, [saying] 
that they were well aware, that, although he 
had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, 
for the old wrongs done by them to the Roman 
people, yet that circumstance had happered 
no less to the benefit of the land of Gaul than 
of the Roman people, because the Helvetii, 


30 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


while their affairs were most flourishing, had 
quitted their country with the design of making 
war upon the whole of Gaul, and seizing the 
government of it, and selecting, out of a great 
abundance, that spot for an abode which they 
should judge to be the most convenient and 
“most productive of all Gaul, and ho.d the rest 
of the states as tributaries. They requested 
that they might be allowed to proclaim an 
assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular 
day, and to do that with Csesar’s permission, 
[stating] that they had some things which, 
with the general consent, they wished to ask of 
him. This request having been granted, they 
appointed a day for the assembly, and ordained 
by an oath with each other, that no one should 
disclose [their deliberations] except those to 
whom this [office] should be assigned by the 
general assembly. 

Cuap. XXXI.— When that assembly was 
dismissed, the same chiefs of states, who had 
before been to Cesar, returned, and asked that 
they might be allowed to treat with him pri- 
vately (in secret) concerning the safety of 
themselves and of all. That request having 
been obtained, they all threw themselves in 
tears at Ceesar’s feet, [saying] that they no 
less begged and earnestly desired that what 
they might say should not be disclosed, than 
that they might obtain those things which they 
wished for; inasmuch as they saw, that, if a 
disclosure were made, they should be put to the 
greatest tortures. For these Divitiacus the 
/Eduan spoke and told him: — ‘‘ That thera — 


CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 31 


were two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the 
4Edui stood at the head of one of these, the 
Arverni of the other. After these had been 
violently strugg!ing with one another for the 
superiority for many years, it came to pass. 
that the Germans were called in for hire by 
the Arverni and the Sequani. That abovt 
15,000 of them [7. e., of the Germans] had 
at first crossed the Rhine: but after these 
wild and savage men had become enamoured 
of the lands and the refinement and the abun-. 
dance of the Gauls, more were brought over, 
that there were now as many as 120,000 of them 
in Gaul: that with these the A®dui and their 
dependants had repeatedly struggled in arms; 
that they had been routed, and had sustained 
a great calamity, — had lost all their nobility, 
all their senate, all their cavalry. And that 
broken by such engagements and calamities, 
although they had formerly been very power- 
ful in Gaul, both from their own valor and 
from the Roman people’s hospitality and friend- 
ship, they were now compelled to give the chief’ 

nobles of their state as hostages to the Sequani, 
_ and to bind their state by an oath, that they 
would neither demand hostages in return, nor 
supplicate aid from the Roman people, nor 
refuse to be forever under their sway and em- 
pire. ‘That he was the only one out of all the 
state of the Awdui, who could not be prevailed 
upon to take the oath or to give his children as. 
hostages. On that account he had fled from 
his state and had gone to the senate at Rome: 
to beseech aid, as he alone was, bound. neither: 


32 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


by oath nor hostages. But a worse thing had 
befallen the victorious Sequani than the yan- 
quished A¢dui, for Ariovistus, the king of the 
Germans, had settled in their territories, and 
had seized upon a third of their lind, which 
was the best in the whole of Gaul, and was 
now ordering them to depart from another 
third part, because a few months previously 
24,000 men of the Harides had come to him, 
for whom room and settlements must be pro- 
vided. The consequence would be, that in a 
few years they would all be driven from the 
territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would 
cross the Rhine; for neither must the land of 
Gaul be compared with the land of the Ger- 
mans, nor must the habit of living of the latter 
be put on a level with that of the former. 
Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner did 
he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle, 
which took place at Magetobria, than [he 
began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to de- 
mand as hostages the children of all the prin- 
cipal nobles, and wreak on them every kind of 
cruelty, if everything was not done at his nod 
or pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, 
and reckless man, and that his commands could 
no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid 
in Cesar and the Roman people, the Gauls 
must all do the same thing that the Helvetii 
have done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, 
and seek another dwelling place, other settle- 
ments remote from the Germans, and try 
whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If 
these things were to be disclosed to Ariovis- 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 33 


tus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that 
he would inflict the most severe punishment 
on all the hostages who are in his possession, 
[and says] that Czesar could, either by his own 
influence and by that of his army, or by his 
late victory, or by name of the Roman people, 
intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater 
number of Germans being brought over the 
Rhine, and could protect all Gaul from the 
outrages of Ariovistus.” 

Cuap. XXXII.— When this speech had 
been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were 
present began with loud lamentation to entreat 
assistance of Cesar. Czesar noticed that the 
Sequani were the only people of all who did 
none of those things which the others did, but, 
with their heads bowed down, gazed on the 
earth in sadness. Wondering what was the 
reason of this conduct, he inquired of them- 
selves. No reply did the Sequani make, but 
silently continued in the same sadness. When 
he had repeatedly inquired of them and could 
not elicit any answer at all, the same Divitia- 
cus the A<duan answered, that —‘‘ the lot of 
the Sequani was more wretched and grievous 
than that of the rest, on this account, because 
they alone durst not even in secret complain or 
supplicate aid ; and shuddered at the cruelty of 
Ariovistus [ even when | absent, justas if he were 
present; for, to the rest, despite of everything, 
there was an opportunity of flight given; but 
all tortures must be endured by the Sequani, 
who had admitted Ariovistus within their terri- 
tories, and whose towns were all in his power.” 


34 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Cuar. XXXIII.— Cesar, on being in. 
formed of these things, cheered the minds of 
the Gauls with his words, and promised that 
this affair should be an object of his concern, 
[saying] that he had great hopes that Ario- 
vistus, induced both by his kindness and his 
power, would put an end to his oppression. 
After delivering this speech, he dismissed the 
assembly ; and, besides those statements, many 
circumstances induced him to think that this 
affair ought to be considered and taken up by 
him; especially as he saw that the Aidui, 
styled [as they had been ] repeatedly by the sen- 
ate ‘* brethren” and ‘‘ kinsmen,” were held in 
the thraldom and dominion of the Germans, 
and understood that their hostages were with 
Ariovistus and the Sequani, which in so mighty 
an empire [as that] of the Roman people he 
considered very disgraceful to himself and the 
republic. That, moreover, the Germans should 
by degrees become accustomed to cross the 
Rhine, and that a great body of them should 
come into Gaul, he saw [would be] dangerous 
to the Roman people, and judged, that wild 
and savage men would not be likely to restrain 
themselves, after they had possessed them- 
selves of all Gaul, from going forth into the 
province and thence marching into Italy, (as 
the Cimbri and Teutones had done before them, ) 
particularly as the Rhone [ was the sole barrier 
that] separated the Sequani from our province. 
Against which events he thought he ought to 
provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, 
Ariovistus, for his part, had assumed to him- 


CLESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 35 


self such pride and arrogance, that he was felt 
to be quite insufferable. 

Cuap. XXXIV.— He therefore determined 
to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to demand 
of him to name some intermediate spot for a 
conference between the two, [saying] that he 
wished to treat with him on state business and 
matters of the highest importance to both of 
them. To this embassy Ariovistus replied, 
that if he himself had had need of anything 
from Ceesar, he would have gone to him; and 
that if Cesar wanted anything from him he 
ought to come to him. That, besides, neither 
dare he go without an army into those parts 
of Gaul which Cesar had possession of, nor 
could he, without great expense and trouble, 
draw his army together to one place; that to 
him, moreover, it appeared strange, what bus- 
iness either Cesar or the Roman people at all 
had in his own Gaul, which he had conquered 
in war. 

Cuap. XXXV.— When these answers were 
reported to Cesar, he sends ambassadors to 
him a second time with this message: ‘Since, 
after having been treated with so much kind- 
ness by himself and the Roman people, (as he 
had in his consulship [B. C. 59] been styled 
‘king and friend’ by the senate,) he makes 
this recompense to [Cesar] himself and the 
Roman people, [viz.] that when invited to a 
conference he demurs, and does not think that 
it concerns him to advise and inform himself 
about an object of mutual interest, these are 
the things which he requires of him; first, that 


36 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


he do not any more bring over any body of 
men across the Rhine into Gaul; in the next 
place, that he restore the hostages, which he 
has from the A®dui, and grant the Sequani - 
permission to restore to them with his consent 
those hostages which they have, and that he 
neither provoke the Acdui by outrage nor make 
war upon them or their allies; if he woula 
accordingly do this,” [Czesar says] that *: he 
himself and the Roman people will entertain a 
perpetual feeling of favor and friendship to- 
wards him; but that if he [Ceesar] does not 
obtain [his desires] that he (forasmuch as in 
the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus 
Piso [B. C. 61] the senate had decreed that, 
whoever should have the administration of the 
province of Gaul should, as far as he could do 
so consistently with the interests of the repub- 
lic, protect the A®dui and the other friends 
of the Roman people) will not overlook the 
wrongs of the dui.” 

Cuarp. XXXVI.—To this Ariovistus re- 
plied, that ‘‘the right of war was, that they 
who had conquered should govern those whom 
they had conquered, in what manner they 
pleased; that in that way the Roman people 
were wont to govern the nations which they 
had conquered, not according to the dictation 
of any other, but according to their own discre- 
tion. If he for his part did not dictate to the 
Roman people as to the manner in which they 
were to exercise their right, he ought not to be 
obstructed by the Roman people in his right; 
that the A<dui, inasmuch as they had tried the 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 37 


fortune of war and had engaged in arms and 
been conquered, had become tributaries to 
him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, 
in that by his arrival he was making his rev- 
enues less valuable to him; that he should not 
restore their hostages to the Aidui, but should 
not make war wrongfully either upon them or 
their allies, if they abode by that which had 
been agreed on, and paid their tribute an- 
nually : if they did not continue to do that, the 
Roman people’s name of ‘* brothers’ would 
avail them naught. As to Cesar’s threatening 
him that he would not overlook the wrongs of 
the ‘dui, [he said] that no one had ever 
entered into a contest with him [ Ariovistus | 
without utter ruin to himself. That Cesar 
might enter the lists when he chose; he would 
feel what the invincible Germans, well trained 
[as they were] beyond all others to arms, who 
for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof, 
could achieve by their valor.” 

Cuap. XXXVII.—At the same time that 
this message was delivered to Cesar, ambassa- 
dors came from the /AXdui and the Treviri; 
from the AXdui to complain that the Hartdes, 
who had lately been brought over into Gaul, 
were ravaging their territories; that they had 
not been able to purchase peace from Ariovis- 
tus, even by giving hostages: and from the 
Treviri, [to state] that a hundred cantons of 
the Suevi had encamped on the banks of the 
Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that 
the brothers, Nasuas and Cimberius, headed 
them. Being greatly alarmed at these things, 


38 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. - 


Cesar thought that he ought to use all de. 
spatch, lest, if this new band of Suevi should 
unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he © 
[ Ariovistus] might be less easily withstood. — 
Having, therefore, as quickly as he could. pro- 
vided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ario- 
vistus by forced marches. 

Cuap. XX XVIII. — When he had proceeded 
three days’ journey, word was brought to him 
that Ariovistus was hastening with all his 
forces to seize on Vesontio, which is the largest 
town of the Sequani, and had advanced three 
days’ journey from his territories. Ceesar 
thought that he ought to take the greatest pre- 
cautions lest this should happen, for there was 
in that town a most ample supply of every- 
thing which was serviceable for war; and so 
fortified was it by the nature of the ground, 
as to afford a great facility for protracting the 
war, inasmuch as the river Doubs almost sur- 
rounds the whole town, as though it were traced 
round it with a pair of compasses. A moun- 
tain of great height shuts in the remaining 
space, which is not more than 600 feet, where 
the river leaves a gap, in such a manner that 
the roots of that mountain extend to the 
river’s bank on either side. A wall thrown 
around it makes a citadel of this [mountain], 
and connects it with the town. Hither Cesar — 
hastens by forced marches by night and day, © 
and, after having seized the town, stations a 
garrison there. 

Cuap. XXXIX. — Whilst he is tarrying a 
few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and 


CHSAR'S COMMENTARIES. 39 


provisions, from the inquiries of our men and 
the reports of the Gauls and traders, (who 
asserted that the Germans were men of huge 
stature, of incredible valor and practice in 
arms; that ofttimes they, on encountering 
them, could not bear even their countenance, 
and the fierceness of their eyes,) so great a 
panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as 
to discompose the minds and spirits of all in 
no slight degree. ‘This first arose from the 
tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the 
rest, who, having followed Cesar from the city 
[Rome] from motives of friendship, had no 
great experience in military affairs. And al- 
leging, some of them one reason, some another, 
which they said made it necessary for them to 
depart, they requested that by his consent 
they might be allowed to withdraw ; some, influ- 
enced by shame, stayed behind in order that 
they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. 
These could neither compose their counte- 
nance, nor even sometimes check their tears; 
‘but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their 
fate, or deplored with their comrades the gen- 
eral danger. Wills were sealed universally 
throughout the whole camp. By the expres- 
sions and cowardice of these men, even those 
who possessed great experience in the camp, 
both soldiers and centurions, and those [the 
decurions] who were in command of the cay- 
alry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of 
them as wished to be considered less alarmed, 
said that they did not dread the enemy, but 
feared the narrowness of the roads and the 


40 CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


vastness of the forests which lay between 
them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies 
could not be brought up readily enough. 
Some even declared to Cesar, that when he 
gave orders for the camp to be moved and — 
the troops to advance, the soldiers would 
not be obedient to the command, nor advance 
in consequence of their fear. 

Cuar. XL.— When Cesar observed these 
things, having: called a council, and sum- 
moned to it the centurions of all the companies, 
he severely reprimanded them, ‘ particularly, 
for supposing that it belonged to them to in- 
quire or conjecture, either in what direction 
they were marching, or with what object. 
That Ariovistus, during his [Czesar’s] consul- 
ship, had most anxiously sought after the 
friendship of the Roman people; why should 
any one judge that he would so rashly depart 
from his duty? He for his part was per- 
suaded, that, when his demands were known 
and the fairness of the terms considered, he 
would reject neither his nor the Roman 
people’s favor. But even if, driven on by 
rage and madness, he should make war upon 
them, what after all were they afraid of? or 
why should they despair either of their own 
valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial 
had been made within our fathers’ recollection, 
when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and Teu- 
tones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded 
as having deserved no less praise than their 
commander himself. It had been made lately, 
too, in Italy,during the rebellion of the slaves, 


é 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 4a] 


whom, however, the experience and training 
which they had received from us assisted 
in some respect. From which a judgment 
might be formed of the advantages which res- 
olution carries with it; inasmuch as_ those 
whom for some time they had groundlessly 
dreaded when unarmed, they had afterwards 
vanquished, when well armed and flushed with 
success. In short, that these were the same 
men whom the Helvetii, in frequent encoun- 
ters, not only in their own territories, but also 
in theirs [the German], have generally van- 
quished, and yet cannot have been a match 
for ourarmy. If the unsuccessful battle and 
flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if 
they made inquiries, might discover that, when 
the Gauls had been tired out by the long dura- 
tion of the war, Ariovistus, after he had 
many months kept himself in his camp and 
in the marshes, and had given no opportunity 
for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, 
by this time despairing of a battle. and scat- 
tered in all directions, and was victorious more 
through stratagem and cunning than valor. 
But theugh there had been room for such 
stratagem against savage and unskilled men, 
not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that 
thereby our armies could be entrapped. That 
those who ascribed their fear to a pretence 
about the [deficiency of] supplies and the nar- 
rowness of the roads, acted presumptuously, as 
they seemed either to distrust their general’s 
discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. 
That these things were his concern; that the 


42 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to 
furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe 
in the fields; that as to the road they would 
soon be able to judge for themselves. As to 
its being reported that the soldiers would not 
be obedient to command, or advance, he was 
not at all disturbed at that; for he knew, that 
in the case of all those whose army had not 
been obedient to command, either upon some 
mismanagement of an affair, fortune had de- 
serted them, or, that upon some crime be- 
ing discovered, covetousness had been clearly 
proved [against them]. His integrity had 
been seen throughout his whole life, his good 
fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That 
he would therefore instantly set about what he 
had intended to put off till a more distant day, 
and would break up his camp the next night, 
in the fourth watch, that he might ascertain, 
as soon as possible, whether a sense of honor 
and duty, or whether fear had more influence 
with them. But that, if no one else should 
follow, yet he would go with only the tenth 
legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it 
should be his pretorian cohort.’’ — This legion 
Ceesar had both greatly favored, and in it, on 
account of its valor, placed the greatest confi- 
dence. 

Cuap. XLI.— Upon the delivery of this 
speech, the minds of all were changed in a 
surprising manner, and the highest ardor and 
eagerness for prosecuting the war were engen- 
dered; and the tenth legion was the first to 
return thanks to him, through their military 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 43 


tribunes, for his having expressed this most 
favorable opinion of them; and assured him 
that they were quite ready to prosecute the 
war. Then, the other legions endeavored, 
through their military tribunes and the centu- 
rions of the principal companies, to excuse 
themselves to Cesar, [saying] that they had 
never either doubted or feared, or supposed 
that the determination of the conduct of the 
war was theirs and not their general’s. Havy- 
ing accepted their excuse, and having had the 
road carefully recennoitred by Divitiacus, 
because in him of all otbers he had the greatest 
faith, [he found] that by a circuitous route of 
more than fifty miles he might lead his army 
through open parts; he then set out in the 
fourth watch, as he had said [he would]. On 
the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his 
march, he was informed by scouts that the 
forces of Ariovistus were only four-and-twenty 
miles distant from ours. 

Cuap. XLII. —Upon being apprised of 
Ceesar’s arrival, Ariovistus sends ambassadors 
. to him, [saying] that what he had before 
requested as toa conference, might now, as 
far as his permission went, take place, since 
he [Cesar] had approached nearer, and he 
considered that he might, now do it without 
danger. Cesar did not reject the proposal, 
and began to think that he was now returning 
to a rational state of mind, as he spontane- 
ously proffered that which he had previously 
refused to him when requesting it; and was in 
great hopes that, in consideration of his own 


44 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


and the Roman people’s great favors towards 
him, the issue would be that he would desist 
from his obstinacy upon his demands being 
made known. The fifth day after that was 
appointed as the day of conference. Mean- 
while, as ambassadors were being often sent 
to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded 
that Cesar should not bring any foot-soldier 
with him to the conference, [saying] that ‘the 
was afraid of being ensnared by him through 
treachery; that both should come accompa- 
nied by cavalry; that he would not come on 
any other condition.” Cesar, as he neither 
wished that the conference should, by an 
excuse thrown in the way, be set aside, nor 
durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, 
decided that it would be most expedient to 
take away from the Gallic cavalry all their 
horses, and thereon to mount the legionary 
soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he placed 
the greatest confidence ; in order that he might 
have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, 
should there be any need for action. And 
when this was done, one of the soldiers of the 
tenth legion said, not without a touch of 
humor, ‘‘ that Cesar did more for them than 
he had promised ; he had promised to have the 
tenth legion in place of his pretorian cohort ; 
but he now converted them into horse.” 

Cuap. XLIII.— There was a large plain, 
and in it a mound of earth of considerable 
size. This spot was at nearly an equal dis- 
tance from both camps. Thither, as had been 
appointed, they came for the conference. 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 45 


Cesar stationed the legion, which he had 
brought [with him] on horseback, 200 paces 
from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus 
also took their stand at an. equal distance. 
Ariovistus then demanded, that they should 
confer on horseback, and that, besides them- 
selves, they should bring with them ten men 
each to the conference. When they were 
come to the place, Cesar, in the opening of 
his speech, detailed his own and the senate’s 
favors towards him [Ariovistus], ‘‘in that 
he had been styled king, in that [he had been 
_styled] friend, by the senate, in that very 
considerable presents had been sent him; 
which circumstance he informed him had both 
fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been 
bestowed in consideration of important per- 
sonal services; that he, although he had 
neither an introduction, nor a just ground 
for the request, had obtained these honors 
through the kindness and munificence of him- 
self [Czesar] and the senate. He informed 
him too, how old and how just were the grounds 
of connection that existed between themselves 
[the Romans] and the A&dui, what decrees 
of the senate had been passed in their favor, 
and how frequent and how honorable; how 
from time immemorial the A¢dui had _ held 
the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even 
[said Cesar] before they had sought our 
friendship ; that it was the custom of the Ro- 
man people to desire not only that its allies 
and friends should lose none of their property, 
but be advanced in influence, dignity, and 


46 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


honor; who then could endure that what they 
had brought with them to the friendship of the 
Roman people, should be torn from them?” 
He then made the same demands which he had 
commissioned the ambassadors to make, that 
[ Ariovistus] should not make war _ either 
upon the AZdui or their allies, that he should 
restore the hostages; that, if he could not 
send back to their country any part of the 
Germans, he should at all events suffer none 
of them any more to cross the Rhine. 

Cuap. XLIV.—Ariovistus replied briefly 
to the demands of Cesar; but expatiated 
largely on his own virtues, ‘‘that he had 
crossed the Rhine not of his own accord, but 
on being invited and sent for by the Gauls; 
tnat he had not left home and kindred without 
great expectations and great rewards; that he 
had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls 
themselves; that the hostages had been given 
by their own good-will; that he took by right 
of war the tribute which conquerors are accus- 
tomed to impose on the conquered; that he 
had not made war upon the Gauls, but the 
Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul 
came to attack him, and had encamped against 
him; that all their forces had been routed and 
beaten by him in a single battle; that if they 
chose to make a second trial, he was ready to 
encounter them again; but if they chose to 
enjoy peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute, 
which of their own free will they had paid up 
to that time. That the friendship of the Ro- 
man people ought to prove to him an orna- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 47 


ment and a safeguard, not a detriment; and 
that he sought it with that expectation. But 
if through the Roman people the tribute was 
to be discontinued, and those who surrendered 
to be seduced from him, he would renounce 
the friendship of the Roman people no less 
heartily than he had sought it. As to his 
leading over a host of Germans into Gaul, 
that he was doing this with a view of securing: 
himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was 
evidence of this, in that he did not coine with- 
out being invited, and in that he did not make 
war, but merely warded it off. That he had 
come into Gaul before the Roman people. 
That never before this time did a Roman army 
go beyond the frontiers of the province of 
Gaul. What [said he] does [Cxsar] desire? 
—why come into his | Ariovistus’s] domains? 
—that this was his province of Gaul, just 
as that is ours. As it ought not to be 
pardoned in him, if he were to make an 
attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that. 
we were unjust, to obstruct him in his preroga- 
_ tive. As for Ceesar’s saying that the AXdui 
had been styled ‘ brethren’ by the senate, he 
was not so uncivilized nor so ignorant of 
affairs, as not to know that the A©dui in the 
very last war with the Allobréges had neither 
rendered assistance tc the Romans, nor re- 
ceived any from the Roman peopie in the 
struggles which the dui had been maintaining 
with him and with the Sequani. He must feel 
suspicious, that Cesar, though feigning friend- 
ship as the reason for his keeping an army in 


48 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Gaul, was keeping it with a view of crushing 
him. And that unless he depart and withdraw 
his army from these parts, he shail regard him 
not as a friend, but as a foe; and that, even if 
he should put him to death, he should do what 
would please many of the nobles and leading 
men of the Roman people; he had assurance 
of that from themselves through their messen- 
gers, and could purchase the favor and the 
friendship of them all by his [Casar’s] death. 
But if he would depart and resign to him the 
free possession of Gaul, he would recompense 
him with a great reward, and would bring to a 
close whatever wars he wished to be carried 
on, without any trouble or risk to him.” * 

Cuar. XLV.— Many things were stated 
by Cesar to the effect [to show]: ‘‘ why he 
could not waive the business, and that neither 
his nor the Roman people’s practice would suf- 
fer him to abandon most meritorious allies, nor 
did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus 
rather than to the Roman people; that the 
Arverni and the Ruténi had been subdued in 
war by Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the 
Roman people had pardoned them and had not 
reduced them into a province or imposed a 
tribute upon them. And if the most ancient 
period was to be regarded, then was the soy- 
ereignty of the Roman people in Gaul most 
just: if the decree of the senate was to be 
observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which 
they [the Romans] had conquered in war, and 
had permitted to enjoy its own laws.” 

Cuap. XLVI.— While these things are 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 49 


being transacted in the conference, it was 
announced to Cesar that the cavalry of Ario- 
vistus were approaching nearer the mound, 
and were riding up to our men, and casting 
stones and weapons at them. Cesar made an 
end of his speech and betook himself to his 
men; and commanded them that they should 
by no means return a weapon upon the enemy. 
For though he saw that an en2agement with 
the cavalry would be without any danger to his 
chosen legion, yet he did not think proper to en- 
gage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might 
be said that they had been ensnared by him 
under the sanction of a conference. When it 
was spread abroad among the common soldiery 
with what haughtin.-ss Ariovistus had behaved 
at the conference, and how he had ordered the 
Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had 
made an attack upon our men, and how this 
had broken off the conference, a much greater 
alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused 
into our army. 

Cuapr. XLVII.— Two days after, Ariovis- 
tus sends ambassadors to Cesar, to state 
‘¢ that he wished to treat with him about those 
things which had been begun to be treated of 
between them, but had not been concluded ” ; 
[and to beg] that ‘‘he would either again 
appoint a day for a conference ; or, if he were 
not willing to do that, that he would send one 
of his [officers] as an ambassador to him.” 
There did not appear to Czesar any good rea- 
son for holding a conference; and the more 
so as the day before the Germans could not 


\ 


50 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


be restrained from casting weapons at our 
men. He thought he should not without great 
danger send to him as ambassador one of his 


[Roman] officers, and should expose him to— 


Savage men. It seemed [therefore] most 
proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, 
the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man 
of the highest courage and accomplishments 
(whose father had been presented with the 
freedom of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus), 
both on account of his fidelity and on account 
of his knowledge of the Gallic language, 
which Ariovistus, by long practice, now spoke 
fluently ; and because in his case the Germans 
would have no motive for committing violence ; 
and [as his colleague] M. Mettius, who had 
shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He 
commissioned them to learn what Ariovistus 
had to say, and to report to him. But when 
Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, 
he cried out in the presence of his army, 
‘¢ Why were they come to him? was it for the 
purpose of acting as spies?” He stopped 
them when attempting to speak, and cast 
them into chains. 

Cuar. XLVIIT.— The same day he moved 
his camp forward and pitched under a hill six 
miles from Ceesar’s camp. ‘The day following 
he led his forces past Cesar’s camp, and 
encamped two miles beyond him; with this 
design, —that he might cut off Ceasar from 
the corn and provisions, which might be con- 
veyed to him from the Sequani and the A¢dui. 
For five successive days from that day, Cesar 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 51 


drew out his forces before the camp, and put 
them in battle order, that, if Ariovistus should 
be willing to engage in battle, an opportunity 
might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all 
this time kept his army in camp: but engaged 
daily in cavalry skirmishes. The method of 
battle in which the Germans had practised 
themselves was this. There were 6,000 horse, 
and as many very active and courageous foot, 
one of whom each of the horse selected out of 
the whole army for his own protection. By 
these [foot] they were constantly accompanied 
in their engagements; to these the horse 
retired ; these on any emergency rushed for- 
ward ; if any one, upon receiving a very severe 
wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood 
around him: if it was necessary to advance 
farther than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, 
so great, from practice, was their swiftness, 
that, supported by the manes of the horses, 
they could keep pace with their speed. 

Cuap. XLIX.— Perceiving that Ariovistus 
kept himself in camp, Cesar, that he might 
- not any longer be cut off from provisions, 
chose a convenient position for a camp beyond 
that place in which the Germans had encamped, 
at about 600 paces from them, and having 
drawn up his army in three lines, marched to 
that place. He ordered the first anil second 
lines to be under arms ; the third to fortify the 
camp. This place was distant from the enemy 
about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither 
Ariovistus sent light troops, about 16.0U0 men 
in number, with all his cavalry ; which forces 


52 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


were to intimidate our men. and hinder them 
in their fortification. Ceesar nevertheless, as 
he had before arranged, ordered two lines to 
drive off the enemy: the third to execute the — 
work. The camp being fortified, he left there 
two legions and a portion of the auxiliaries ; 
and led back the other four legions into the 
larger camp. 

Cuap. L.— The next day, according to his 
custom, Cesar led out his forces from both 
camps, and having advanced a little from the 
larger one, drew up his line of battle, and gave 
the enemy an opportunity of fighting. When 
he found that they did not even then come out 
[from their intrenchments], he led back his 
army into camp about noon. Then at last 
Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the 
lesser camp. The battle was vigorously main- 
tained on both sides till the evening. At sun- 
set, after many wounds had been inflicted and 
received, Ariovistus led back his forces into 
cainp. When Ceesar inquired of his prisoners, 
wherefore Ariovistus did not come to an en- 
gagement, he discovered this to be the reason : 
that among the Germans it was the custom 
for their matrons to pronounce from lots and 
divination, whether it were expedient that the 
battle should be engaged in or not; that they 
had said, ‘* that it was not the will of heaven 
that the Germans should conquer, if they 
engaged in buttle before the new moon.” 

Cuap. LI. — The day following, Cesar left 
what seemed sufficient as a guard for both 
camps ; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries 


CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 53 


in sight of the enemy, before the lesser camp, 
because he was not very powerful in the num- 
ber of legionary soldiers, considering the num- 
ber of the enemy; that [thereby] he might 
make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. 
He himself, having drawn up his army in 
three lines, advanced to the camp of the enemy. 
Then at last of necessity the Germans drew 
their forces out of camp, and disposed them 
canton by canton, at equal distances, the 
Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, 
Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi ; and surrounded their 
whole army with their chariots and wagons, 
that no hope might be left in flight. On these 
they placed their women, who, with dishevelled 
hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as 
they went forward to battle, not to deliver 
them into slavery to the Romans. 

Cuap. LII.—Cesar appointed over each 
legion a lieutenant and a questor, that every 
one might have them as witnesses of his valor. 
He himself began the battle at the head of the 
right wing, because he had observed that part 
_ of the enemy to be the least strong. Accord- 
ingly our men, upon the signal being given, 
vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, 
and the enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed 
forward, that there was no time for casting the 
javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore ] 
their javelins, they fought with swords hand 
tohand. But the Germans, according to their 
custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained 
the attack of our swords. There were found 
very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the 


Nie 


54 CHSan’S COMMENTARIES. 


phalanx, and with their hands tore away the 
Shields, and wounded the enemy from above. 
Although the army of the enemy was routed 
on the left wing and put to flight, they [still] 
pressed heavily on our men from the right wing, 
by the great number of their troops. On 
observing which, P. Crassus, a young man, 
who commanded the cavalry, —as he was more 
disengaged than those who were employed in 
the fight,—sent the third line as a relief to 
our men who were in distress. 

Cuap. LIII.— Thereupon the engagement 
was renewed, and all the enemy turned their 
backs, nor did they cease to fiee until they 
arrived at the river Rhine, about fifty miles 
from that place. There some few, either rely- 
ing on their strength, endeavored to swim 
over, or. finding boats, procured their safety. 
Among the latter was Ariovistus, who, meeting 
with a small vessel tied to the bank, escaped 
in it: our horse pursued and slew all the rest 
of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a 
Suevan by nation, whom he had brought with 
him from home; the other a Norican, the sister 
of King Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, 
she having been sent [thither for that purpose ] 
by her brother. Both perished in that flight. 
_ Of their two daughters, one was slain, the other 

captured. C. Valerius Procillus, as he was 
being dragged by his guards in the flight, 
bound with a triple chain, fell into the hands of 
Cesar himself, as he was pursuing the enemy 
with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed 
uiforded Ceesar no less pleasure than the victory 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 55 


itself ; because he saw a man of the first rank 
in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaint- 
ance and friend, rescued from the hand of the 
enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune 
had not diminished aught of the joy and exul- 
tation [of that day] by his destruction. He 
[ Procillus] said that, in his own presence, the 
lots had been thrice consulted respecting him, 
whether he should immediately be put to death 
by fire, or be reserved for another time: that 
by the favor of the lots he was uninjured. 
M. Mettius, also, was found and brought back 
to him [Ceesar ]. 

Cuap. LIV. — This battle having been re- 
ported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had 
come to the banks of that river, began to 
return home, when the Ubii, who dwelt near- 
est to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much 
alarmed, slew agreatnumber of them. Cesar 
having concluded two very important wars in 
one campaign, conducted his army into winter 
quarters among the Sequani, a little earlier than 
the season of the year required. He appointed 
Labienus over the winter quarters, and set out 
in person for Hither Gaul to hold the assizes. 


56 CASAR'S COMMENTARIES. 


BOOK II. 


THE ARGUMENT. 


I. The Belge, from various motives, enter into a confederacy 
against the Roman people.—II. Ceesar, having received in- 
telligence of it, proceeds against them. — III., 1V. The Remi 
submit to Cesar, and give him information respecting the 
other Belge. — V. He crosses the 1iver Aisne and encamps 
beyond it.— VI., VII. The attack on Bibrax by the Belge, 
and its relief by the Romans. — VIII.-X. State of affairs be- 
tween the Romans and the Belge.— XI. The Bellovaci, 
withdrawing from the warfare to return home, are pursued 
by the Romans and suffer severely.— XII. Cesar proceeds 
against the SuessiOnes.— XIIi. Then against the Bellovici, 
and receives the surrender of both.— XIV. Divitiicus pleads 
in behalf of the Bellovaci.— XV. Ceesar’s reply ; the charac- 
ter of the Nervii.— XVI.-XXIII. Engagements with them; a 
peculiarity in their mode of warfare; their extraordinary 
courage; they are finally subdued.— XXIX. The Aduatici. 
—XXX. Their ridicule of the Roman engineering. —XXXI. 
Their pretended submission to the Romans.— XXXII. Ca: 
sar’s reply to their embassy.— XXXIII. Their treachery and 
overthrow.— XXXIV. P. Crassus announces that several 
nations had submitted to the Roman power.—XXXV. Oz- 
sar returns to Italy ; a solemn thanksgiving is decreed by the 
senate. ‘ 


Cuap. I.— While Cesar was in winte1 
quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown 
above, frequent reports were brought to him, 
and he was also informed by letters from La- 
bienus, that all the Belgze, who we have said 
are a third part of Gaul, were entering intoa 
confederacy against the Roman people, and 
giving hostages to one another; that the rea- 
sons of the confederacy were these — first, 
because they feared that, after all [Celtic] 
Gaul was subdued, our army would be led 
against them ; secondly, because they were in- 


CHISAR’?S COMMENTARIES. 57 


stigated by several of the Gauls, some of whom 
as [on the one hand] they had been unwilling 
that the Germans should remain any longer in 
Gaul, so [on the other] they were dissatisfied 
that the army of the Roman people should pass 
the winter in it, and settle there; and others 
of them, from a natural instability and fickle- 
ness of disposition, were anxious for a revolu: 
tion’; [the Belgze were instigated] by several, 
also, because the government in Gaul was gen- 
erally seized upon by the more powerful per- 
sons and by those who had the means of hir- 
ing troops, and they could less easily effect 
this object under our dominion. 

Cuar. II. — Alarmed by these tidings and 
letters, Cesar levied two new legions in 
Hither Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, 
sent Q. Pedius, his lieutenant, to conduct them 
farther into Gaul. He himself, as soon as 
there began to be plenty of forage, came to 
the army. He gives a commission to the Sen- 
ones and the other Gauls who were neighbors 
of the Belge, to learn what is going on 
amongst them [7. e., the Belge], and inform 
him of these matters. These all uniformly 
reported that troops were being raised, and 
that an army was being collected in one place. 
Then, indeed, he thought that he ought not to 
hesitate about proceeding towards them, and 
having provided supplies, moves his camp, and 
in about fifteen days arrives at the territories 
of the Belge. 

Cuar. III. — As he arrived there unexpect- 
edly and sooner than any one anticipated, the 


58 CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Remi, who are the nearest of the Belge ta 
[Celtic] Gaul. sent to him Iccius and Ante- 
brogius, [two of] the principal persons of the 


state, as their smbassadors: to tell him that — 


they surrendered themselves and all their pos- 
sessions to the protection and disposal of the 
Roman people ; and that they had neither com- 
bined with the rest of the Belge, nor entered 
into any confederacy against the Roman ‘peo- 
ple; and were prepared to give hostages, to 
obey his commands, to receive him into their 
towns, and to aid him with corn and other 
things ; that all the rest of the Belgee were in 
arms; and that the Germans, who dwell on 
this side the Rhine, had joined themselves to 
them ; and that so great was the infatuation of 
them all, that they could not restrain even the 
Suessiones, their own brethren and kinsmen, 
who enjoy the same rights, and the same laws, 
and who have one government and one ma- 
gistracy [in common] with themselves, from 
uniting with them. 

Cuap. IV.— When Cesar inquired of them 
what states were in arms, how powerful they 
were, and what they could do in war. he 
received the following information: that the 
greater part of the Belgse were sprung from 
the Germans, and that having crossed the 
Rhine at an early period, they had settled 
there, on account of the fertility of the coun- 
try, and had driven out the Gauls who inhab- 
ited those regions; and that they were the 
only people who, in the memory of our fathers, 
when all Gaul was overrun, had prevented 


A ciel she Sg ah i aaa tg Z 


hee * By 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 59 


the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering 
their territories; the effect of which was, 
that, from the recollection of those events, 
they assume to themselves great authority 
and haughtiness in military matters. The 
Remi said, that they had known accurately 
everything respecting their number, because, 
being united to them by neighborhood and by 
alliances, they kad learnt what number each 
state had in the general council of the Belgz 
promised for that war. That the Bellovaci 
were the most powerful amongst them in valor, 
influence, and number of men; that these 
could muster 100,000 armed men [and had] 
promised 60,000 picked men out of that num- 
ber, and demanded for themselves the com- 
mand of the whole war. ‘That the Suessiones 
were their nearest neighbors and possessed 
a very extensive and fertile country; that 
among them, even in our own memory, Divi- 
tiacus, the most powerful man of ali Gaul, 
had been king; who had held the government 
of a great part of these regions, as well as of 
Britain ; that their king at present was Galba ; 
that the direction of the whole war was con. 
ferred, by the consent of all, upon him, on 
account of his integrity and prudence; that 
they had twelve towns; that they had prom- 
ised 50,000 armed men; and that the Nervii, 
who are reckoned the most warlike among 
them, and are situated ata very great distance, 
[had promised] as many; the Atrébates, 
15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 
25,000; the Menapii, 9,000; the Caléti, 


60 CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


10,000; the Velocasses and the Veromandu 
as many; the Aduatici, 19,000 ; that the Con- 
drusi, the Eburodnes, the Ceereesi, the Peemani, 
who are called by the common name of Ger- 
mans, [had promised], they thought, to the 
number of 40,000. 

Cuar V.— Cesar, having encouraged the 
Remi, and addressed them courteously, ordered 
the whole senate to assemble before him, and 
the children of their chief men to be brought 
to him as hostages; all which commands they 
punctually performed by the day [appointed]. 
He, addressing himself to Divitidcus, the 
/Eduan, with great earnestness, points out 
how much it concerns the republic and their 
common security, that the forces of the enemy 
should ‘be divided, so that it might not be 
necessary to engage with so large a number 
at one time. [He asserts] that this might be 
effected if the A%dui would lead their forces 
into the territories of the Bellovaci, and begin 
to lay waste their country. With these 
instructions he dismissed him from his pres- 
ence. After he perceived that all the forces 
of the Belgze, which had been collected in one 
place, were approaching towards him, and 
learnt from the scouts whom he had sent out, 
and [also] learnt from the Remi, that they 
were not then far distant, he hastened to lead 
his army over the Aisne. which is on the bor- 
ders of the Remi, and there pitched his camp. 
This position fortified one side of his camp by 
the banks of the river, rendered the country 
which lay in his rear secure from the enemy, 


CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 61 


and furthermore insured that provisions might 
without danger be brought to him by the Remi 
and the rest of the states. Over that river 
was a bridge: there he places a guard; and 
on the other side of the river he leaves 
Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with six 
cohorts. He orders him to fortify a camp 
with a rampart twelve feet in height, and a 
trench eighteen feet in breadth. 

Cuar. VI. — There was a town of the 
Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant 
from this camp. This the Belg on their 
march began to attack with great vigor. [The 
assault] was with difficulty sustained for that 
day. The Gauls’ mode of besieging is the 
same as that of the Belg: when after having 
drawn a large number of men around the 
whole of the fortifications, stones have begun 
to be cast against the wall on all sides, and 
the wall has been stript of its defenders, 
[then], forming a testudo, they advance to 
the gates and undermine the wall: which was 
easily effected on this occasion; for while so 
large a number were casting stones and darts, 
- no one was able to maintain his position upon 
the wall. When night had put an end to the 
assault, Iccius, who was then in command of 
the town, one of the Remi, a man of the high- 
est rank and influence amongst his people, and 
one of those who had come to Cesar as ambas- 
sador [to sue] for a peace, sends messengers 
to him, [to report] ‘‘ That, unless assistance 
were sent to him, he could not hold out any 
longer.” 


62 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Cuap. VII. — Thither, immediately after 
midnight, Cesar, using as guides the same 
persons who had come to him as messengers 
from Iccius, sends some Numidian and Cre- 
tan archers and some Balearian slingers as a 
relief to the towns-people, by whose arrival 
both a desire to resist, together with the hope 
of [making good their] defence, was infused 
into the Remi, and, for the same reason, the 
hope of gaining the town abandoned the 
enemy. ‘Therefore, after staying a short time 
before the town, and laying waste the country 
of the Remi, when all the villages and build- 
ings which they could approach had been 
burnt, they hastencd with all their forces to 
the camp of Ceesar, and encamped within less 
than two miles [of it]; and their camp, as was 
indicated by the smoke and fires, extended 
more than eight miles in breadth. 

Cuap. VIII. — Cesar at first determined to 
decline a battle, as well on account of the 
oreat number of the enemy as their distin- 
guished reputation for’valor: daily, however, 
in cavalry actions, he strove to ascertain, by 
frequent trials, what the enemy could effect 
by their prowess and what our men would dare. 
When he perceived that our men were not 
inferior, as the place before the camp was nat- 
urally convenient and suitable for marshalling 
an army, (since the hill where the camp was 
pitched, rising gradually from the plain, 
extended forward in breadth as far as the 
space which the marshalled army could occupy, 
and had steep declines of its side in eithes 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 63 


direction, and gently sloping in front gradu- 
ally sank to the plain;) on either side of that 
hill he drew a cross trench of about four hun- 
dred paces, and at the extremities of that 
trench built forts, and placed there his mili- 
tary engines, lest, after he had marshalled his 
army, the enemy, since they were so powerful 
in point of number, should be able to surround 
his men in the flank, while fighting. After 
doing this, and leaving in the camp the two 
legions which he had last raised, that, if there 
should be any occasion, they might be brought 
as a reserve, he formed the other six legions 
in order of battle before the camp. The 
enemy, likewise, had drawn up their forces 
which they had brought out of the camp. 
Cuap. IX.— There was a marsh of no 
great extent between our army and that of the 
enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our 
men would pass this; our men, also, were 
ready in arms to attack them while disordered, 
if the first attempt to pass should be made by 
them. In the mean time battle was com- 
_ menced between the two armies by a cavalry 
action. When neither army began to pass the 
marsh, Cesar, upon the skirmishes of the 
horse [proving] favorable to our men. led 
back his forces into the camp. The enemy 
immediately hastened from that place to the 
river Aisne, which it has been stated was 
behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they 
endeavored to lead a part of their forces over 
it; with the design, that, if they could, they 
might carry by storm the fort which Q. Titu- 


64 CHiSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


rius, Cesar’s lieutenant, commanded, and 
might cut off the bridge; but, if they could 
not do that, they should lay waste the lands 
of the Remi, which were of great use to us 
in carrying on the war, and might hinder our 
men from foraging. 

Cuar. X.— Cesar, being apprised of this 
by Titurius, leads all his cavalry and light- 
armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over 
the bridge, and hastens towards them. There 
was a severe struggle in that place. Our 
men, attacking in the river the disordered 
enemy, slew a great part of them. By the 
immense number of their missiles they drove 
back the rest, who, in a most courageous 
manner, were attempting to pass over their 
bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, 
and cut to pieces those who had first crossed 
the river. The enemy, when they perceived 
that their hopes had deceived them both with 
regard to their taking the town by storm and 
also their passing the river, and did not see 
our men advance to a more disadvantageous 
place for the purpose of fighting, and when 
provisions began to fail them, having called a 
council, determined that it was best for each 
to return to his country, and resolved to as- 
semble from all quarters to defend those into 
whose territories the Romans should first 
march an army; that they might contend in 
their own rather than in a foreign country, 
and might enjoy the stores of provision which 
they possessed at home. Together with other 
causes, this consideration also led them to 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 65 


that resolution, viz., that they had learnt that 
Divitiacus and the /Mdui were approaching 
the territories of the Bellovaci. And it was 
impossible to persuade the latter to stay any 
longer, or to deter them from conveying suc- 
cor to their own people. 

Cuap. XI. — That matter being determined 
on marching out of their camp at the second 
watch, with great noise and confusion, in no 
fixed order, nor under any command, since 
each sought for himself the foremost place 
in the journey, and hastened to reach home, 
they made their departure appear very like 
a flight. Cesar, immediately learning this 
through his scouts, [but] fearing an ambus- 
cade, because he had not yet discovered for 
what reason they were departing, kept his 
army and cavalry within the camp. At day- 
break, the intelligence having been confirmed 
by the scouts, he sent forward his cavalry to 
harass their rear; and gave the command of 
it to two of his lieutenants, Q. Pedius, and L. 
Aurunculeius Cotta. He ordered 'l’. Labienus, 
another of his lieutenants, to follow them 
closely with three legions. These, attacking 
their rear, and pursuing them for many miles, 
slew a great number of them as they were 
fleeing ; while those in the rear with whom they 
had come up, halted, and bravely sustained 
the attack of our soldiers; the van, because 
they appeared to be removed from danger, 
and were not restrained by any necessity or 
command, as soon as the noise was heard, 


broke their ranks, and, to a man, rested their 
t 


66 CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. — 


safety in flight. Thus without any risk [to 
themselves] our men killed as great a number 
of them as the length of the day allowed ; and 
at sunset desisted from the pursuit, and betook 
themselves into the camp, as they had been 
commanded. 

Cuap. XITI.— On the day following, before 
the enemy could recover from their terror and 
flight, Ceesar led his army into the territories 
of the Suessiones, which are next to the Remi, 
and having accomplished a long march, hast- 
ens to the town named Noviodunum. Having 
attempted to take it by storm on his march, 
because he heard that it was destitute of 
[sufficient] defenders, he was not able to 
carry it by assault, on account of the breadth 
of the ditch and the height of the wall, though 
few were defending it. Therefore, having 
fortified the camp, he began to bring up the 
vine, and to provide whatever things were 
necessary for the storm. In the mean time, 
the whole body of the Suessiones, after their 
flight, came the next night into the town. 
The vinee having been quickly brought up 
against the town, a mound thrown up, and 
towers built, the Gauls, amazed by the great- 
ness of the works, such as they had neither 
seen nor heard of before, and struck, also, by 
the despatch of the Romans, send ambassadors 
to Cesar respecting a surrender, and succeed 
In consequence of the Remi requesting that 
they [the Suessidnes] might be spared. 

Cuap. XIII. — Cesar, having received as 
hostages the first men of the state. and even 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 64 


the two sons of King Galba himself, and ali 
the arms in the town having been delivered 
up, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender, 
and led his army against the Bellovaci. Who, 
when they had conveyed themselves and all 
their possessions into the town called Bratus- 
pantium, and Cesar with his army was about 
five miles distant from that town, all the old 
men, going out of the town, began to stretch out 
their hands to Cesar, and to intimate by their 
voice that they would throw themselves on his 
protection and power, nor would contend in 
arms against the Roman people. In like 
manner, when he had come up to the town, 
and there pitched his camp,.the boys and the 
women from the wall, with outstretched hands, 
after their custom, begged peace from the 
Romans. 

Cuap. XIV. — For these Divitiacus pleads 
(for after the departure of the Belge, having 
dismissed the troops of the .Aidui, he had 
returned to Cesar): ‘¢ The Bellovaci had at 
all times been in the alliance and friendship 
_ of the Aiduan state; that they had revolted 
from the Adui and made war upon the 
Roman people, being urged thereto by their 
nobles, who said that the dui, reduced to 
slavery by Czesar, were suffering every indig- 
nity and insult. That they who had been the 
leaders of that plot, because they perceived 
how great a calamity they had brought upon 
the state, had fled into Britain. That not 
only the Bellovaci, but also the /Edui, en- 
treated him to use his [accustomed] clemency 


68 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


and lenity towards them [the Bellovaci]: 
which if he did, he would increase the influ- 
ence of the A%dui among all the Belge, by 
whose succor and resources they had been accus- 
tomed to support themselves whenever any 
wars occurred.” 

Cuar. XV.— Cesar said that on account 
of nis respect for Divitiicus and the /Eduans, 
he would receive them into his protection, and 
would spare them; but, because the state wag 
of great influence among the Belge, and pre- 
eminent in the number of its population, he 
demanded 6v0 hostages. When these were 
delivered, and all the arms in the town col- 
lected, he went from that place into the 
territories of the Ambiani, who, without delay, 
surrendered themselves and all their posses- 
sions. Upon their territories bordered the 
Nervii, concerning whose character and cus- 
toms when Cesar inquired he received the 
following information: hat ‘‘ there was no 
access for merchants to them; that they suf- 
fered no wine and other things tending to 
juxury to be imported, because they thought 
that by their use the mind is enervated and 
the courage impaired ; that they were a savage 
people and of great bravery; that they up- 
praided and condemned the rest of the Belgze 
who had surrendered themselves to the Roman 
people and thrown aside their national cour- 
age; that they openly declared they would 
neither send ambassadors, nor accept any con- 
dition of peace.” 

Cuap. XVI.— After he had made three 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 69 


days’ march through their territories, he dis- 
covered from some prisoners that the river 
Sambre was not more than ten miles from his 
camp ; that all the Nervii had stationed them- 
selves on the other side of that river, and 
together with the Atrébates and the Vero- 
mandui, their neighbors, were there awaiting 
the arrival of the Romans; for they had per- 
suaded both these nations to try the same 
fortune of war [as themselves]: that the 
forces of the Aduattici were also expected by 
them, and were on their march; that they had 
put their women, and those who through age 
appeared useless for war, in a place to which 
there was no approach for an army, on account 
of the marshes. 

Cuap. XVII.— Having learnt these things, 
he sends forward scouts and centurions to 
choose a convenient place for the camp. 
And as a great many of the surrounding 
Belge and other Gauls, following Cesar, 
marched with him, some of these, as was 
afterwards learnt from the prisoners, having 
accurately observed, during those days, the 
army’s method of marching, went by night to 
the Nervii, and informed them that a great 
number of baggage-trains passed between the 
several legions, and that there would be no 
difficulty, when the first legion had come 
into the camp, and the other legions were at 
a great distance, to attack that legion while 
under baggage, which being routed, and the 
baggage-train seized, it would come to pass 
that the other legions would not dare to stand 


70 CH4ISAR'S COMMENTARIES. 


their ground. It added weight also to the 
advice of those who reported that circum- 
Stance, that the Nervii, from early times, 
because they were weak in cavalry, (for not 
_ even at this time do they attend to it, but 
accomplish by their infantry whatever they 
can,) in order that they might the more 
easily obstruct the cavalry of their neighbors 
if they came upon them for the purpose of 
plundering, having cut young trees, and bent 
them, by means of their numerous branches 
[extending] on to the sides, and the quick- 
briers an thorns springing up between them, 
had made these hedges present a fortification 
like a wall, through which it was not only 
impossible to enter, but even to penetrate 
with the eye. Since [therefore] the march of 
our army would be obstructed by these things, 
the Nervii thought that the advice ought not to 
be neglected by them. 

Cuap. XVIII.— The nature of the ground 
which our men had chosen for the camp was this : 
A hill, declining evenly from the top, extended 
to the river Sambre, which we have mentioned 
above: from this river there arose a [second] 
hill of like ascent, on the other side and oppo- 
site to the former, and open for about 200 
paces at the lower part ; but in the upper part, 
woody, (so much so) that it was not easy to 
see through it into the interior. Within those 
woods the enemy kept themselves in conceal- 
ment; a few troops of horse-soldiers appeared 
on the open ground, along the river. The 
depth of the river was about three feet. 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 7I 


Cuap. XIX. — Cesar, having sent his cay- 
alry on before, followed close after them with 
all his forces; but the plan and order of the 
march was different from that which the Belgze 
had reported to the Nervii. For as he was 
approaching the enemy, Czesar, according to 
his custom, led on [as the van] six legions 
unencumbered by baggage; behind them he 
had placed the baggage-trains of the whole 
army; then the two legions which had been 
last raised closed the rear, and were a guard 
for the baggage-train. Our horse, with the 
slingers and archers, having passed the river, 
commenced action with the cavalry of the 
enemy. While they from time to time betook 
themselves into the woods to their companions, 
and again made an assault out of the wood 
upon our men, who did not dare to follow them 
in their retreat farther than the limit to which 
the plain and open parts extended, in the 
mean time the six legions which had arrived 
first, having measured out the work, began to 
fortify the camp. When the first part of the 
baggage-train of our army was seen by those 
who lay hid in the woods, which had. been 
agreed on among them as the time for com- 
mencing action, as soon as they had arranged 
their line of battle and formed their ranks 
within the woods, and had encouraged one 
another, they rushed out suddenly with all their 
forces and made an attack upon our horse. 
The latter being easily routed and thrown into 
confusion, the Nervii ran down to the river 
with such incredible speed that they seemed 


72 WESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


to be in the woods, the river, and close upon 
us almost at the same time And with the 
same speed they hastened up the hill to our 
camp and to those who were employed in the 
works. 


Cuap. XX.—Ceesar had everything to do 


at one time: the standard to be displayed, 
which was the sign when it was necessary to 
run to arms; the signal to be given by the 
trumpet; the soluiers to be called off from the 
works ; those who had proceeded some distance 
for the purpose of seeking materials for the 
rampart, to be summoned; the order of battle 
to be formed; the soldiers to be encouraged ; 
the watchword to be given. <A great part 
of these arrangements was prevented hy the 
shortness of time and the sudden approach and 
charge of the enemy. Under these difficulties 
two things proved of advantage: [first] the 
skill and experience of the soldiers, because, 
haying been trained by former engagements, 
they could suggest to themselves what ought 
to be done, as conveniently as receive infor- 
mation from others ; and [ secondly ] that Caesar 
had forbidden his several lheutenants to depart 
from the works and their respective legions, 
before the camp was fortified. These, on ac- 
count of the near approach and the speed of 
the enemy, did not then wait for any command 
from Ceesar, but of themselves executed what- 
ever appeared proper. 

Cuap. XXI.— Cesar, having given the ne- 


ey Ps ae ee De eee a a 


cessary orders, hastened to and fro into what- , 


ever quarter fortune carried him, to animate 


CH4ISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 73 


the troops, and came to the tenth legion. 
Having encouraged the soldiers with no further 
speech than that ‘they should keep up the 
remembrance of their wonted valor, and not 
be confused in mind, but valiantly sustain the 
assault of the enemy”’; as the latter were not 
farther from them than the distance to which 
a dart could be cast, he gave the signal for 
commencing battle. And having gone to 
another quarter for the purpose of encour- 
aging [the soldiers], he finds them fighting. 
Such was the shortness of the time, and so 
determined was the mind of the enemy on fizht- 
ing, that time was wanting not only for affix- 
ing the military insignia, but even for putting 
on the helmets and drawing off the covers from 
the shields. To whatever part any one by 
chance came from the works (in which he had 
been employed), and whatever standards he 
saw first, at these he stood, lest in seeking his 
Own company he should lose the time for 
fighting. 

Cuap. XXII. — The army having been mar- 
shalled, rather as the nature of the ground and 
the declivity of the hill and the exigency of the 
time, than as the method and order of military 
matters required ; whilst the legions in the dif- 
ferent places were withstanding the enemy, 
‘some in one quarter, some in another, and the 
view was obstructed by the very thick hedges 
intervening, as we have before remarked, 
neither could proper reserves be posted, nor 
could the necessary measures be taken in each 
part, nor could all the commands be issued by 


4 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


one person. Therefore, in such an unfavor- 
able state of affairs, various events of fortune 
followed. 

Cuapr. XXIII. — The soldiers of the ninth 
and tenth legions, as they had been stationed 
on the left part of the army, casting their weap- 
ons, speedily drove the Atrébates, (for that 
division had been opposed to them,) who were 
breathless with running and fatigue, and worn 
out with wounds, from the higher ground into 
the river; and following them as they were 
endeavoring to pass it, slew with their swords 
a great part of them while impeded (therein). 
They themselves did not hesitate to pass the 
river; and having advanced to a disadvanta- 
geous place, when the battle was renewed, 
they [nevertheless] again put to flight the 
enemy, who had returned and were opposing 
them. Inlike manner, in another quarter two 
different legions, the eleventh and the eighth, 
having routed the Verormandui, with whom 
they had engaged, were fighting from the 
higher ground upon the very banks of the river. 
But, almost the whole camp on the front and 
on the left side being then exposed, since the 
twelfth legion was posted in the right wing, 
and the seventh at no great distance from it, 
all the Nervii, in a very close body, with Bod- 
uognatus, who held the chief command, as 
their leader, hastened towards that place ; and 
part of them began to surround the legions on 
their unprotected flank, part to make for the 
highest point of the encampment. 

Cyarp. XXIV.— At the same time our 


CH4ISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 75 


horsemen, and light-armed infantry, who had 
been with those, who, as I have related, were 
routed by the first assault of the enemy, as they 
were betaking themselves into the camp, met 
the enemy face to face, and again sought flight 
into another quarter; and the camp-followers, 
who from the Decuman Gate and from the 
highest ridge of the hill had seen our men pass 
the river as victors, when, after going out for 
the purposes of plundering, they looked back 
and saw the enemy parading in our camp, com- 
mitted themselves precipitately to flight ; at the 
same time there arose the cry and shout of 
those who came with the baggage-train; and 
they (affrighted) were carried some one way, 
some another. By all these circumstances the 
cavalry of the Treviri were much alarmed, 
(whose reputation for courage is extraordinary 
among the Gauls, and who had come to Cesar, 
being sent by their state as auxiliaries,) and, 
when they saw our camp filled with a large 
number of the enemy, the legions hard pressed 
and almost held surrounded, the camp-retain- 
- ers, horsemen, slingers, and Numidians fleeing 
on all sides divided and scattered, they, 
despairing of our affairs, hastened home, and 
related to their state that the Romans were 
routed and conquered, [and] that the enemy 
were in possession of their camp and baggages 
train. 

Cuap. XXV.— Cesar proceeded, after en- 
couraging the tenth legion, to the right wing ; 
where he perceived that his men were hard 
pressed, and that in consequence of the stand- 


76  CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


ards of the twelfth legion being collected to 
gether in one place, the crowded soldiers were 


a hindrance to themselves in the fight; that all — 


the centurions of the fourth cohort were slain, 
and the standard-bearer killed, the standard 
itself lost, almost all the centurions of the other 
cohorts either wounded or slain, and among 
them the chief centurion of the legion, P. Sex- 
tius Baculus, a very valiant man, who was so 
exhausted by many and severe wounds, that 
he was already unable to support himself; he 
likewise perceived that the rest weic slack- 
ening their efforts, and that sme, deserted by 
those in the rear, were retiring from the battle 
and avoiding the weapons ; that the enemy [on 
the other hand], though advancing from the 
“ower ground, were not relaxing in front, and 
were [at the same time} pressing hard on both 
flanks ; he also perceived that the affair was at 
a crisis, and that there was not any reserve 
which could be brought up; having therefore 
snatched a shield from one of the soldiers in 
the rear (for he himself had come without a 
shield), he advanced to the front of the line, 
and addressing the centurions by name, and 
encouraging the rest of the soldiers, he ordered 
them to carry forward the standards, and ex- 
tend the companies, that they might the more 
easily use their swords. On his arrival, as 
hope was brought tc the soldiers and their 
courage restored, whilst every one for his own 
part, in the sight of his general, desired to 
exert his utmost energy, the impetuosity of the 
enemy was a little checked. : 


deat ity 


CH4iSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 77 


Cuapr. XXVI.— Cesar, when he perceived 
that the seventh legion, which stood close by 
him, was also hard pressed by the enemy, 
directed the tribunes of the soldiers to effect a 
junction of the legions gradually, and make 
their charge upon the enemy with a double 
front; which having been done since they 
brought assistance the one to the other, nor 
feared lest their rear should be surrounded by 
the enemy, they began to stand their ground 
more boldly, and to fight more courageously. 
In the mean time, the soldiers of the two 
legions which had been in the rear of the army, 
as a guard for the baggage-train, upon the bat- 
tle being reported to theni, quickened their 
pace, and were seen by the enemy on the top 
of the hill; and Titus Labienus, having gained 
possession of the camp of the enemy, and ob- 
served from the higher ground what was going 
on in our camp, sent the tenth legion as a 
relief to our men, who, when they had learnt 
from the flight of the horse and the sutlers in 
what position the affair was, andin how great 
_ danger the camp and the legion and the com- 
mander were involved, left undone nothing 
[which tended] to despatch. 

Cuap. XXVII. — By their arrival, so great 
a change of matters was made, that our men, 
even those who had fallen down exhausted with 
wounds, leant on their shields, and renewed 
the fight: then the camp-retainers, though un- 
armed, secing the enemy completely dismayed, 
attacked [them though] armed; the horsemen 
too, that they might by their valor blot cut 


78 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


the disgrace of their flight, thrust themselves 
before the legionary soldiers in all parts of the 
battle. But the enemy, even in the last hope 


of safety, displayed such great courage, that 
when the foremost of them had fallen, the next. 


stood upon them prostrate, and fought from 
their bodies ; when these were overthrown, and 
their corpses heaped up together, those who 
survived cast their weapons against our men 
[ thence, ] as from a mound, and returned our 
darts which had fallen short between [the 
armies |; so that it ought not to be concluded, 
that men of such great courage had injudi- 
ciously dared to pass a very broad river, ascend 
very high banks, and come up to a very dis- 
advantageous place; since their greatness of 
spirit had rendered these actions easy, although 
in themselves very difficult. 

Cuap. XXVIII. — This battle being ended, 
and the nation and name of the Nervii be- 
ing almost reduced to annihilation, their old 
men, whom together with the boys and women 
we have stated to have been collected togethen 
inthe fenny places and marshes, on this battle 
having been reported to them, since they were 
convinced that nothing was an obstacle to the 
conquerors, and nothing safe to the conquered, 
sent ambassadors to Cesar by the consent of 
all who remained, and surrendered themselves 
to him ; and in recounting the calamity of their 
state, said that their senators were reduced 
from 600 to three ; that from 60,000 men they 
[were reduced] to scarcely 500 who could bear 
arms; whom Cesar, that he might appear te 


a ee 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 79 


use compassion towards the wretched and the 
suppliant, most carefully spared ; and ordered 
them to enjoy their own territories and towns, 
and commanded their neighbors that they 
should restrain themselves and their depend- 
ants from offering injury or outrage [to them]. 

Cuap. XXIX.— When the Aduatici, of 
whom we have written above, werc coming with 
all their forces to the assistance of the Nervi, 
upon this battle being reported to them, they 
returned home after they were on the march ; 
deserting all their towns and forts, they con- 
veyed together all their possessions into one 
town, eminently fortified by nature. While 
this town had on all sides around it very high 
rocks and precipices, there was left on one side 
a gently ascending approach, of not more than 
200 feet in width ; which place they have forti- 
fied with avery lofty double wall : besides, they 
had placed stones of great weight and sharp- 
ened stakes upon the walls. They were de- 
scended from the Cimbri and Teutones, who, 
when they were marching into our province and 
Italy, having deposited on this side the river 
Rhine such of their baggage-trains as they 
could not drive or convey with them, left 6,000 
of their men as a guard and defence for them. 
These having, after the destruction of their 
“countrymen, been harassed for many years 
by their neighbors, while one time they waged 
war offensively, and at another resisted if when 
waged against them, concluded a peace with 
the consent of all, and chose this place as their 
settlement. 


80 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Cuap. XXX. — And on the first arrival of 
our army they made frequent sallies from the 
town, and contended with our men in trifling 
skirmishes ; afterwards, when hemmed in by a 
rampart of twelve feet [in height], and fifteen 
miles in circuit, they kept themselves within 
the town. When, vine having been brought 
up and a mound raised, they observed that a 
tower also was being built at a distance, they 
at first began to mock the Romans from their 
wall, and to taunt them with the following 
speeches, ‘¢‘ For what purpose was so vast a 
machine constructed at so great a distance?” 
‘‘ With what hands,” or ‘‘ with what strength 
did they, especially [as they were] men of such 
very small stature ’’ (for our shortness of stat- 
ure, in comparison with the great size of their 
bodies, is generally a subject of much contempt 
to the men of Gaul), ‘ trust to place against 
their walls a tower of such great weight?” 

Cuap. XXXI.— But when they saw that it 
was being moved, and was approaching their 
walls, startled by the new and unaccustomed 
sight, they sent ambassadors to Cesar [to 
treat] about peace; who spoke in the follow- 
ing manner: ‘* That they did not believe the 
Romans waged war without divine aid, since 
they were able to move forward machines of 
such a height with so great speed, and thus 
fight from close quarters: that they resigned 
themselves and all their possessions to 
[Ceesar’s] disposal: that they begged and 


earnestly entreated one thing, viz., that if per- — 


chence, agreeably to his clemency and human- 


| 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 81 


ity, which they had heard of from others, he 
should resolve that the Aduatiici were to be 
spared, he would not deprive them of their 
arms; that all their neighbors were enemies to 
them and envied their courage, from whom 
they could not defend themselves if their arms 
were delivered up ; that'it was better for them, 
if they should be reduced to that state, to suf- 
fer any fate from the Roman people, than to 
be tortured to death by those among whom 
they had been accustomed to rule.” 

Cuap. XXXII.—To these things Cvzesar 
replied, ‘¢ That he, in accordance with his cus- 
tom, rather than owing to their desert, should 
spare the state, if they should surrender them- 
selves before the battering-ram should touch 
the wall; but that there was no condition of 
surrender, except upon their arms being deliv- 
ered up; that he should do to them that which 
he had done in the case of the Nervii, and 
would command their neighbors not to offer 
any injury to those who had surrendered to the 
Roman people.” The matter being reported 
_ to their countrymen, they said that they would 
execute his commands. Having cast a very 
large quantity of their arms from the wa | into 
the trench which was before the town, so that 
the heaps of arms almost equalled the top of 
the wall and the rampart, and nevertheless 
having retained and concealed, as we after- 
wards discovered, about a third part in the 
town, the gates were opened, and they enjoyed 
peace for that day. 

Cuar. XXXII. — Towards evening Cesar 


82 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


ordered the gates to be shut, and the soldiers 
to go out of the town, lest the towns-people . 
should receive any injury from them by night. 
They [the Aduatici], by a design before en- 
tered into, as we afterwards understood, be- 
cause they believed that, as a surrender had 
been made, our men would dismiss their guards. 
or at least would keep watch less carefully, 
partly with those arms which they had retained 
and concealed, partly with shields made of 
bark or interwoven wickers, which they had 
hastily covered over with skins, (as the short- 
ness of time required,) in the third watch, 
suddenly made a sally from the town with all 
their forces [in that direction] in which the 
ascent to our fortifications seemed the least 
difficult. The signal having been immediately 
given by fires, as Cesar had previously com- 
manded, a rush was made thither [7. e., by the 
Roman soldiers] from the nearest fort; and 
the battle was fought by the enemy as vigor- 
ously as it ought to be fought by brave men. 
in the last hope of safety, in a disadvanta= 
geous place, and against those who were throw- 
ing their weapons from a rampart and from 
towers ; since all hope of safety depended op 
their courage alone. About 4,000 of the men 
having been slain, the rest were forced back 
into the town. The day after, Czesar, after 
breaking open the gates, which there was no 
one then to defend, and sending in our soldiers, 
sold the whole spoil of that town. The num- 
ber of 53,000 persons was reported to him by 
those who had bought them. 


CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 8S 


Cuap. XXXIV.—At the same time he 
was informed by P. Crassus, whom he had 
sent with one legion against the Venéti, the 
Unelli, the Osismii, the Curiosolite, the Sesuvii, 
the Aulerci, and the Rhedones, which are 
maritime states, and touch upon the [ Atlantic ] 
ocean, that all these nations were brought 
under the dominion and power of the Roman 
people. 

Cuarp. XXXV.—These things being 
achieved, [and] all Gaul being subdued, so higk 
an opinion of this war was spread among ths 
barbarians, that ambassadors were sent to 
Cesar by those nations who dwelt beyond the 
Rhine, to promise that they would give host- 
ages and execute his commands. Which em- 
bassies Caesar, because he was hastening into 
Italy and Illyricum, ordered to return to him 
at the beginning of the following summer. 
He himself, having led his legions into winter 
quarters among the Carnutes, the Andes, and 
the Turones, which states were close to those 
regions in which he had waged war, set out for 
Italy ; and a thanksgiving of fifteen days was 
decreed for those achievements, upon receiving 
Ceesar’s letter; [an honor] which before that 
time had been conferred on none. 


84 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


BOOK III. 


THE ARGUMENT, 


[. Cesar, at the close of the late campaign, sent Servius Galba 
into the territories of the Nantuates, Veragri, and Seduni, 
with permission to winter there, if expedient; his reason for 
this. Galba resolved to winter at Octodtrus.—il. The 
Seduni and Veragricombine against him. —III. And attack 
his camp.—IV.-VI. <A fierce battle ensues; in which, as 
well as in several other engagements, Galba is successful. — 
VIlI., VIII. An unexpected war in Gaul; the occasion of it. 
The Venéti are the principal instigators. —IX. Ozesar gives 
orders for the equipment of a fleet. The Venéti and other 
sates augment their navy, and extend their alliances.— 
X.-XII. Cvesar’s difficulties; arising chiefly from the posi- 
tion of the Venetic towns.— XIII. The structure of the 
Venetic ships accommodated to that position. — XI1V., XV. 
Cesar surmounts these disadvantages; and in a naval 
engagement obtains avictory.— XVI. Which terminated the 
war with the Venéti.—XVII.-XIX. Titurius Sabinus is 
sent into the territories of the Unelli. Conduct of their king, 
Viridoyvix. Sabinus is compelled to resort to stratagems; he 
defeats the Unelli.i—XX., XXI. P. Crassus enters Aqui- 
tania, and is attacked by the Sotiates, who are signally 
worsted. — XXII. The ‘*Soldurii.”?—XXIII. Crassus 
proceeds into the territories of the Vocates and Tarusates; 
who engage in measures of opposition. —XXIV. He draws 
up his forces for a battle; which the enemy decline. — 
XXV., XXVI. He then attacks their encampment, and is 
victorious. — XXVIII. Cesar advances against the Morini 
and Menapii; his motives for this: the enemy make a sud- 
den assault on the Roman forces, and are repelled with 
great loss. — XXIX. Cesar’s provision against such at- 
tacks : his operations interrupted by the inclemency of the 
season: the army is led into winter quarters. 


Cuap. I. — When Cesar was setting out for 
Italy, he sent Servius Galba with the twelfth 
legion and part of the cavalry, against the 
Nantuates, the Veragri, and Sedini, who. 
extend from the territories of the Allobréges, 
and the lake of Geneva, and the river Rhone 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 85 


to the top of the Alps. The reason for send- 
ing him was, that he desired that the pass 
along the Alps. through which [the Roman] 
merchants had been accustomed to travel with 
great danger. and under great imposts, should 
be opened. He permitted him, if he thought 
it necessary, to station the legion in these 
places, for the purpose of wintering. Galba, 
having fought some successful battles, and 
stormed several of their forts, upon ambassa- 
dors being sent to him from all parts and host- 
ages given and a peace concluded, determined 
to station two cohorts among the Nantuates, 
and to winter in person with the other cohorts 
of that legion in a village of the Veragri, 
which is called Octedirus; and this village 
being situated in a valley, with a small plain 
annexed to it, is bounded on all sides by very 
high mountains. As this village was divided 
into two parts by a river, he granted one part 
of it to the Gauls, and assigned the other, 
which had been left by them unoecupied, to 
the cohorts to winter in. He fortified this 
[latter] part with a rampart and a ditch. 
Cuar. II. — When several days had elapsed 
in winter quarters, and he had ordered corn 
to be brought in, he was suddenly informed by 
his scouts that all the people had gone off in 
the night from that part of the town which he 
had given up to the Gauls, and that the moun- 
tains which hung over it were occupied by a 
very large force of the Sedini and Veragri. 
It had happened for several reasons that the 
Gauls suddenly formed the design of renew- 


86 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


ing the war and cutting off that legion. First, 
because they despised a single legion, on 
account of its small number, and that not 
quite full (two cohorts having been detached, 
and several individuals being absent, who had 
been despatched for the purpose of seeking pro- 
vision) ; then, likewise, because they thought 
that on account of the disadvantageous char- 
acter of the situation, even their first attack 
could not be sustained [by us] when they 
would rush from the mountains into the valley, 
and discharge their weapons upon us. To 
this was added, that they were indignant that 
their children were torn from them under the 
title of hostages, and they were persuaded 
that the Romans designed to seize upon the 
summits of the Alps, and unite those parts to 
the neighboring province [of Gaul], not only 
to secure the passes, but also as a constant 
possession. | 

Cuap. III. — Having received these tidings, 
Galba, since the works of the winter quarters 
and the fortifications were not fully completed, 
nor was sufficient preparation made with regard 
to corn and other provisions (since, as a sur- 
render had been made, and hostages received, 
he had thought ke need entertain no apprehen- 
sion of a war), speedily summoning a council, 
began to anxiously inquire their opinions. In 
which council, since so much sudden danger 
had happened contrary to the general expecta- 
tion, and almost all the higher places were 
seen already covered with a multitude of 
armed men, nor could [either] troops come to 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 87 


their relief, or provisions be brought in, as the 
passes were blocked up [by the enemy ;] safety 
being now nearly despaired of, some opinions 
of this sort were delivered: that, ‘‘ leaving 
their baggage, and making a sally, they should 
hasten away for safety by the same routes by 
which they had come thither.” To the greater 
part, however, it seemed best, reserving that 
measure to the last, to await the issue of the 
matter, and to defend the camp. 

Cuarp. IV.—A snort time only having 
elapsed, so that time was scarcely given for 
arranging and executing those things which 
they had determined on, the enemy, upon the 
signal being given, rushed-down [upon our 
men] from all parts, and discharged stones 
and darts upon our rampart. Our men at first, 
while their strength was fresh, resisted bravely, 
nor did they cast any weapon ineffectually 
from their higher station. As soon as any 
part of the camp, being destitute of defenders, 
seemed to be hard pressed, thither they ran, 
and brought assistance. But they were over- 
- matched in this, that the enemy when wearied 
by the long continuance of the battle, went 
out of the action, and others with fresh strength 
came in their place; none of which things 
could be done by our men, owing to the small- 
ness of their number; and not only was per- 
mission not given to the wearied [Roman] te 
retire from the fight, but not even to the 
wounded [was liberty granted] to quit the post 
where he had been stationed, and recover. 

Cuap V.— When they had now been fight- 


88 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


ing for more than six hours, without cessation, 
and not only strength, but even weapons were 
failing our men, and the enemy were pressing 
on more rigorously, and had begun to demolish 
the rampart and to fill up the trench, while 
our men were becoming exhausted, and the 
matter was now brought to the last extremity, 
P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first 
rank, whom we have related to have been dis- 
abled by severe wounds in the engagement 
With the Nervii, and also C. Volusenus, a trib- 
une of the soldiers, a man of great skill and 
valor, hasten to Galba, and assure him that 
the only hope of safety lay in making a sally, 
and trying the last resource. Whereupon, 
assembling the centurions, he quickly gives 
orders to the soldiers to discontinue the fight 
a short time, and only collect the weapons 
flung [at them], and recruit themselves after 
their fatigue, and afterwards, upon the signal 
being given, sally forth from the camp, and 
place in their valor all their hope of safety. 
Cuap. VI. — They do what they were or- 
dered; and, making a sudden sally from all 
the gates [of the gamp], leave the enemy the 
means neither of knowing what was taking 
place, nor of collecting themselves. Fortune 
thus taking a turn, [our men] surround ‘on 
every side, and slay those who had entertained 
the hope of gaining the camp, and having 
killed more than the third part of an army of 
more than 30,000 men (which number of the 
barbarians it appeared certain had come up te 
dur camp), put to flight the rest when panic: 


C4ASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 89 


stricken, and do not suffer them to halt even 
upon the higher grounds. All the forces of 
the enemy being thus routed, and stripped of 
their arms, [our men] betake themselves to 
their camp and fortifications. Which battle 
being finished, inasmuch as Galba was unwill- 
ing to tempt fortune again, and remembered 
that he had come into winter quarters with 
one design, and saw that he had met witha 
different state of affairs ; chiefly, however. urged 
by the want of corn and provision, having the 
next day burned all the buildings of that vil- 
lage, he hastens to return into the province ; 
and as no enemy opposed or hindered his 
march, he brought the legion safe into the 
[country of the] Nantuates, thence into [ that 
of | the Allobréges, and there wintered. 

Cuar. VII — These things being achieved, 
while Czesar had every reason to suppose that 
Gaul was reduced to a state of tranquillity, 
the Belge being overcome, the Germans ex- 
pelled, the Sedini among the Alps defeated, 
and when he had, therefore, in the beginning 
of winter, set out for Illyricum, as he wished 


to visit those nations, and acquire a knowl- 


edge of their countries, a sudden war sprang 
up in Gaul. The occasion of that war was 


this: P. Crassus, a young man, had taken 


up his winter quarters with the seventh legion 


_ among the Andes, who border upon the [ At- 


=_— 


lantic] ocean. He, as there was a scarcity of 
corn in those parts, sent out some officers of 


_ cavalry, and several military tribunes amongst 


the neighboring states, for the purpose of pro- 


90 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


curing corn and provision; in which number 
T. Terrasidius was sent amongst the Esubil; 
M. Trebius Gallus amongst the Curiosolite ; 
Q. Velanius, with T. Silius, amongst the 
Venéti. 

Cuap. VIII. — The influence of this state is 
by far the most considerable of any of the 
countries on the whole sea-coast, because the 
Venéti both have a very great number of ships, 
with which they have been accustomed to sail 
to Britain, and [thus] excel the rest in their 
knowledge and experience of nautical affairs 5 
and as only a few ports lie scattered along that 
stormy and open sea, of which they are in pos- 
session, they hold as tributaries almost all 
those who are accustomed to traffic in that sea. 
With them arose the beginning [of the revolt] 
by their detaining Silius and Velanius ; for they 
thought that they should recover by their means 
the hostages which they had given to Crassus. 
The neighboring people, led on by their influ- 
ence (as the measures of the Gauls are sudden 
and hasty), detain Trebius and Terrasidius for 
the same motive; and quickly sending ambas- 
sadors, by means of their leading men, they 
enter into a mutual compact to do nothing 
except by general consent, and abide the same 
issue of fortune; and they solicit the other 
states to choose rather to continue in that liberty 
which they had received from their ancestors, 
than endure slavery under the Romans. All 
the sea-coast being quickly brought over to 
their sentiments, they send a common embassy 
to P. Crassus [tor say], ‘‘ If he wished to re- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. Sl 


ceive back his officers, let him send back to 
them their hostages.” 

Cuap. IX.—Cwsar, being informed of 
these things by Crassus, since he was so far 
distant himself, orders ships of war to be built 
in the mean time on the river Loire, which flows 
into the ocean; rowers to be raised from the 

rovince; sailors and pilots to be provided. 

hese matters being quickly executed, he him- 
self, as soon as the season of the year permits, 
hastens tothe army. The Venéti, and the other 
states also, being informed of Cesar’s arrival, 
when they reflected how great a crime they had 
eommitted, in that the ambassadors (a char- 
acter which had amongst ali nations ever been 
sacred and inviolable) had by them been de- 
tained and thrown into prison, resolve to pre- 
pare for a war in proportion to the greatness 
of their danger, and especially to provide those 
things which appertain to the service of a 
navy, with the greater confidence, inasmuch as 
they greatly relied on the nature of their situ- 
ation. They knew that the passes by land 
- were cut off by estuaries, that the approach 
by sea was most difficult, by reason of our 
ignorance of the localities, [and] the small 
number of the harbors, and they trusted that 
our army would not be able to stay very long 
among them, on account of the insufficiency of 
corn ; and again, evenif all these things should 
turn out contrary to their expectation, yet they 
were very powerful in their navy. They well 
understood that the Romans neither had any 
number of ships, nor were acquainted with the 


92 CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


shallows, the harbors, or the islands of those 
parts where they would have to carry on the 
war; and that navigation was very different in 
a narrow sea from what it is in the vast and 
open ocean. Having come to this resolution, 
they fortify their towns, convey corn into them 
from the country parts, bring together as many 
ships as possible to Venetia, where it appeared 
Ceesar would at first carry on the war. They 
unite to themselves as allies for that war, the 
Osismii, the Lexovii, the Nannetes, the Ambi- 
liati, the Morini, the Diablintes, and the Me- 
napii; and send for auxiliaries from Britain, 
which is situated over against those regions. 

Cuar. X.—There were these difficulties 
which we haye mentioned above, in carrying 
on the war, but many things, nevertheless, 
urged Cesar to that war;—the open insult 
offered to the state in the detention of the Ro- 
man knights, the rebellion raised after surren- 
dering, the revolt after hostages were given, 
the confederacy of so many states, but princi- 
pally, lest if [the conduct of] this part was 
overlooked, the other nations should think that 
the same thing was permitted them. Where- 
fore, since he reflected that almost all the 
Gauls were fond of revolution, and easily and 
quickly excited to war; that all men likewise, 
by nature, love liberty and hate the condition 
of slavery, he thought he ought to divide and 
more widely distribute his army, before more 
states should join the confederation. 

Cuap. XI. — He therefore sends T. Labie- 
nus, his lieutenant, with the cavalry to the 


s 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 93 


Treviri, who are nearest to the river Rhine. He 
charges him to visit the Remi and the other 
Belgians, and to keep them in their allegiance 
and repel the Germans, (who were said to have 
been summoned by the Belgze to their aid,) if 
they attempted to cross the river by force in 
their ships. He orders P. Crassus to proceed 
into Aquitania with twelve legionary cohorts 
and a great number of the cavalry, lest auxili- 
aries should be sent into Gaul by these states, 
and such great nations be united. He sends 
Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, with three 
legions, among the Unelli, the Curiosolitze, 
and the Lexovii, to take care that their forces 
should be kept separate from the rest. He 
appoints D. Brutus, a young man, over the 
fleet and those Gallic vessels which he had 
ordered to be furnished by the Picténes and 
the Santoni, and the other provinces which 
remained at peace ; and commands him to pro- 
ceed towards the Venéti, as soon as he could. 
He himself hastens hither with the land forces. 

Cuap. XII.—The sites of their towns 
- were generally such that, being placed on ex- 
treme points [of land] and on promontories, 
they neither had an approach by land when the 
tide had rushed in from the main ocean, which 
always happens twice in the space of twelve 
hours; nor by ships, because, upon the tide 
ebbing again, the ships were likely to be 
dashed upon the shoals. Thus, by either cir- 
cumstance, was the storming of their towns 
rendered difficult ; and if at any time perchance 
the Venéti, overpowered by the greatness of our 


94 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


works, (the sea having been excluded by a 
mound and large dams, and the latter being 
made almost equal in height to the walls of the 
town,) had begun to despair of their fortunes ; 
bringing up a large number of ships, of which 
they had a very great quantity, they carried 
off all their property and betook themselves to 
the nearest towns; there they again defended 
themselves by the same advantages of situa- 
tion. They did this the more easily during a 
great part of the summer, because our ships 
were kept back by storms, and the difficulty of 
sailing was very great in that vast and open 
sea, with its strong tides and its harbors far 
apart and exceedingly few in number. 

Cuav. XIII. — For their ships were built 
aud equipped after this manner. The keels 
were somewhat flatter than those of our ships, 
whereby they could more easily encounter the 
shallows and the ebbing of the tide : the prows 
were raised very high, and, in like manner, the 
sterns were adapted to the force of the waves 
and storms [which they were formed to sus- 
tain]. The ships were built wholly of oak, 
and designed to endure any force and violence 
whatever; the benches, which were’ made of 
planks a foot in breadth, were fastened by iron 
spikes of the thickness of a man’s thumb ; the 
anchors were secured fast by iron chains in- 
stead of cables, and for sails they used skins 
and thin dressed leather. These [were used ] 
either through their want of canvas and their 
ignorance of its application, or for this reason, 
which is more probable, that they thought that: 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 95 


such storms of the ocean and such violent 
gales of wind could not be resisted by sail, 
nor ships of such great burden be conveniently 
enough managed by them. The encounter of 
our fleet with these ships was of such a nature 
that our fleet excelled in speed alone, and the 
plying of the oars; cther things, considering 
the nature of the place [and] the violence of 
the storms, were more suitable and better 
adapted on their side; for neither conld our 
ships injure theirs with their beaks (so great 
was their strength), nor on account of their 
height was a weapon easily cast up to them; 
and for the same reason they were less readily 
locked in by rocks. To this was added, that 
whenever a storm began to rage and they ran 
before the wind, they both could weather the 
storm more easily and heave to securely in the 
shallows, and when left by the tide feared 
nothing from rocks and shelves: the risk of 
all which things was much to be dreaded by 
our ships. 

Cuap. XIV. —Cesar, after taking many 
of their towns, perceiving that so much labor 
was spent in vain and that the flight of the 
enemy could not be prevented on the capture 
of their towns, and that injury could not be 
done them, determined to wait for his fleet. 
As soon as it came up and was firs$ seen by 
the enemy, about 220 of their ships, fully 
equipped and appointed with every kind of 
[naval] implement, sailed forth from the har- 
bor, and drew up opposite to ours; nor did it 
appear clear to Brutus, who commanded the 


26 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


fleet, or to the tribunes of the soldiers and the 
centurions, to whem the several ships were 
assigned, what to do, or what system of tac- 
tics to adopt; for they knew that damage 
could not be done by their beaks; and that, 
although turrets were built [on their decks], 
yet the height of the stems of the barbarian 
ships exceeded these; so that weapons could 
not be cast up from [our] lower position with 
sufficient effect, and those cast by the Gauls 
fell the more forcibly upon us. One thing 
provided by our men was of great service, 
[viz.] sharp hooks inserted into and fastened 
upon poles, of a form not unlike the hooks 
used in attacking town walls. When the 
ropes which fastened the sail-yards to the 
masts were caught by them and pulled, and 
our vessel vigorously impelled with the oars, 
they [the ropes] were severed ; and when they 
were cut away, the yards necessarily fell 
down; so that as all the hope of the Gallic 
vessels depended on their sails and rigging, 
upon these being cut away, the entire manage- 
ment of the ships was taken from them at the 
same time. The restof the contest depended 
on courage, in which our men decidedly had 
the advantage ; and the more so, because the 
whole action was carried on ia the sight of 
Cesar and the entire army; so that no act, a 
little more valiant than ordinary, could pass 
unobserved, for all the hills and higher grounds, 
from which there was a near prospect of the 
sea, were occupied by our army. 

Cuar. XV. — The sail-yards [of the enemy ], 


CHSAR’?S COMMENTARIES. 97 


as we have said, being brought down, although 
two and [in some cases] three ships [of theirs | 
surrounded each one [of ours], the soldiers 
strove with the greatest energy to board the 
ships of the enemy; and, after the barbarians 
observed this taking place, as a great many of 
their ships were beaten, and as no relief for 
that-evil could be discovered, they hastened to 
seek safety in flight. And, having now turned 
their vessels to that quarter in which the wind 
blew, so great a calm and lull suddenly arose, 
that they could not move out of their place, 
which circumstance, truly, was exceedingly 
opportune for finishing the business; for our 
men gave chase and took them one by one, so 
that very few out of all the number, [and 
those] by the intervention of night, arrived at 
the land, after the battle had lasted almost 
from the fourth hour till sunset. 

Cuar. XVI.— By this battle the war with 
the Venéti and the whole of the sea-coast was 
finished ; for both all the youth, and all, too, 
of more advanced age, in whom there was any 
discretion or rank, had assembled in that bat- 
tle; and they had collected in that one place 
whatever naval forces they had anywhere ; and 
when these were lost, the survivors had no 
place to retreat to, nor means of defending 
their towns. They accordingly surrendered 
themselves and all their possessions to Cesar, 
on whom Cesar thought that punishment 
should be inflicted the more severely, in order 
that for the future the rights of ambassadors 
might be more carefully respected by barba- 


98 CHSAR’S’ COMMENTARIES. 


rians : having, therefore, put to death all their 
senate, he sold the rest for slaves. 

Cuap. XVII. — While these things are go- 
ing on amongst the Venéti, Q. Titurius Sabi- 
nus, with those troops which he had received 
from Ceesar, arrives in the territories of the 
Unelli. Over these people Viridovix ruled, 
and held the chief command of all those states 
which had revolted: from which he had col- 
lected a large and powerful army. And in 
those few days, the Aulerci and the Lexovii, 
having slain their senate because they would 
not consent to be promoters of the war, shut 
their gates [against us] and united themselves 
to Viridovix; a great multitude besides of 
desperate men and robbers assembled out 
of Gaul from all quarters, whom the hope of 
plundering and the love of fighting had called 
away from husbandry and their daily labor. 
Sabinus kept himself within his camp, which 
was in a position convenient for everything ; 
while Viridovix encamped over against him at 
a distance of two miles, and daily bringing out 
his forces, gave him an opportunity of fight- 
ing; so that Sabinus had now not only come 
into contempt with the enemy, but also was 
somewhat taunted by the speeches of our 
soldiers; and furnished so great a suspicion 
of his cowardice that the enemy presumed to 
approach even to the very rampart of our 
camp. He adopted this conduct for the fol- 
lowing reason: because he did not think that 
a lieutenant ought to engage in battle with sc 
great a force, especially while he who held the 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 99 


chief command was absent, except on advan- 
tageous ground or unless some favorable cir- 
cumstance presented itself. 

Cuap. XVIII. — After having established 
this suspicion of his cowardice, he selected a 
certain suitable and crafty Gaul, who was one 
of those whom he had with him as auxiliaries. 
He induces him by great gifts and promises to 
go over to the enemy; and informs [him] of 
what he wished to be done. Who, when he 
arrives amongst them as a deserter, lays before 
them the fears of the Romans; and informs 
them by what difficulties Czesar himself was 
harassed, and that the matter was not far 
removed from this: that Sabinus would the 
next night privately draw off his army out of 
the camp and set forth to Cesar, for the pur- 
pose of carrying [him] assistance, which, 
when they heard, they all cry out together 
that an opportunity of successfully conducting 
their enterprise ought not be thrown away; . 
that they ought to go to the [Roman] camp. 
Many things persuaded the Gauls to this meas- 
ure: the delay of Sabinus during the previous 
days ; the positive assertion of the [pretended] 
deserter; want of provisions, for a supply of 
which they had not taken the requisite precau- 
tions; the hope springing from the Venetic 
war; and [also] because in most cases men 
willingly believe what they wish. Influenced 
by these things, they do not discharge Virido- 
vix and the other leaders from the council, 
before they: gained permission from them to 
take up arms and hasten to [our] camp; which 


100 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


being granted, rejoicing as if victory were 
fully certain, they collected fagots and brush- 
wood, with which to fill up the Roman trenches, 
and hastened to the camp. 

Cuap. XIX.—The situation of the camp 
was a rising ground, gently sloping from the 
bottom for about a mile. Thither they pro- 
ceeded with great speed (in order that as little 
time as possible might be given to the Romans 
to collect and arm themselves), and arrived 
quite out of breath. Sabinus having encour- 
aged his men, gives them the signal, which 
they earnestly desired. While the enemy 
were encumbered by reason of the burdens 
which they were carrying, he orders a sally to 
be suddenly made from two gates [of the 
camp]. It happened, by the advantage of sit- 
uation, by the unskilfulness and the fatigue 
of the enemy, by the valor of our soldiers, 
and their experience in former battles, that 
_ they could not stand one attack of our men, 
and immediately turned their backs: and our 
men with full vigor followed them while dis- 
ordered, and slew a great number of them; 
the horse pursuing the rest, left but few, who 
escaped by flight. Thus, at the same time, 
Sabinus was informed of the naval battle and 
Cesar of victory gained by Sabinus; and all 
the states immediately surrendered themselves 
to Titurius: for as the temper of the Gauls is 
impetuous and ready to undertake wars, so 
their mind is weak, and by no means resolute 
in enduring calamities. 

Cuarp. XX.--About the same time, P. 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 101 


Crassus, when he had arrived in Aquitania 
(which, as has been before said, both from its 
extent of territory and the great number of its 
people, is to be reckoned a third part of Gaul), 
understanding that he was to wage war in 
these parts, where a few years before, L. Va- 
lerius Preconinus, the lieutenant, had been 
killed, and his army routed, and from which L. 
Manilius, the proconsul, had fled with the loss 
of his baggage, he perceived that no ordinary 
care must be used by him. Wherefore, hav- 
ing provided corn, procured auxiliaries and 
cavalry, [and] having summoned by name 
many valiant men from Tolosa, Carcaso, and 
Narbo, which are the states of the province of 
Gaul that border on these regions [Aqui- 
tania], he led his army into the territories of 
the Sotiates. On his arrival being known, the 
Sotiates having brought together great forces 
and [much] cavalry, in which their strength 
principally lay, and assailing our army on the 
march, engaged first in a cavalry action, then 
when their cavalry was routed, and our men 
pursuing, they suddenly display their infan- 
try forces, which they had placed in ambuscade 
inavalley. These attacked our men [while] 
disordered, and renewed the fight. 

Cuap. XXI. The battle was long and vig- 
orously contested, since the Sotiates, relying 
on their former victories, imagined that the 
safety of the whole of Aquitania rested on 
their valor ; [and] our men, on the other hand, 
desired it might be seen what they could ac- 
complish without their general and without 


102 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


the other legions, under a very young com- 
mander; at length the enemy, worn out with 
wounds, began to turn their backs, and a great 
number of them being slain, Crassus began to 
besiege the [principal] town of the Sotiates on 
his march. Upon their valiantly resisting, he 
raised vineze and turrets. They at one time 
attempting a sally, at another forming mines 
to our rampart and vinez (at which the Aqui- 
tani are eminently skilled, because in many 
places amongst them there are copper mines), 
when they perceived that nothing could be 
gained by these operations through the perse- 
verance of our men, they send ambassadors to 
Crassus, and entreat him to admit them toa 
surrender. Having obtained it, they, being 
ordered to deliver up their arms, comply. 
Cuar. XXII. — And while the attention of 
our men is engaged in that matter, in another 
part Adcantuannus, who held the chief com- 
mand, with 600 devoted followers whom they — 
call soldurii (the conditions of whose associa- 
tion are these, that they enjoy all the con- 
veniences of life with those to whose friendship 
they have devoted themselves: if anything 
calamitous happen to them, either they endure 
the same destiny together with them, or com- 
mit suicide: nor hitherto, in the memory of 
men, has there been found any one who, upon 
his being slain to whose friendship he had de- 
voted himself, refused to die), Adcantuannus, 
[I say] endeavoring to make a sally with these, 
when our soldiers had rushed together to arms, 
upon a shout being raised at that part of the 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 108 


fortification, and a fierce battle having been 
fought there, was driven back into the town; 
yet he obtained from Crassus [the indulgence] 
that he should enjoy the same terms of sur- 
render [as the other inhabitants]. 

Cuap. XXIII. — Crassus, having received 
their arms and hostages, marched into the 
territories of the Vocates and the Tarusates. 
But then, the barbarians being alarmed, be- 
pause they had heard that a town fortified by 
the nature of the place and by art had been 
taken by us in a few days after our arrival 
there, began to send ambassadors into all 
quarters, to combine, to give hostages one to 
another, to raise troops. Ambassadors also 
are sent to those states of Hither Spain which 
are nearest to Aquitania, and auxiliaries and 
leaders are summoned from them; on whose 
arrival they proceed to carry on the war with 
great confidence, and with a great host of men. 
They who had been with Q. Sertorius the whole 
period [of his war in Spain], and were sup- 
posed to have very great skill in military mat- 
ters, are chosen leaders. These, adopting the 
practice of the Roman people, began to select 
[advantageous] places, to fortify their camp, 
to cut off our men from provisions, which, 
when Crassus observes, [and likewise] that 
his forces, on account of their small number, 
could not safely be separated ; that the enemy 
both made excursions and beset the passes, 
and [yet] left sufficient guard for their camp ; 
that on that accountycorn and provision could 
not very conveniently be brought up to him, 


104 CHBAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


and that the number of the enemy was daily 
increased, he thought that he ought not to 
delay in giving battle. This matter being 
brought to a council, when he discovered that 
all thought the same thing, he appointed the 
next day for the fight. 

Cuap. XXIV.— Having drawn out all his 
forces at the break of day, and marshalled 
them in a double line, he posted the auxiliaries 
in the centre, and waited to see what measures 
the enemy would take. They, although on 
account of their great number and their ancient 
renown in war, and the small number of our 
men they supposed they might safely fight, 
nevertheless considered it safer to gain the 
victory without any wound, by besetting the 
passes [and] cutting off the provisions: and 
if the Romans, on account of the want of corn, 
should begin to retreat, they intended to attack 
them while encumbered in their march and 
depressed in spirit [as being assailed while] 
under baggage. ‘This measure being approved 
of by the leaders and the forces of the Romans 
drawn out, the enemy [still] kept themselves 
in their camp. Crassus having remarked this 
circumstance, since the enemy, intimidated by 
their own delay, and by the reputation [7. e., 
for cowardice arising thence] had rendered 
our soldiers more eager for fighting, and the 
remarks of all were heard [declaring] that no 
longer ought delay to be made in going to the 
camp, after encouraging his men, he marches 
to the camp of the enemy, to the great grat- 
ification of his ewn troops. 


i 
De 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 105 


Cuap. XXV.— There, while some were fill- 
ing up the ditch, and others, by throwing a 
large number of darts, were driving the defend- 
ers from the rampart and fortifications, and 
the auxiliaries, on whom Crassus did not much 
rety in the battle, by supplying stones and 
weapons [to the soldiers], and by conveying 
turf to the mound, presented the appearance 
and character of men engaged in fighting; 
while also the enemy were fighting resolutely 
and boldly, and their weapons, discharged from 
their higher position, fell with great effect ; the 
horse, having gone round the camp of the 
enemy, reported to Crassus that the camp was 
not fortified with equal care on the side of the 
Decuman gate, and had an easy approach. 

Cuap. XXVI.—Crassus, having exhorted 
the commanders of the horse to animate their 
men by great rewards and promises, points 
out to them what he wished to have done. 
They, as they had been commanded, having 
brought out the four cohorts, which, as they 
had been left as a guard for the camp, were 
not fatigued by exertion, and having led them 
round by a somewhat longer way, lest they 
could be seen from the camp of the enemy, 
when the eyes and minds of all were intent upon 
the battle, quickly arrived at those fortifications 
which we have spoken of, and, having demol- 
ished these, stood in the camp of the enemy 
before they were seen by them, or it was 
known what wasgoing on. And then, a shout 
being heard in that quarter, our men, their 
strength having been recruited (which usually 


106 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


occurs on the hope of victory), began to fight 
more vigorously. ‘The enemy surrounded on 
all sides, [and] all their affairs being despaired 
of, made great attempts to cast themselves 
down over the ramparts and toseek safety in 
flight. These the cavalry pursued over the 
very open plains, and after leaving scarcely a 
fourth part out of the number of 50,000, which 
it was certain had assembled out of Aquitania 
and from the Cantabri, returned late at night 
to the camp. 

Cuap. XXVII. — Having heard of this bat- 
tle, the greatest part of Aquitania surrendered 
itself to Crassus, and of its own accord sent 
hostages, in which number were the Tarbelli, 
the Bigerriones, the Preciani, the Vocasates, 
the Tarusates, the Elurates, the Garites, the 
Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibuzates, the Coco- 
sates. A few [and those] most remote nations, 
relying on the time of the year, because winter 
was at hand, neglected to do this. 

Cuap. XXVIII.—About the same time 
Ceesar, although the summer was nearly past, 
yet, since, all Gaul being reduced, the Morini 
and the Menapii alone remained in arms, and 
had never sent ambassadors to him [to make 
a treaty | of peace, speedily led his army thither, 
thinking that that war might soon be termi- 
nated. They resolved to conduct the war on a 
very different method from the rest of the 
Gauls, for as they perceived that the greatest 
nations [of Gaul] who had engaged in war, 
had been routed and overcome, and as they 
possessed continuous ranges of forests and 


CHSAR’S COMMENTALIES. 107 


morasses, they removed themselves and all 
their property thither. When Cesar had 
arrived at the opening of these forests, and 
had begu> to fortify his camp, and no enemy 
was in the mean time seen, while our men were 
dispersed on their respective duties, they sud- 
denly rushed out from all parts of the forest, 
and made an attack on our men. The latter 
quickly took up arms and drove them back 
again to their forests ; and having killed a great 
many, losta few of their own men while pursu- 
ing them too far through those intricate places. 

Cuar. XXIX.— During the remaining days 
after this, Caesar began to cut down the forests ; 
and that no attack might be made on the flank 
of the soldiers, while unarmed and not fore- 
seeing it, he placed together (opposite to the 
enemy) all that timber which was cut down, 
and piled it up as a rampart on either flank. 
Whena great space had been, with incredible 
speed, cleared in a few days, when the cattle 
[of the enemy] and the rear of their baggage- 
train were already seized by our men, and they 
themselves were seeking for the thickest parts 
of the forests, storms of such a kind came on 
that the work was necessarily suspended, and, 
through the continuance of the rains, the sol- 
diers could not any longer remain in their tents. 
Therefore, having laid waste all their country, 
[and] having burnt their villages and houses, 
Ceesar led back his army and stationed them 
in winter quarters among the Aulerci and Lex- 
ovii, and the other states which had made war 
upon him last. 


108 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


BOOK IV. 


THE ARGUMENT. 


[.-III. The Usipétes and Tenchtheri, oppressed by the Suevi 
migrate from Germany into Gaul; the national character o 
the Suevi.—IV. The Usipétes and Tenchtheri possess them- 
selves of the estates of the Menapii.— V., VI. Cesar resolves 
to make war upon the Germans. — VII.-IX. Receives an 
overture of peace from them; their treacherous designs. — 
X. Description of the Meuse and the Rhine. — XI.-XV. The 
perfidy of the Germans; their overthrow and retreat. — 
XVI.,-X VII. Cesar’s bridge over the Rhine. —XVIIL., 
XIX. Cvsar leads his army into Germany; punishes the 
Sigambri; frees the Ubii from the tyranny of the Sueyi, and 
returns into Gaul. — XX.-XXII. His design upon Britain; 
preparations for the expedition. —XXIII.-XXVII. Carrieg 
it into effect; the defeat and surrender of the Britons. — 
XXVIII., XXIX. The Roman vessels overtaken by astorm. 
XXX. The Britons think to take advantage of this. —XXXI. 
Cesar defeats their designs. —XXXII. A stratagem of the 
Britons for attacking a Roman legion. —XXXIII. Their 
mode of fighting with chariots.— XXXIV. They advance 
to the Roman camp.—XXXV. Are defeated.— XXXVI. 
Sue for peace.— XXXVII., XXXVIII. The Morini attack 
two legions which had just returned from’ Britain and suffer 
a severe loss; Cesar goes into winter quarters among the 
Beige ; a thanksgiving of twenty days decreed by the senate 
for the successes of this campaign. 


Cuap. I.— The following winter (this was 
the year in which Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus 
were consuls) those Germans [called] the 
Usipétes, and likewise the Tenchtheri, with a 
great number of men, crossed the Rhine, not 
far from the place at which that river dis- 
charges itself into the sea. The motive for 
crossing [that river] was, that having been for 
several years harassed by the Suevi, they were 
constantly engaged in war, and hindered from 
the pursuits of agricuiture. The nation of the 


CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 109 


Suevi is by far the largest and the most war- 
like nation cf all the Germans. ‘They are said 
to possess a hundred cantons, from each of 
which they yearly send from their territories 
for the purpose of war a thousand armed men: 
the others who remain at home maintain 
[both] themselves and those engaged in the 
expedition. The latter again, in their turn, 
are in arms the year after: the former remain 
at home. ‘Thus neither husbandry nor the art 
and practice of war are neglected. But among 
them there exists no private and separate land ; 
nor are they permitted to remain more than 
one year in one place for the purpose of resi- 
dence. They do not live much on corn, but 
subsist for the most part on milk and flesh, 
and are much [engaged] in hunting ; which cir- 
cumstance must, by the nature of their food, 
and by their daily exercise and the freedom of 
their life (for having from boyhood been accus- 
tomed to no employment, or discipline, they 
do nothing at all contrary to their inclination), 
both promote their strength and render them 
men of vast stature of body. And to such a 
habit have they brought themselves, that even 
in the coldest parts they wear no clothing what- 
ever except skins, by reason of the scantiness 
of which, a great portion of their body is bare, 
and besides they bathe in open rivers. 

Cuap. Ii. — Merchants have access to them 
rather that they may have persons to whom 
they may sell those things which they have 
taken in war, than because they need any 
commodity to be imported to them. Moreover. 


116 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


even as to laboring cattle, in which the Gauls 
take the greatest pleasure, and which they 
procure at a great price, the Germans do not 
employ such as are imported. but those poor 
and ill-shaped animals, which belong to their 
country ; these, however, they render capable 
of the greatest labor by daily exercise. In 
cavalry actions they frequently leap from their 
horses and fight on foot; and train their horses 
to stand still in the very spot on which they 
leave them, to which they retreat with great 
activity when there is occasion ; nor, according 
to their practice, is anything regarded as more 
unseemly, or more unmanly, than to use hous- 
ings. Accordingly, they have the courage, 
though they be themselves but few, to advance 
against any number whatever of horse mounted 
with housings. They on no account permit 
wine to be imported to them, because they 
consider that men degenerate in their powers 
of enduring fatigue, and are rendered effemi- 
nate by that commodity. 

Cuap. ILI.—- They esteem it their greatest 
praise as a nation, that the lands about their 
territories lie unoccupied to a very great ex- 
tent, inasmuch as [they think] that by this 
circumstance is indicated, that a great number 
of nations cannot withstand their power; and 
thus on one side of the Suevi the lands are 
said to he desolate for about six hundred 
miles. On the other side they border on the 
Ubii, whose state was large and flourishing, 
considering the condition of the Germans, and 
wha are somewhat more refined than those of 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 111 


she same race and the rest [of the Germans], 
and that because they border on the Rhine, 
and are much resorted to by merchants, and 
are accustomed to the manners of the Gauls, by 
reason of their proximity to them. Though 
the Suevi, after making the attempt frequently 
and in several wars, could not expel this nation 
from their territories, on account of the extent 
and population of their state, yet they made 
them tributaries, and rendered them less dis- 
tinguished and powerful [than they had ever 
veen |. 

Cuap. IV.—In the same condition were the 
Usipétes and the Tenchtheri (whom we have 
mentioned above), who for.many years resisted 
the power of the Suevi, but being at last diiven 
from their possessions, and having wandered 
through many parts of Germany, came to the 
Rhine, to districts which the Menapii inhab- 
ited, and where they had lands, houses, and 
villages on either side of the river. ‘The latter 
people, alarmed by the arrival of so great a 
multitude, removed from those houses which 
they had on the other side of the river, and 
having placed guards on this side the Rhine, 
proceeded to hinder the Germans from cross- 
ing. They, finding themselves, after they had 
tried all means, unable either to force a passage. 
on account of their deficiency in shipping, or 
cross by stealth on account of the guards of 
the Menapii, pretended to return to their own 
settlements and districts; and, after having 
proceeded three days’ march, returned; and 
their cavalry having performed the whole of 


112 CLESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


this journey in one night, cut off the Menapii, 
who were ignorant of, and did not expect 
{their approach, and] who, having moreover 
been informed of the departure of the Ger- 
mans by their scouts, had, without apprehen- 
sion, returned to their villages beyond the 
Rhine. Having slain these, and seized their 
ships, they crossed the river before that part 
of the Menapii, who were at peace in their 
settlements over the Rhine, were apprised of 
[their intention]; and seizing all their houses, 
maintained themselves upon their provisions 
during the rest of the winter. 

Cuap. V.— Cesar, when informed of these 
matters, fearing the fickle disposition of the 
Gauls, who are easily prompted to take up res- 
’ olutions, and much addicted to change, con- 
sidered that nothing was to be intrusted to 
them ; for it is the custom of that people to 
compel travellers to stop, even against their 
inclination, and inquire what they may have 
heard, or may know, respecting any matter ; 
and in towns the common people throng 
around merchants and force them to state 
from what countries they come, and what 
affairs they know of there. They often engage 
in resolutions concerning the most important 
matters, induced by these reports and stories 
alone ; of which they must necessarily instantly 
repent, since they yield to mere unauthorized 
reports ; and since most people give to their 
questions answers framed agreeably to their 
_ wishes. 

Cuap. VI.— Cesar, being aware of their 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 115 


custom, in order that he might not encounter 
a more formidable war, sets forward to the 
army earlier in the year than he was accus- 
tomed to do. When he had arrived there, he 
discovered that those things, which he had 
suspected would occur, had taken place ; that 
embassies had been sent to the Germans by 
some of the states, and that they had been 
entreated to leave the Rhine, and had been 
promised that all things which they desired 
should be provided by the Gauls. Allured by 
this hope, the Germans were then making 
excursions to greater distances, and had ad- 
vanced to the territories of the Eburones and 
the Condrusi, who are under the protection of 
the Treviri. After summoning the chiefs of 
Gaul, Ceesar thought proper to pretend igno- 
rance of the things which he had discovered ; 
and having conciliated and confirmed their 
minds, and ordered some cavalry to be raised, 
resolved to make war against the Germans. 
Cuapr. VII.— Having provided corn and 
selected his cavalry, he began to direct his 
march towards those parts in which he heard 
the Germans were. Whenhe was distant from 
them only a few days’ march, ambassadors 
come to him from their state; whose speech 
was as follows: ‘‘ That the Germans neither 
make war upon the Roman people first, nor 
do they decline, if they are provoked, to 
engage with them in arms; for that this was 
the custom of the Germans handed down to 
them from their forefathers, — to resist what- 
soever people make war upon them and not to 


114 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


avert it by entreaty ; this, however, they con. 
fessed,— that they had come hither relue- 
tantly, having been expelled from their coun- 
try. If the Romans were disposed to accept 
their friendship, they might be serviceable 
allies to them ; and let them either assign them 
lands, or permit them to retain those which 
they had acquired by their arms; that they 
are inferior to the Suevi alone, to whom not 
even the immortal gods can show themselves 
equal; that there was none at all besides on 
earth whom they could not conquer.” 

Cuap. VIII.—To these remarks Cesar 
replied in such terms as he thought proper; 
but the conclusion of his speech was, ‘‘ That 
he could make no alliance with them, if they 
continued in Gaul; that it was not probable 
that they who were not able to defend their 
own territories, should get possession of those 
of others, nor were there any lands lying waste 
in Gaul, which could be given away, espe- 
cially to so great a number of men, without 
doing wrong [to others]; but they might, if 
they were desirous, settle in the territories of © 
the Ubii; whose ambassadors were then with 
him, and were complaining of the aggressions 
of the Suevi, and requesting assistance from 
him; and that he would obtain this request 
from them.” 

Cuap. IX. — The ambassadors said that they 
would report these things to their countrymen ; 
and, after having deliberated on the matter, 
would return to Cesar after the third day ; they 
begged that he would not in the mean time 


v4SAR’S COMMENTARIES. 115 


advance his camp nearer to them. Cesar said 
that he could not grant them even that; for 
he had learned that they had sent a great part 
of their cavalry over the Meuse to the Ambi- 
variti, some days before, for the purpose of 
plundering and procuring forage. He sup- 
posed that they were then waiting for these 
horse, and that the delay was caused on this 
account. 

Cuap. X.— The Meuse rises from mount 
Le Vosge, which is in the territories of the 
Lingones ; and, having received a branch of 
the Rhine, which is called the Waal, forms the 
island of the Batavi, and not more than eighty 
miles from it it falls into the ocean. But the 
Rhine takes its source among the Lepontii, who 
inhabit the Alps, and is carried with a rapid 
current for a long distance through the terri- 
tories of the Sarunates, Helvetii, Sequani, 
Mediomatrici, Tribuci, and Treviri, and when 
it approaches the ocean, divides into several 
branches ; and having formed many and exten- 
sive islands, a great part of which are inhabited 
by savage and barbarous nations (of whom there 
are some who are supposed to live on fish and 
the eggs of sea-fowl), flows into the ocean by 
several mouths. 

Cuap. XI.—When Cesar was not more 
than twelve miles distant from the enemy, the 
ambassadors return to him, as had been 
arranged; who, meeting him on the march, 
earnestly entreated him not to advance any 
farther. When they could not obtain this, they 
begged him to send on a despatch to those who 


116 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


had marched in advance of the main army, and 
forbid them to engage; and grant them per- 
mission to send ambassadors to the Ubii, and 
if the princes and senate of the latter would 
give them security by oath, they assured Ceesar 
that they would accept such conditions as 
might be proposed by him; and requested that 
he would give them the space of three days 
for negotiating these affairs. Cesar thought 


that these things tended to the self-same point | 


|as their other proposal] ; [namely] that, in 
consequence of a delay of three days inter- 
vening, their horse which were at a distance 
might. return ; however, he said, that he would 
not that d: ay ‘advance farther than four miles 
for the purpose of procuring water ; he ordered 
that they should assemble at that place in as 
large a number as possible, the following day, 
that he might inquire into their demands. In 
the mean time he sends messengers to the offi- 
cers who had marched in advance with all the 
cavalry to order them not to provoke the enemy 
to an engagement, and if they themselves were 
assailed, “to sustain the attack until he came up 
with the army. 

Cuar. XII.—But the enemy, as soon as 
they saw our horse, the number of which was 
5,000, whereas they themselves had not more 
than 800 horse, because those which had gone 
over the Meuse for the purpose of foraging had 
not returned, while our men had no apprehen- 
sions, because their ambassadors had gone 
away from Ceesar a little before, and that day 
had been requested by them as a period of 


ee oo ee ee 


CHSAR’S) COMMENTARIES. 117 


truce, made an onset on our men, and soon 
threw them into disorder. When our men, in 
their turn, made a stand, they, according to 
their practice, leaped from their horses to their 
feet, and stabbing our horses in the belly and 
overthrowing a great many of our men, put the 
rest to flight, and drove them forward so much 
alarmed that they did not desist from their 
retreat till they had come in sight of our army. 
In that encounter seventy-four of our horse 
were slain; among them, Piso, an Aquitanian, 
a most valiant man, and descended from a very 
illustrious family ; whose grandfather had held 
the sovereignty of his state, and had been styled 
friend by oursenate. He, while he was endeavy- 
oring to render assistance to his brother who 
was surrounded by the enemy, and whom he 
rescued from danger, was himself thrown from 
his horse, which was wounded under him, but 
still opposed [his antagonists] with the great- 
est intrepidity, as long as he was able to main-~ 
tain the conflict. When at length he fell, sur- 
rounded on all sides and after receiving many 
wounds, and his brother. who had then retired 
from the fight, observed it from a distance, he 
spurred on his horse, threw himself upon the 
enemy, and was killed. 

Cuar. XIII. — After this engagement, Cze- 
sar considered that neither ought ambassadors 
to be received to audience, nor conditions be 
accepted by him from those who, after having 
sued for peace by way of stratagem and 
treachery, had made war without provocation. 
And to wait till the enemy’s forces were aug: 


118 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


mented and their cavalry had returned, he 
concluded, would be the greatest madness ; 
and knowing the fickleness of the Gauls, he 
felt how much influence the enemy had. already 
acquired among them by this one skirmish. 
He [therefore] deemed that no time for con- 
certing measures ought to be afforded them. 
After having resolved on these things and 
communicated his plans to his lieutenants and 
questor in order that he might not suffer any 
ppportunity for engaging to escape him, a very 
seasonable event occurred, namely, that on 
the morning of the next day, a large body of 
Germans, consisting of their princes and old 
men, came to the camp to him to practise the 
same treachery and dissimulation; but, as 
they asserted, for the purpose of acquitting 
themselves for having engaged in a skirmish 
the day before, contrary to what had been 
agreed and to what, indeed, they themselves 
had requested ; and also if they could by any 
means obtain a truce by deceiving him. 
Ceesar, rejoicing that they had fallen into his 
power, ordered them to be detained. He then 
drew all his forces out of the camp, and com- 
manded the cavalry, because he thought they 
were intimidated by the late skirmish, to fol- 
Jow in the rear. 

Cuap. XIV.— Having marshalled his army 
in three lines, and in a short time performed a 
march of eight miles, he arrived at the camp 
of the enemy before the Germans could per- 
ceive what was going on; who, being sud- 
denly alarmed by all the circumstances, both 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 119 


by the speediness of our arrival and the 
absence of their own officers, as time was 
afforded neither for concerting measures nor 
for seizing their arms, are perplexed as to 
whether it would be better to lead out their 
forces against the enemy, or to defend their 
camp, or seek their safety by flight. Their 
consternation being made apparent by their 
noise and tumult, our soldiers, excited by the 
treachery of the preceding day, rushed into 
the camp: such of them as could readily get 
their arms, for a short time withstood our 
men, and gave battle among their carts and 
baggage wagons; but the rest of the people, 
[consisting] of boys and women (for they had 
left their country and crossed the Rhine with 
Wl their families), began to fly in all direc- 
tions; in pursuit of whom Cesar sent the 
cavalry. 

Cuap. XV.—The Germans, when, upon 
hearing a noise behind them, [they looked 
and] saw that their families were being slain, 
throwing away their arms and abandoning 
their standards, fled out of the camp, and 
when they had arrived at the confluence of the 
Meuse and the Rhine, the survivors, despair- 
ing of further escape, as a great number of 
their countrymen had been killed, threw them- 
selves into the river, and there perished, over- 
come by fear, fatigue, and the violence of the 
stream. Our soldiers, after the alarm of so 
great a war, for the number of the enemy 
amounted to 430,000, returned to their camp, 
all safe to a man, very few being even 


120 CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


wounded. Cesar granted those whom he had 
detained in the camp liberty of departing. 
They, however, dreading revenge and torture 
from the Gauls, whose land they had harassed, 
said that they desired to remain with him. 
Ceesar granted them permission. 

Cuap. XVI.— The German war being fin- 
ished, Ceesar thought it expedient for him to 
cross the Rhine, for many reasons; of which 
this was the most weighty, that, since he saw 
the Germans were so easily urged to go into 
Gaul, he desired they should have their fears 
for their own territories, when they discovered 
that the army of the Roman people both could 
and dared pass the Rhine. There was added 
also, that that portion of the cavalry of the 
Usipétes and the Tenchtheri, which I have 
above related to have crossed the Meuse for 
the purpose of plundering and procuring forage, 
and was not present at the engagement, had 
betaken themselves, after the retreat of their 
countrymen, across the Rhine into the territories 
of the Sigambri, and united themselves to them. 
When Cesar sent ambassadors to them, to 
demand that they should give up to him those 
whohad made war against him and against 
Gaul, they replied, ‘‘That the Rhine bounded 
the empire of the Roman people; if he did not 
think it just for the Germans to pass over into 
Gaul against his consent, why did he claim that 
anything beyond the Rhine should be subject 
to his dominion or power?” The Ubii, also, 
who alone, out of all the nations lying beyond 
the Rhine, had sent ambassadors to Cesar, 


SEE Ee eS ee ae a ET 


CASAR’S COMMENLARIES. 12} 


and formed an alliance and given hostages, 
earnestly entreated ‘+ that he would bring them 
assistance, because they were grievously op- 
pressed by the Suevi; or, if he was prevented 
from doing so by the business of the common- 
wealth, he would at least transport his army 
over the Rhine; that that would be sufficient 
for theit present assistance and their hope for 
the future ; that so great was the name and the 
reputation of his army, even among the most 
remote nations of the Germans, arising from 
the defeat of Ariovistus and this last battle 
which was fought, that they might be safe under 
the fame and friendship of the Roman people.” 
They promised a large number of ships for 
transporting the army. 

Cuap. XVII.—Cesar, for those reasons 
which I have mentioned, had resolved to cross 
the Rhine; but to cross by ships he neither 
deemed to be sufliciently safe, nor considered 
consistent with his own dignity or that of the 
Roman people. Therefore, although the great- 
est difficulty in forming a bridge was presented 
to him, on account of the breadth, rapidity, and 
depth of the river, he nevertheless considered 
that it ought to be attempted by him, or that 
his army ought not otherwise to be led over. 
He devised this plan of a bridge. He joined 
together at the distance of two feet, two piles, 
each a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little 
at the lower end, aud proportioned in length to 
the depth of theriver. After he had, by means 
of engines, sunk these into the river, and fixed 
them at the bottom, and then driven them in 


122 CEASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


with rammers, not quite perpendicularly, like 
a stake, but bending forward and sloping, so 
as to incline in the direction of the current of 
the river, he also placed two [other piles] oppo- 
site to these, at the distance of forty feet lower 
down, fastened together in the same manner. 
but directed against the force and current of 
the river. Both these, moreover, were kept 
firmly apart by beams two feet thick (the space 
which the binding of the piles occupied), laid 
in at their extremities between two braces on 
each side ; andin consequence of these being in 
different directions and fastened on sides the one 
opposite to the other, so great was the strength 
of the work, and such the arrangement of the 
materials, that in proportion as the greater 
body of water dashed against the bridge, so 
much the closer were its parts held fastened 
together. ‘These beams were bound together 
by timber laid over them in the direction of the 
length of the bridge, and were [then] covered 
over with laths and hurdles; and in addition to 
this, piles were driven into the water obliquely, 
at the lower side of the bridge, and these serv- 
ing as buttresses, and being connected with 
every portion of the work, sustained the force 
of the stream ; and there were others also above 
the bridge at a moderate distance ; thatif trunks 
of trees or vessels were floated down the river 
by the barbarians for the purpose of destroy- 
ing the work, the violence of such things might 
be diminished by these defences, and might 
not injure the bridge. 

Cuap. XVIII. — Within ten days after the 


Se 


CASAL’ S COMMENTARIES. 123 


timber began to be collected, the whole work 
was completed, and the whole army led over. 
Cesar, leaving a strong guard at each end of 
the bridge, hastens into the territories of the 
Sigambri. In the mean time, ambassadors 
from several nations come to him, whom, on 
their suing for peace and alliance, he answers 
in a courteous manner, and orders hostages to 
be brought to him. But the Sigambri, at the 
very time the bridge was begun to be built, 
made preparations for a flight (by the advice 
of such of the Tenchtheri and Usipétes as they 
had amongst them), and quitted their terri- 
tories and conveyed away all their possessions, 
and concealed themselves in deserts and woods. 

Cuap. XIX.— Cesar, having remained in 
their territories a few days, and burnt all their 
villages and houses, and cut down their corn, 
proceeded into the territories of the Ubii; and 
having promised them his assistance, if they 
were ever harassed by the Suevi, he learned 
from them these particulars: that the Suevi, 
after they had by means of their scouts found 
that the bridge was being built, had called a 
council, according to their custom, and sent or- 
ders to all parts of their state to remove from 
the towns and convey their children, wives, 
and all their possessions into the woods, and 
that all who could bear arms should assemble 
in one place; that the place thus chosen was 
nearly the centre of those regions which the 
Suevi possessed; that in this spot they had 
resolved to await the arrival of the Romans, 
and give them battle there. When Cesar dis- 


124 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


covered this, having already accomplished all 
these things on account of which he had re- 
solved tolead his army over, namely, to strike 
fear into the Germans, to take vengeance onthe 
Sigambri, and free the Ubii from the invasion 
of the Suevi, having spent altogether eighteen 
days beyond the Rhine, and thinking he had 
advanced far enough to serve both honor and 
interest, he returned into Gaul, and cut down 
the bridge. 

Cuap. XX.— During the short part of sum- 
mer which remained, Cesar, although in these 
countries, as all Gaul lies toward the north, 
the winters are early, nevertheless resolved to 
proceed into Britain, because he discovered 
that in almost all the wars with the Gauls suc- 
cors had been furnished to our enemy from 
that country; and even if the time of year 
should be insufficient for carrying on the war, 
yet he thought it would be of great service to 
him if he only entered the island, and saw into 
the character of the people, and got knowledge 
of their localities, harbors, and landing places, 
all which were for the most part unknown to 
the Gauls. For neither does any one except 
merchants generally go thither, nor even to 
them was any portion of it known, except the 
sea-coast and those parts which are opposite 
to Gaul. Therefore, after having called up to 
him the merchants from all parts. he could 
learn neither what was the size of the island, 
nor what or how numerous were the nations 
which inhabited it, nor what system of war 
they followed, nor what customs they used, 


} 
P: 
5 
; 
F 
4 
ah 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 125 


nor what harbors were convenient for a great 
number of large ships. 

Cuap. XXJI.— He sends before him Caius 
Volusenus with a ship of war, to acquire a 
knowledge of these particulars before he in 
person should make a descent into the island, 
as he was convinced that this was a judicious 
measure. He commissioned him to thoroughly 
examine into all matters, and then return to 
him as soon as possible. He himself proceeds 
to the Morini with all his forces. He orders 
ships from all parts of the neighboring coun- 
tries, and the fleet which the preceding sum- 
mer he had built for the war with the Venéti, 
to assemble in this place. In the mean time, 
his purpose having been discovered, and re- 
ported to the Britons by merchants, ambassa- 
dors come to him from several states of the 
island, to promise that they will give hostages, 
and submit to the government of the Roman 
people. Having given them an audience, he, 
after promising liberally, and exhorting them 
to continue in that purpose, sends them back 
to their own country, and [despatches] with 
them Commius, whom, upon subduing the 
Atrebates, he had created king there, a man 
whose courage and conduct he esteemed, and 
who he thought would be faithful to him, and 
whose influence ranked highly in those coun- 
tries. He orders him to visit as many states 
as he could, and persuade them to embrace the 
protection of the Roman people, and apprise 
them that he would shortly come thither. 
Volusenus, having viewed the localities as far 


126 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


as means could be afforded one who dared not 
leave his ship and trust himself to barbarians, 
returns to Cesar on the fifth day, and reports 
what he had there observed. 

Cuar. XXII.— While Cesar remains in 
these parts for the purpose of procuring ships, 
ambassadors come to him from a great por- 
tion of the Morini, to plead their excuse 
respecting their conduct on the late occasion ; 
alleging that it was as men uncivilized, and as 
those who were unacquainted with our cus- 
tom, that they had made war upon the Roman 
people, and promising to perform what he 
should command. Cesar, thinking that this 
had happened fortunately enough for hin, 
because he neither wished to leave an enemy 
behind him, nor had an opportunity for 
carrying on a war, by reason of the time of 
year, nor considered that employment in such 
trifling matters was to be preferred to his 
enterprise on Britain, imposes a large number 
of hostages; and when these were brought, 
he received them to his protection. Having 
collected together, and provided about eighty 
transport ships, as many as he thought neces- 
sary for conveying over two legions, he as- 
signed such [ships] of war as he had besides 
to the questor, his lieutenants, and officers 
of cavalry. There were in addition to these 
eighteen ships of burden which were pre- 
vented, eight miles from that place, by winds, 
from being able to reach the same port. 
These he distributed amongst the horse; the 
rest of the army he delivered to Q: Titurius 


CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 127 


Sabinus and &. Avrunculeius Cotta, his lieus 
tenants, to lead into the territories of the Me- 
napii and those cantons of the Morini from 
which ambassadors had not come to him. He 
ordered P. Sulpicius Rufus, his lieutenant, to 
hold possession of the harbor, with such a gar- 
rison as he thought sufficient. 

Cuap. XXIII. — These matters being ar- 
ranged, finding the weather favorable for his 
voyage, he set ‘sail about the third watch, and 
ordered the horse to march forward to the far- 
ther port, and there embark and follow him. 
As this was performed rather tardily by them, 
he himself reached Britain with the-first squad- 
ron of ships, about the fourth hour of the 
day, and there saw the forces of the enemy 
drawn up in arms on all the hills. The nature 
of the place was this: the sea was confined by 
mountains so close to it that a dart could be 
thrown from their summit upon the shore. Con- 
sidering this by no means a fit place for disem- 
barking, he remained at anchor till the ninth 
hour, for the other ships to arrivethere. Hay- 
ing in the mean time assembled the lieutenants 
and military tribunes, he told them both what he 
had learnt from Volusenus, and what he wished 
to be done; and enjoined them (as the prin- 
ciple of military matters, and especially as 

maritime affairs, which have a precipitate and 
uncertain action, required) that all things 
should be performed by them at a nod and at 
the instant. Having dismissed them, meeting 
both with wind and tide favorable at the same 
time, the signal being given and the anchor 


128 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


weighed, he advanced about seven miles from 
that place, and stationed his fleet over against 
an open and level shore. 

Cuap. XXIV.—But the barbarians, upon 
perceiving the design of the Romans, sent for- 
ward their cavalry and charioteers, a class of 
warriors of whom it is their practice to make 
great use in their battles, and following with 
the rest of their forces, endeavored to prevent 
our men landing. In this was the greatest 
difficulty, for the following reasons, namely, 
because our ships, on account of their great 
size, could be stationed only in deep water ; 
and our soldiers, in places unknown to them, 
with their hands embarrassed, oppressed with 
a large and heavy weight of armor, had at 
the same time to leap from the ships, stand 
amidst the waves, and encounter the enemy ; 
whereas they, either on dry ground, or advan- 
cing alittle way into the water, free in all their 
limbs, in places thoroughly known to them, 
could confidently throw their weapons and spur 
on their horses, which were accustomed to this 
kind of service. Dismayed by these circum- 
stances and altogether untrained in this mode 
of battle, our men did not all exert the same 
vigor and eagerness which they had been wont 
to exert in engagements on dry ground. ¢ 

Cuap. XXV.— When Cesar observed this, 
he ordered the ships of war, the appearance of 
which was somewhat strange to the barbarians | 
and the motion more ready for service, to be 
withdrawn a little from the transport vessels, 
and to be propelled by their oars, and be sta- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 129 


tioned towards the open flank of the enemy, and 
the enemy to be beaten off and driven away, 
with slings, arrows, and engines: which plan 
was of great service to our men; for the bar- 
barians being startled by the form of our ships 
and the motions of our oars and the nature of 
our engines, which was strange to them, 
stopped, and shortly after retreated a little. 
And while ourmen were hesitating | whether they 
should advance to the shore ], chiefly on account 
of the depth of the sea, he who carried the 
eagle of the tenth legion, after supplicating the 
gods that the matter might turn out favorably 
to the legion, exclaimed, ‘* Leap, fellow-sol- 
diers, unless you wish to betray your eagle to 
the enemy. I, for my part, will perform my 
duty to the commonwealth and my general.” 
When he had said this with a loud voice, he 
leaped from the ship and proceeded to bear 
the eagle toward the enemy. ‘Then our men, 
exhorting one another that so great a disgrace 
should not be incurred, all leaped from the ship. 
When those in the nearest vessels saw them, 
they speedily followed and approached the 
enemy. 

Cuap. XXVI.— The battle was maintained 
vigorously on both sides. Our men, however, 
as they could neither keep their ranks, nor get 
firm footing, nor follow their standards, and as 
one from one ship and another from another 
assembled around whatever standards they met, 
were thrown into great confusion. But the 
enemy, who were acquainted with all the shal- 
lows, when from the shore they saw any com- 


130 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


ing from a ship one by one, spurred on their 
horses, and attacked them while embarrassed, 
many surrounded a few, others threw their 
weapons upon our collected forces on their 
exposed flank. When Cesar observed this, 
he ordered the boats of the ships of war and 
the spy sloops to be filled with soldiers, and 
sent them up to the succor of those whom he 
had observed in distress. Our men, as soon as 
they made good their footing on dry ground, 
and all their comrades had joined them, made 
an attack upon the enemy, and put them to 
flight, but could not pursue them very far, 
because the horse had not been able to main- 
tain their course at sea and reach the island. 
‘This alone was wanting to Czesar’s accustomed 
success. 

Cuar. XXVII.—The enemy being thus 
vanquished in battle, as soon as they recovered 
after their flight, instantly sent ambassadors 
to Cesar to negotiate about peace. They prom- 
ised to give hostages and perform what he 
should command. ‘Together with these ambas- 
sadors came Commius the Atrebatian, who, as 
I have above said, had been sent by Ceesar into 
Britain. Him they had seized upon when leay- 
ing his ship, although in the character of 
ambassador he bore the general’s commission to 
them, and thrown into chains: then after the 
battle was fought, they sent him back, and in 
suing for peace cast the blame of that act upon 
the common people, and entreated that it might; 
be pardoned on account of their indiscretion. 
Cesar, complaining, that after they had sued 


C4AISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 181 


for peace, and had voluntarily sent ambassa- 
bors into the continent for that purpose, they 
had made war without a reason, said that he 
would pardon their indiscretion, and imposed 
hostages, a part of whom they gave immedi- 
ately ; the rest they said they would give in a 
few days, since they were sent for from remote 
places. In the mean time they ordered their 
people to return to the country parts, and the 
chiefs assembled from all’ quarters, and pro- 
ceeded to surrender themselves and their states 
to Ceesar. 

Cuap. XXVIII.—A peace being estab- 
lished by these proceedings four days after we 
had come into Britain, the eighteen ships, to 
which reference has been made above, and 
which conveyed the cavalry, set sail from the 
upper port with a gentle gale; when, how- 
ever, they were approaching Britain and were 
seen from the camp, so great a storm sud- 
denly arose that none of them could maintain 
their course at sea; and some were taken 
back to the same port from which they had 
started ; others, to their great danger, were 
driven to the lower part of the island, nearer 
to the west; which, however, after having 
cast anchor, as they were getting filled with 
water, put out to sea through necessity in a 
stormy night, and made for the continent. 
Cap. XXIX. — It happened that night to 
be full moon, which usually occasions very 
high tides in that ocean; and that circum- 
stance was unknown to our men. Thus, at 
the same time, the tide began to fill the ships 


132 CASAR’S ~COMMENTARIES. ~ 


of war which Cesar had provided to convey 
over his army, and which he had drawn up on 
the strand; and the storm began to dash the 
ships of burden which were riding at anchor 
against each other; nor was any means af- 
forded our men of either managing them or 
of rendering any service. A great many ships 
having been wrecked, inasmuch as the rest, 
having lost their cables, anchors, and other 
tackling, were unfit for sailing, a great confu- 
sion, as would necessarily happen, arose 
throughout the army; for there were no other 
ships in which they could be conveyed back, 
and all things which are of service in repair- 
ing vessels were wanting, and corn for the 
winter had not been provided in those places, 
for it was understood by all that they would 
certainly winter in Gaul. 

Cuap. XXX.-—On discovering these things 
the chiefs of Britain, who had come up after 
the battle was fought to perform those condi- 
tions which Czesar had imposed, held a con- 
ference, when they perceived that cavalry, and 
ships, and corn were wanting to the Romans, 
and discovered the small number of our sol- 
diers from the small extent of the camp (which, 
too, was on this account more limited than 
ordinary, because Cesar had conveyed over his 
legions without baggage), and thought that 
the best plan was to renew the war, and cut 
off our men from corn and provisions and pro- 
tract the affair till winter; because they felt 
confident, that, if they were vanquished or cut 
off from a return, no one would afterwards 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 133 


pass over into Britain for the purpose of mak- 
ing war. Therefore, again entering into a 
conspiracy, they began to depart from the 
camp by degrees and secretly bring up their 
people from the country parts. 

Cuapr. XXXI.— Rut Cesar, although he 
had not as yet discovered their measures, yet, 
both from what had occurred to his ships, and 
from the circumstance that they had neglected 
io give the promised hostages, suspected that 
the thing would come to pass which really dic 
happen. He therefore provided remedies 
against all contingencies; for he daily con- 
veyed corn from the country parts into the 
camp, used the timber and brass of such ships 
as were most seriously damaged for repairing 
the rest, and o:dered whatever things besides 
were necessary for this object te be brought 
to him from the continent. And thus, since 
that business was executed by the soldiers 
with the greatest energy, he effected that, 
after the loss of twelve ships, a voyage could 
be made well enough in the rest. 

Cuap. XXXII.— While these things are 
being transacted, one legion had been sent to 
forage, according to custom, and no suspicion 
of war had arisen as yet, and some of the peo- 
ple remained in the country parts, others went 
backwards and forwards to the camp, they 
who were on duty at the gates of the camp 
reported to Czesar that a greater dust than was 
usual was seen in that direction in which the 
legion had marched. Czesar, suspecting that 
which was [really the case],— that some new 


134 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


enterprise was undertaken by the barbarians, 
— ordered the two cohorts which were on duty 
to march into that quarter with him, and two 
other cohorts to relieve them on duty ; the rest 
to be armed and follow him immediately. 
When he had advanced some little way from 
the camp, he saw that his men were overpow- 
ered by the enemy and scarcely able to stand 
their ground, and that, the legion being 
crowded together, weapons were being cast 
on them from all sides. For as all the corn 
was reaped in every part with the exception 
of one, the enemy, suspecting that our men 
would repair to that, had concealed them- 
selves in the woods during the night.. Then 
attacking them suddenly, scattered as they 
were, and when they had laid aside their arms, 
and were engaged in reaping, they killed a 
small number, threw the rest into confusion, 
and surrounded them with their cavalry and 
chariots. 

Cuap. XXXIII.— Their mode of fighting 
with their chariots is this: first, they drive 
about in all directions and throw their weapons 
~ and generally break the ranks of the enemy 
with the very dread of their horses and the 
noise of their wheels; and when they have 
worked themselves in between the troops of 
horse, leap from their chariots and engage on 
foot. ‘The charioteers in the mean time with- 
draw some little distance from the battle, and 
so place themselves with the chariots that, 
if their masters are overpowered by the num- 
ber of the enemy, they may have a ready 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 135 


retreat to their own troops. Thus they dis- 
play in battle the speed of horse, [together 
with] the firmness of infantry; and by daily 
practice and exercise attain to such expert- 
ness that they are accustomed, even on a de- 
clining and steep place, to check their horses 
at full speed, and manage and turn them in 
an instant and run along the pole, and stand 
on the yoke, and thence betake themselves 
with the greatest celerity to their chariots 
again. 

Cuap. XXXIV.—Under these  circum- 
stances, our men being dismayed by the nov- 
elty of this mode of battle, Caesar most season- 
ably brought assistance ; for upon his arrival 
the enemy paused, and our men recovered from 
their fear; upon which, thinking the time un- 
favorable for provoking the enemy and coming 
to an action, he kept himself in his own quar- 
ter, and a short time having intervened, drew 
back the legions into the camp. While these 
things are going on, and all our men engaged, 
the rest of the Britons, who were in the fields, 
departed. Storms then set in for several suc- 
cessive days, which both confined our men to 
camp and hindered the enemy from attacking 
us. In the mean time the barbarians de- 
spatched messengers to all parts, and reported 
to their people the small number of our sol- 
diers. and how good an opportunity was given 
for obtaining spoil and for hberating them- 
selves forever, if they should only drive the 
Romans from their camp. Having by these 
means speedily got together a large force of 


136 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


infantry and of cavalry, they came up to 
the camp. 

Cuap. XXXV.—Although Cesar antici- 
pated that the same thing which had happened 
on former occasions would then occur; that, 
if the enemy were routed, they would escape 
from danger by their speed; still, having got 
about thirty horse, which Commius the Atre- 
batian, of whom mention has been made, had 
brought over with him [from Gaul], he drew 
up the legions in order of battle before the 
camp. When the action commenced, the 
enemy were unable to sustain the attack of 
our men long, and turned their backs; our 
men pursued them as far as their speed and 
strength permitted, and slew a great number 
of them; then, having destroyed and burnt 
everything far and wide, they retreated to 
their camp. 

Cuarp. XXXVI.— The same day, ambassa- 
dors sent by the enemy came to Cesar to ne- 
gotiate a peace. Cesar doubled the number 
of hostages which he had before demanded ; 
and ordered that they should be brought over 
to the continent, because, since the time of 
the equinox was near, he did not consider that, 
with his ships out of repair, the voyage ought 
to be deferred till winter. Having met with 
favorable weather, he set sail a little after mid- 
night, and all his fleet arrived safe at the con- 
tinent, except two of the ships of burden 
which could not make the same port which the 
other ships did, and were carried a little lower 
down. 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 137 


CHap. XX XVII.— When our soldiers, 
about 3800 in number, had been drawn out of 
these two ships, and were marching to the 
samp, the Morini, whom Cesar, when setting 
forth for Britain, had left in a state of peace, 
excited by the hope of spoil, at first sur- 
rounded them with a small number of men, and 
ordered them to lay down their arms, if they 
did not wish to be slain; afterwards, however, 
when they, forming a circle, stood on their de- 
fence, a shout was raised and about 6,000 of 
the enemy soon assembled; which being re- 
ported, Ceesar sent all the cavalry in the camp 
as arelief to his men. In the mean time our 
soldiers sustained the attack of the enemy, 
and fought most valiantly for more than four 
hours, and, receiving but few wounds them- 
selves, slew several of them. But after our 
cavalry came in sight, the «nemy, throwing 
away their arms, turned thcir backs, and a 
great number of them were killed. 

CHap. XX XVIII. — The day following Ce- 
sar sent Labienus, his lieutenant, with those 
legions which he had brought back from Britain, 
avainst the Morini, who had revolted ; who, as 
they had no place to which they might retreat, 
on account of the drying up of their marshes 
(which they had availed themselves of as a 
place of refuge the preceding year), almost all 
fell into the power of Labienus. In the mean 
time Ceesar’s lieutenants, Q. Titurius and L. 
Cotta, who had led the levions into the territo- 
ries of the Menapii, having laid waste all their 
lands, cut down their corn and burnt their 


138 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


houses. returned to Czesar because the Menapilt 
had all concealed themselves in their thickest 
woods. Czesar fixed the winter quarters of all 
the legions amongst the Belge. Thither only 
two British states sent hostages; the rest 
omitted to do so. For these successes, a thanks- 
giving of twenty days was decreed by the sen- 
ate upon receiving Czesar’s letter. 


CHESAR’?S COMMENTARIES. 139 


BOOK V. 


THE ARGUMENT. 


[. Czesar orders a large fleet of peculiarly constructed ships to 
. be built; proceeds against the Piruste; they submit.—TII. 
Returns into Hither Gaul; marches against the Treviri. — III. 
Indutiomirus and Cingetorix. — V. Ceesar goes to port Itins; 
his policy in taking certain Gallic chieftains with hir to 
Britain. — VI. Dumnorix, who was to have been in that 
number, by craft and violence, escapes attending Cesar, but 
is slain. — VII. Cesar proceeds on his second expedition 
against Britain. —IX. The bold resistance of the Britons; 
they are defeated. —X. The Roman fleet suffers severely in 
astorm.— XI. Czsar gives orders to Labienus to build more 
ships; Cassivellaunu .— XII.-XIV.— Description of Bri- 
tain and its inhabitants. —XVII. The Britains again pre- 
pare for war, and receive a signal defeat.— XVIII. Cesar 
advances into the territories of Cassivellaunus as far as the 
Thames; an engagement with that prince.— XIX. The strat- 
agem of Cassivellaunus.—XX. The Trinobantes send 
ambassadors to Cesar respecting the conduct of Cassivel- 
launus towards Mandubratius. — XXIT. The latter induces 
four princes of Cantiumto attack the Romans, by whom 
they are defeated.— XXIII. Cesar receives hostages, and 
leads back his army into Gaul.— XXIV. He quarters his 
forces contrary to his custom, in several divisions. — XXV. 
Tasgetius.—XXVI. The revolt of Ambiorix and Cativol- 
cus.—XXVII. Ambiorix defends himself in reference to 
his share in the Gallic combination. —XXVIII.-XXXI. Dis- 
pute between Titurius and Cotta.— XXXII. The valor 
and conduct of Cotta. —XXXVIII.-XLII. The quarters of 
Cicero attacked by the Eburones; he sends intelligence to 
Cesar.—XLIV. The noble conduct of Pulfio and Varenus, 
—XLVIII.-LII. Cssar marches to the relief of Cicero; 
defeats the Eburones.—LIII. Indutiomiirus is thereby 
deterred from attacking the camp of Labienus.— LVI.- 
LVIII. Re-enforced, Indutiomirus attacks Labienus; hit 
forces are routed, and he isslain; Gaul becomes more tran 
quil. 


Cuap. I. —Lutius Domitius and Appius 
Claudius being consuls, Cesar, when departing 


from his winter quarters into Italy, as he had 
been accustomed to do yearly, commands the 


140 CLESAR’?S COMMENTARIES. 


lieutenants whom he appointed over the legions 
to take care that during the winter as many 
ships as possible should be built, and the old 
repaired. He plans the size and shape of 
them. For despatch of lading, and for draw- 
ing them on shore, he makes them a, little lower 
than those which we have been accustomed ty 
use in our sea; and that so much the more, 
because he knew that, on account of the fre- 
quent changes of the tide, less swells occurred 
there ; for the purpose of transporting burdens 
and a great number of horses,[ he makes them | 
a little broader than those which we use in 
other seas. All these he orders to be con- 
structed for lightness and expedition, to which 
object their lowness contributes greatly. He 
orders those things which are necessary for 
equipping ships to be brought thither from 
Spain. He himself, on the assizes of Hither 
Gaul being concluded, proceeds into Illyricum, 
because he heard that the part of the province 
nearest them was being laid waste by the incur- 
sions of the Pirustze. When he had arrived 
there, he levies soldiers upon the states, and 
orders them to assemble at an appointed place. 
Which circumstance having been reported [ to 
them], the Pirustz sent ambassadors to him to 
inform him that no part of those proceedings 
was done by public deliberation, and assert 
that they were ready to make compensation by 
all means for the injuries [inflicted]. Ceesar, 
accepting their defence, demands hostages, and 
orders them to be brought to him on a speci- 
fied day, and assures them that unless they did 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 141 


so he would visit their state with war. These 
being brought to*him on the day which he haa 
ordered, he appoints arbitrators between the 
states, who should estimate the damages and 
determine the reparation. 

Cuap. IIl.— These things being finished, 
and the assizes being concluded, he returns 
into Hither Gaul, and proceeds thence to the 
army. When he had arrived there, having 
made a survey of the winter quarters, he finds 
that, by the extraordinary ardor of the sol- 
diers, amidst the utmost scarcity of all mate- 
rials, about six hundred ships of that kind 
which we have described above, and twenty- 
eight ships of war, had been built, and were 
not far from that state, that they might be 
launched ina few days. Having commended 
the soldiers and those who had presided over 
the work, he informs them what he wishes to 
be done, and orders all the ships to assemble 
at port Itius, from which port he had learned 
that the passage into Britain was shortest, 
{being only] about thirty miles from the con- 
tinent. He left whatseemed a sufficient num- 
ber of soldiers for that design ; he himself pro- 
ceeds into the territories of the Treviri with 
four legions without baggage, and 800 horse, 
because they neither came to the general diets 
[of Gaul], nor obeyed his commands, and 
were, moreover, said to be tampering with the 
Germans beyond the Rhine. 

Cuar. III. — This state is by far the most 
powerful of all Gaul in cavalry, and has great 
forces of infantry, and as we have remarked 


142 C#HSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


above, borders on the Rhine. In that state, 
two persons, Indutiomarus* and Cingetorix, 
were then contending with each other for the 
supreme power; one of whom, as soon as the 
arrival of Cesar and his legions was known, 
came to him; assures him that he and all his 
party would continue in their allegiance, and 
not revolt from the alliance of the Roman 
people, and informs him of the things which 
were going on amongst the Treviri. But Indu- 
tiomarus began to collect cavalry and infantry, 
and make preparations for war, having con- 
cealed those who by reason of their age could 
not be under arms, in the forest Arduenna, 
which is of immense size, [and] extends from 
the Rhine across the country of the Treviri to 
the frontiers of the Remi. But after that, some 
of the chief persons of the state, both influ- 
enced by their friendship for Cingetorix, and 
alarmed at the arrival of our army, came to 
Cesar and began to solicit him privately about 
their own interests, since they could not pro- 
vide for the safety of the state} Indutiomarus, 
dreading lest he should be abandoned by all, 
sends ambassadors to Cesar, to declare that 
he absented himself from his countrymen, and 
refrained from coming to him on this account, 
that he might the more easily keep the state 
in its allegiance, lest on the departure of all 
the nobility the commonalty should, in their 
indiscretion, revolt. And thus the whole state 
was at his control; and that he, if Cesar would 
permit, would come to the camp to him, and 
would commit his own fortunes and those of 
the state to his good faith. 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 143 


Cuap. IV.—Cesar, though he discerned 
from what motive these things were said, and 
what circumstance deterred him from his med- 
itated plan, still, in order that he might not 
be compelled to waste the summer among the 
Treviri, while all things were prepared for the 
war with Britain, ordered Indutiomarus to 
come to him with 200 hostages. When these 
were brought, [and] among them his son and 
near relations whom he had demanded by name, 
he consoled Indutiomarus, and enjoined him 
to continue in his allegiance ; yet, nevertheless, 
summoning to him the chief men of the Treviri, 
he reconciled them individually to Cingetorix : 
this he both thought should be done by him in 
justice to the merits of the latter, and also 
judged that it was of great importance that 
the influence of one whose singular attachment. 
towards him he had fully seen, should prevail 
as much as possible among his people. In- 
dutiomarus was very much offended at this 
act, [seeing that] his influence was diminished 
among his countrymen; and he, who already 
before had borne a hostile mind towards us, 
was much more violently inflamed against us 

through resentment at this. 
- CuHap. V.—These matters being settled, 
Cesar went to port Itius with the legions. 
There he discovers that forty ships which had 
been built in the country of the Meldi, having 
been driven back by a storm, had been unable 
to maintain the course, and had returned to 
the same port from which they had set out; 
he finds the rest ready for sailing, and fur- 


144 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


nished with everything. In the same place, 
the cavalry of the whole of Gaul, in number 
4,000, assembles, and [also] the chief persons 
ot all the states; he had determined to leave 
in Gaul a very few of them, whose fidelity 
towards him he hid clearly discerned, and 
take the rest with him as hostages; because 
he feared a commotion in Gaul when he should 
be absent. 

Cuap. VI.— There was together with the 
others, Dumnorix, the A¢duan, of whom we 
have made previous mention. Him in partic- 
ular he had resolved to have with him, because 
he had discovered him to be fond of change, 
fond of power, possessing great resolution, 
and great influence among the Gauls. To 
this was added, that Dumnorix had before 
said in an assembly of duans, that the sov- 
ereignty of the state had been made ove. to 
him by Czesar; which speech the Aédui bore 
with impatience and yet dared not send am- 
bassadors to Ceesar for the purpose of either 
rejecting or deprecating [that appointment]. 
That fact Csesar had learned from his own 
personal friends. He at first strove to obtain 
by every entreaty that he should be left in 
Gaul; partly, because, being unaccustomed 
to sailing, he feared the sea; partly, because 
he said he was prevented by divine .admoni- 
tions. After he saw that this request was firmly 
refused him, all hope of success being lost, he 
began to tamper with the chie persons of the 
Gauls, to call them apart singly and exhort 
them to remain on the continent; to agitate 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 145 


chem with the fear that it was not without rea- 
son that Gaul should be stript of all her no- 
bility; that it was Ceesar’s design, to bring 
over to Britain and put to death ali those whom 
he feared ‘o slay in the sight of Gaul, to pledge 
his honor to the rest, to ask for their oath that 
they would by common deliberation execute 
what they should perceive to be necessary for 
Gaul. These things were reported to Cesar 
by several persons. 

Cuap. VII.— Having learned this fact, Cze- 
sar, because he had conferred so much honor 
upon the A¢duan state, determined that Dum- 
norix should be restrained and deterred by 
whatever means he could; and ithat, because 
he perceived hi. insane design. to be pro- 
ceeding farther and farther, care should be 
taken lest he might be abl to injure him and 
the commonwealth. Therefore, having stayed 
about twenty-five days in that place, because 
the north wind, which usually blows a great 
part of every season, prevented the voyage, he 
exerted himself to keep Dumnorix in his 
- allegiance [and] nevertheless learn all his 
measures : having at length met with favorable 
weather, he orders the “foot soldi: s and the 
horse to embark in the ships. But, while the 
minds of all were occupied, Dumnorix began to 
take his departure from the camp homewards 
with the cavalry of the /Xdui, Cesar being 
ignorant of it. Cesar, on this matter being 
reported to him, ceasing from his expedition 
and deferring all other affairs, sends a great 
part of the cavalry to pursue him. and com- 


146 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


mands that he be brought back; he orders 
that if he use violence and do not submit, 
he be slain: considering that Dumnorix would 
do nothing as a rational man while he himself 
was absent, since he had disregarded his com- 
mand even when present. He, however, when 
recalled, began to resist and defend himself 
with his hand, and implore the support of his 
people, often exclaiming that ‘* he was free and | 
the subject of a free state.” They surround 
and kill the man as they had been commanded ; 
but the ASduan horsemen all return to Cesar. 

Cuap. VIIJ.— When these things were 
flone [and] Labienus left on the continent 
with three legions and 2,00! horse, to defend 
the harbors and provide corn, and discover 
what was going on in Gaul, and take meas- 
ures according to the occasion and according 
to the circumstance, he himself, with five 
legions and a number of horse, equal to that 
which he was leaving on the continent, set sail 
at sunset, and [though for a time) borne for- 
ward by a gentle southwest wind, he did not 
maintain his course, in consequence of the 
wind dying away about midnight, and being 
carried on too far by the tide, when the sun 
rose, espied Britain passed on hisleft. ‘Then, 
again, following the change of tide, he urged 
on with the oars that he might make that part 
of the islund in which he had discovered the 
preceding summer, that there was the best 
landing-place, and in this affair the spirit of 
our soldiers was very much to be extolled ; for 
they with the transports and heavy ships, the 


CAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 147 


labor of rowing not being [for a moment] dis- 
continued, equalled the speed of the ships of 
war. All the ships reached Britain nearly at 
mid-day ; nor was there seen a; single] enemy 
in that place, but, as Caesar afterwards found 
from some prisoners, though large bodies of 
troops had assembled there, yet being alarmed 
by the great number of our ships, more than 
eight hundred of which, including the ships of 
the preceding year, and those private vessels 
which each had built for his own convenience, 
had appeared at one time, they had quitted 
the coast and concealed themselves among the 
higher points. 

Cuap. IX.—Cesar, having disembarked 
his army and chosen a convenient place for 
the camp, when he discovered from the pris- 
oners in what part the forces of the enemy 
had lodged themselves, having left ten cohorts 
and 3v0 horse at the sea, to be a guard to the 
ships, hastens to the enemy, at the third 
watch, fearing the less for the ships for the 
reason that he was leaving them fastened at 
anchor upon an even and open shore; and 
he placed Q. Atrius over the guard of the 
ships. He himself, having advanced by night 
about twelve miles, espied the forces of the 
enemy. They, advancing to the river with 
their cavalry and chariots from the higher 
ground, began to annoy our men and give bat- 
tle. Being repulsed by our cavalry, they con- 
cealed themselves in woods, as they had se- 
cured a place admirably fortified by nature 
and by art, which, as it seemed, they had be: 


148 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


fore prepared on account of a civil war; fot 
all entrances to it were shut up by a great 
number of felled trees. ‘They themselves | 
rushed out of the woods to fight here and 
there, and prevented our men from enter- 
ing their fortifications. But the soldiers of 
the seventh legion, having formed a testado 
and thrown up a rampart against the fortifica- 
tion, took the place and drove them out of the 
woods, receiving only a few wounds. But 
Cesar forbade his men to pursue them in their 
flight any great distance ; both because he was 
ignorant of the nature of the ground, and be- 
cause, as a great part of the day was spent, 
he wished time to be left for the fortification 
of the camp. 

Cuap. X.—The next day, early in the 
morning, he sent both foot-soldiers and horse 
in three divisions on an expedition to pursue 
those who had fled. These having advanced a 
little way, when already the rear [of the 
enemy] was in sight, some horse came to 
Cesar from Quintus Atrius, to report that the 
preceding night, a very great storm having 
arisen, almost all the ships were dashed to 
pieces and cast upon the shore, because 
neither the anchers and cable could resist, nor 
eould the sailors and pilots sustain the violence 
of the storm; and thus great damage was re- 
ceived by that collision of the ships. 

Cuap. XI. — These things being known [to 
him], Cesar orders the legions and cavalry to 
be recalled and to cease from their march; he 
himself returns to the ships: he sees clearly 


CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 149 


before him almost the same things which he 
had heard of from the messengers and by let- 
ter, so that, about forty ships being lost, the 
remainder seemed capable of being repaired 
with much labor. Therefore he selects work- 
men from the legions, and orders others to be 
sent for from the continent ; he writes to Labi- 
enus to build as many ships as he could with 
those legions which were with him. He him- 
self, though the matter was one of great diffi- 
culty and labor, yet thought it to be most ex- 
pedient for all the ships to be brought up on 
shore and joined with the camp by one fortifi- 
cation. In these matters he employed about 
ten days, the labor of the soldiers being unre- 
mitting even during the hours of night. The 
ships having been brought up on shore and the 
camp strongly fortified, he left the same forces 
which he did before as a guard for the ships ; 
he sets out in person for the same place that 
he had returned from. When he had come 
thither, greater forces of the Britons had 
already assembled at that place, the chief 
- command and management of the war having 
been intrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose terri. 
tories a river, which is called the Thames, sep: 
arates from the maritime states at about 
eighty miles from the sea. At an earlier 
period perpetual wars had taken place between 
him and the other states ; but, greatly alarmed 
by our arrival, the Britons had placed him 
over the whole war and the conduct of it. 
Cuap. XII. — The interior portion of Brit- 
ain is inhabited by those of whom they say 


150 C.SAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


that it is handed down by tradition that they 
were born in the island itself: the maritime 
yortion by taose who had passed over from 
the country of the Belge for the purpose of | 
plunder and making war; almost all of whom 
are called by the names of those states from 
which being sprung they went thither, and 
having waged war, continued there and began 
to cultivate the lands. The number of the 
- people is countless, and their buildings exceed- 
ingly numerous, for the most part very like 
those of the Gauls: the number of cattle is 
great. They use either brass or iron rings, 
determined at a certain weight, as their money. 
Tin is produced in the midland regions ; in the 
maritime, iron; but the quantity of it is small: 
they employ brass. which is imported. There, 
as in Gaul, is timber of every description, ex- 
cept beech and fir. They do not regard it 
lawful to eat the hare, and the cock, and the 
goose; they, however, breed them for amuse- 
ment and pleasure. The climate is more tem- 
perate than in Gaul, the colds being less 
severe. 

 Caapr. XIII.— The island is triangular in 
its form, and one of its sides is opposite to 
Gaul. One angle of this side, which 1s in 
Kent, whither almost ail ships from Gaul are 
directed, [looks] to the east; the lower looks 
to the south. ‘This side extends about 500 
miles. Another side lies towards Spain and 
the west, on which part is Ireland, less, as is 
reckoned, than Britain, by one half; but the 
passage [from it] into Britain is of equal dis- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 151 


tance with that from Gaul. In the middle of 
this voyage is an island, which is called 
Mona; many smaller islands besides are sup- 
posed to lie [ there |], of which islands some have 
written that at the time of the winter solstice 
it is night there for thirty consecutive days. 
We, in our inquiries about that matter, ascer- 
tained nothing, except that, by accurate meas- 
urements with water, we perceived the nights to 
be shorter there than on the continent. The 
length of this side, as their account states, is 
700 miles. The third side is towards the 
north, to which portion of the island no land is 
opposite ; but an angle of that side looks prin- 
cipally towards Germany. This side is con- 
sidered to be 800 miles in length. Thus the 
whole island is [about] 2,000 miles in circum- 
ference. 

Cuap. XIV. — The most civilized of all 
these nations are they who inhabit Kent, which 
is entirely a maritime district, nor do they 
differ much from the Gallic customs. Most 
of the inland inhabitants do not sow corn, but 
_ live on milk and flesh, and are clad with skins. 
All the Britains, indeed, dye themselves with 
woad, which occasions a bluish color, and 
thereby have a more terrible appearance in 
fight. They wear their hair long, and have 
every part of their body shaved except their 
head and upper lip. Ten and-even twelve 
have wives common to them, and particularly 
brothers among brothers, and parents among 
their children; but if there be any issue by 
these wives, they are reputed to be the children 


152 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


of those by whom respectively each was first 
espoused when a virgin. 

Cuap. XV.— The horse and charioteers of 
the enemy contended vigorously in a skirmish 
with our cavalry on the march; yet so that our 
men were conquerors in all parts, and drove 
them to their woods and hills; but, having 
slain a great many, they pursued too eagerly, 
and lost some of their men. But the enemy, 
after some time had elapsed, when our men 
were off their guard, and occupied in the forti- 
fication of the camp, rushed out of the woods, 
and making an attack upon those who were 
placed on duty before the camp, fought in a 
determined manner; and two cohorts being 
sent by Cesar to their relief, and these sever- 
ally the first of two legions, when these had 
taken up their position ata very small distance 
from each other, as our men were disconcerted 
by the unusual mode of battle, the enemy broke 
through the middle of them most courageously, 
and retreated thence in safety. That day, Q. 
Laberius Durus, a tribune of the soldiers, was 
slain. The enemy, since more cohorts were 
sent against them, were repulsed. 

Cuap. XVI. — In the whole of this method 
of fighting, since the engagement took place 
under the eyes of all and before the camp, it 
was perceived that our men, on account of the 
weight of their arms, inasmuch as they could 
neither pursue [the enemy when] retreating, 
nor dare quit their standards, were little suited 
to this kind of enemy; that the horse also 
fought with great danger, because they [the 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 153 


Britons] generally retreated even designedly, 
and, when they had drawn off our men a short 
distance from the legions, leaped from their 
chariots and fought on foot in unequal [and to 
them advantageous | battle. But the system of 
cavalry engagement is wont to produce equal 
danger, and indeed the same, both to those 
who retreat and those who pursue. To this 
was added, that they never fought in close 
order, but in small parties and at great dis- 
tances, and had detachments placed [in differ- 
ent parts], and then the one relieved the other, 
and the vigorous and fresh succeeded the wea- 
ried. 

Cuap. XVII.— The following day the en- 
emy halted on the hills, at a distance from our 
camp, and presented themselves in small par- 
ties, and began to challenge our horse to bat- 
tle with less spirit than the day before. But 
at noon, when Cesar had sent three legions, 
and all the cavalry with C. Trebonius, the lieu- 
tenant, for the purpose of foraging, they flew 
upon the foragers suddenly from all quarters, 
_ so that they did not keep off [even] from the 
standards and the legions, Our men making 
an attack on them vigorously, repulsed them ; 
nor did they cease to pursue them until the 
horse, relying on relief, as they saw the legions 
behind them, drove the enemy precipitately 
before them, and, slaying a great number of 
them, did not give them the opportunity either 
of rallying, or halting, or leaping from their 
chariots. Immediately after this retreat, the 
auxiliaries, who had assembled from all sides, 


154 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


departed; nor after that time did the enemy 
ever engage with us in very large numbers. 

Cuar. XVIII. — Cesar, discovering their 
design, leads his army into the territories of 
Cassivellaunus to the river Thames; which 
river can be forded in one place only, and that 
with difliculty. When he had arrived there, 
he perceives that numerous forces of the enemy 
were marshalled on the other bank of the river ; 
the bank also was defended by sharp stakes 
fixed in front, and stakes of the same kind 
fixed under the water were covered by the river. 
These things being discovered from [some] 
prisoners and deserters, Caesar, sending for- 
ward the cavalry, ordered the legions to follow 
them immediately. But the soldiers advanced 
with such speed and such ardor, though they 
stood above the water by their heads only, that 
the enemy could not sustain the attack of the 
legions and of the horse, and quitted the banks, 
and committed themselves to flight. 

Cuap. XIX.—Cassiveilaunus, as we have 
stated above, all hope [rising out] of battle 
Deing laid aside, the greater part of his forces 
being dismissed, and about 4,000 charioteers 
only being left, used to observe our marches 
and retire a little from the road, and conceal 
himself in intricate and woody places, and in 
those neighborhoods in which he had discov- 
ered we were about to march, he used to drive 
the cattle and the inhabitants from the fields 
into the woods; and, when our cavalry, for 
the sake of plundering and ravaging the more 
freely, scattered themselves among the fields, 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 155 


he used to send out charioteers from the woods 
by all the well-known roads and paths, and, 
to the great danger of our horse, engage with 
them; and this source of fear hindered them 
from straggling very extensively. The result 
was that Cesar did not allow excursions to be 
made to a great distance from the main body of 
the legions, and ordered that damage should 
be done to the enemy in ravaging their lands 
and kindling fires only so far as the legion- 
ary soldiers could, by their own exertion and 
marching, accomplish it. 

Cuap. XX.—JIn the mean time, the Trino- 
bantes, almost the most powerful state of 
those parts, from which the young man Man- 
dubratius, embracing the protection of Cesar, 
had come to the continent of Gaul to [meet] 
him (whose father, Imanuentius, had_ pos- 
sessed the sovereignty in that state, and had 
been killed by Cassivellanus; he himself had 
escaped death by flight), send ambassadors. to 
Cesar, and promise that they wi!l surrender 
themselves to him and perform his commands ; 
' they entreat him to protect Mandubratius from 
the violence of Cassivellaunus, and send to 
their state some one to preside over it, and 
possess the government. Cvesar demands forty 
hostages from them, and corn for his army, 
and sends Mandubratius tothem. They speed- 
ily performed the things demanded, and sent 
hostages to the number appointed, and the corn. 

Cuapr. XXI.— The Trinobantes being pro- 
tected and secured from any violence of the 
soldiers, the Cenimagni, the Segontiadci, the 


156 CESAR’? S COMMENTARIES. 


Ancalites, the Bibréoci, and the Cassi, sending 
embassies, surrender themselves to Ceesar. 
From them he learns that the capital town of 
Cassivellaunus was not far from that place, 
and was defended by woods and morasses, 
and a very large number of men and of cattle 
had been collected in it. (Now the Britons, 
when they have fortified the intricate woods, 
in which they are wont to assemble for the 
purpose of avoiding the incursion of an en- 
emy, with an intrenchment und a rampart, 
call them a town.) ‘Thither he proceeds with 
his legions: he finds the place admirably for- 
tified by nature and art; he, however, un- 
dertakes to attack it in two directions. The 
enemy, having remained only a short time, 
did not sustain the attack of our soldiers, and 
hurried away on the other side of the town. 
A great amount of cattle was found there, 
and many of the enemy were taken and slain 
in their flight. 

Cuap. XXII. — While these things are go- 
ing forward in those places, Cassivellaunus 
sends messengers into Kent, which, we have 
observed above, is on the sea, over which dis- 
triets four several kings reigned, Cingetorix, 
Carvilius, Taximagulus and Segonax, and 
commands them to collect all their forces, and 
unexpectedly assail and storm the naval camp. 
When they had come to the camp, our men, 
after making a sally, slaying many of their 
men, and also capturing a distinguished leader 
named Lugotorix, brought back their own men 
in safety. Cassivellaunus, when this battle 


CHSAR*S COMMENTARIES. 157 


was reported to him, as so many losses had 
been sustained, and his territories laid waste, 
being alarmed most of all by the desertion of 
the states, sends ambassadors to Cesar [to 
treat] about a surrender through the media- 
tion of Commius the Atrebatian. Cesar, 
since he had determined to pass the winter on 
the continent, on account of the sudden re- 
volts of Gaul, and as much of the summer did 
not remain, and he perceived that even that 
could be easily protracted, demands hostages, 
and prescribes what tribute Britain should pay 
each year to the Roman people; he forbids 
and commands Cassivellaunus that he wage 
not war against Mandubratius ‘or the Trino- 
bantes. 

Cuap. XXIII.— When he had received the 
hostages, he leads back the army to the sea, 
and finds *the ships repaired. After launch- 
ing these, because he had a large number of 
prisoners, and some of the ships had been lost 
in the storm, he determines to convey back his 
army’ at two embarcations. And it so hap- 
pened, that out of so large a number of ships, 
in sO many voyages, neither in this nor in the 
previous year was any ship missing which con- 
veyed soldiers; but very few out of those 
which were sent back to him from the conti- 
nent empty, as the soldiers of the former con- 
voy had been disembarked, and out of those 
(sixty in number) which Labienus had taken 
care to have built, reached their destination ; 
almost all the rest were driven back, and 
when Cesar had waited for them for some 


158 CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


time in vain, lest he should be debarred from 
a voyage by the season of the year, inasmuch 
as the equinox was at hand, he of necessity 
stowed his soldiers the more closely, and, a 
very great calm coming on, after he had 
weighed anchor at the beginning of the second 
watch, he reached land at break of day and 
brought in all the ships in safety. 

Cuap. XXIV.—‘The ships having been 
drawn up and a general assembly of the Gauls 
held at Samarobriva, because the corn that 
year had not prospered in Gaul by reason of 
the droughts, he was compelled to station his 
army in its winter quarters, differently from 
the former years, and to distribute the legions 
among several states: one of them he gave to 
C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to be marched into 
the territories of the Morini; a second to Q. 
Cicero, into those of the Nervii; a third to L. 
Roscius, into those of the Essui,; a fourth he 
ordered to winter with T. Labienus, among 
the Remi in the confines of the Treviri; he 
stationed three in Belgium; over these he ap- 
pointed M. Crassus, his questor, and L. Muna- 
tius Plancus and C. Trebonius, his heuten- 
ants. One legion which he had raised last on 
the other side of the Po, and five cohorts, he 
sent amongst the Eburones, the greatest por- 
tion of whom lie between the Meuse and the 
Rhine, [and] who were under the government 
of Ambiorix and Cativoleus. He ordered Q. 
Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, 
his lieutenants, to take the command of these 
soldiers. The legions being distributed in this 


CH4iSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 159 


manner, he thought he could most easily rem- 
edy the scarcity of corn; and yet the winter 
quarters of all these legions (except that which 
-he had given to L. Roscius to be led into 
the most peaceful and tranquil neighborhood) 
were comprehended within [about] 100 miles. 
He himself in the mean while, until he had sta- 
tioned the legions and knew that the several 
winter quarters were fortified, determined to 
stay in Gaul. 

Cuapr. XXV.— There was among the Car- 
- nutes a man named Tasgetius, born of very 
high rank, whose ancestors had held the sov- 
ereignty in his state. To him Cesar had 
restored the position of his ancestors, in con- 
sideration of his prowess and attachment 
towards him, because in all his wars he had 
availed himself of his valuable services. His 
personal enemies had killed him when in the 
third year of his reign, many even of his own 
state being openly promoters [of that act]. 
This event is related to Cesar. He, fearing, 
because several were involved in the act, that 
_ the state might revolt at their instigation, 

orders Lucius Plancus, with a legion, to pro- 
ceed quickly from Belgium to the Carnutes, 
and winter there, and arrest and send to him 
the persons by whose instrumentality he should 
discover that Tasgetius was slain. In the 
mean time, he was apprised by all the lieuten- 
ants and questors to whom he had assigned 
the legions, that they had arrived in winter 
quarters, and that the place for the quarters. 
was fortified. 


160 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Cuar. XXVI.— About fifteen days after 
they had come into winter quarters, the begin- 
ning of a sudden insurrection and revolt arose 
from Ambiorix and Cativolecus, who, though 
they had met with Sabinus and Cotta at the 
borders of their kingdom, and had conveyed 
corn into our winter quarters, induced by the 
messages of Indutiomarus, one of the Treviri, 
excited their people, and after having sud- 
denly assailed the soldiers, engaged in procur- 
ing wood, came with a large body to attack 
the camp. When our men had speedily taken 
up arms and had ascended the rampart, and 
sending out some Spanish horse on one side, 
had proved conquerors in a cavalry action, the 
enemy, despairing of success, drew off their 
troops from the assault. Then they shouted, 
according to their custom, that some of our 
men should go forward to a conference, [al- 
leging] that they had some things which they 
desired to say respecting the common interest, 
by which they trusted their disputes could be 
removed. 
 Cuar. XXVII.—C. Arpineius, a Roman 
knight, the intimate friend of Q. Titurius, and 
with him, Q. Junius, a certain person from 
Spain, who already on previous occasions had 
been accustomed to go to Ambiorix, at Czesar’s 
mission, is sent to them for the purpose of 
a conference: before them Aybiorix spoke 
to this effect: ‘‘ That he confessed, that for 
Ceesar’s kindness towards him, he was very 
much indebted to him, inasmuch as by his aid 
he had been freed from a tribute which he had 


CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 161 


been accustomed to pay to the Aduatici, his 
neighbors ; and because his own son and the 
son of his brother had been sent back to him, 
whom, when sent in the number of hostages, 
the Aduatici had detained among them in 
slavery and in chains; and that he had not 
done that which he had done in regard to the 
attacking of the camp, either by his own judg- 
ment or desire, but by the compulsion of his 
state; and that his government was of that 
nature, that the people had as much of au- 
thority over him as he over the people. To 
the state moreover the occasion of the war was 
this — that it could not withstand the sudden 
combination of the Gauls ; that he could easily 
prove this from his own weakness, since he 
was not so little versed in affairs as to presume 
that with his forces he could conquer the 
Roman people; but that it was the common 
resolution of Gaul; that that day was ap- 
pointed for the storming of all Cesar’s winter 
quarters, in order that no legion should be 
able to come to the relief of another legion, 
that Gauls could not easily deny Gauls, espe- 
cially when a measure seemed entered into 
for recovering their common freedom. Since 
he had performed his duty to them on the score 
of patriotism [he said]. he has now regard to 
gratitude for the kindness of Cesar; that he 
warned, that he prayed Titurius by the claims 
of hospitality, to consult for his and his sol- 
diers’ safety; that a large force of the Ger- 
mans had been hired and had passed the Rhine ; 
that it would arrive in two days ; that it was for 


162 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


them to consider, whether they thought fit, be- 
fore the nearest people perceived it, to lead off 
their soldiers when drawn out of winter quar- 
ters, either to Cicero or to Labienus; one of 
whom was about fifty miles distant from them, 
the other rather more; that this he promised 
and confirmed by oath, that he would give them 
a safe passage through his territories; and 
when he did that, he was both consulting for 
his own state, beoaige it would be relieved 
from the winter quarters, and also making a 
requital to Ceesar for his obligations.” 

Cuap. XXVIII.—Arpineius and Junius 
relate to the lieutenants what they had heard. 
They, greatly alarmed by the unexpected affair, 
though those things were spoken by an enemy, 
still thought they were not to be disregarded ; 
and they were especially influenced by this con- 
sideration, that it was scarcely credible that 
the obscure and humble state of the Eburones 
had dared to make war upon the Roman 
people of their own accord. Accordingly, 
they refer the matter to a council, and a great 
controversy arises among them. L. Auruncu- 
leius, and several tribunes of the soldiers and 
the centurions of the first rank, were of opinion 
‘¢that nothing should be done hastily, and 
that they should not depart from the camp 
without Ceesar’s orders” ; they declared, ‘‘ that 
any forces of the Germans, however great, 

might be encountered by fortified winter 
quarters ; that this fact was a proof [of it] ; 
that they had sustained the first assault of 
the Germans most valiantly, inflicting many 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. ~ 163 


wounds upon them; that they were not dis- 
tressed for corn; that in the mean time relief 
would come both from the nearest winter 
quarters and from Cesar”; lastly, they put 
the query, ‘* what could be more undetermined, 
more undignified, than to adopt measures re- 
specting the most important affairs on the au- 
thority of an enemy?” 

Cuap. XXIX.—JIn opposition to those 
things Titurius exclaimed, ‘‘ That they would 
do this too late, when greater forces of the 
enemy, after a junction with the Germans, 
should have assembled ; or when some disaster 
had been received in the neighboring winter 
quarters ; that the opportunity for deliberat- 
ing was short; that he believed that Czesar 
had set forth into Italy, as the Carnutes would 
not otherwise have taken the measure of slay- 
ing ‘Tasgetius, nor would the Eburones, if he 
had been present, have come to the camp with 
so great defiance of us; that he did not regard 
the enemy, but the fact, as the authority ; that 
the Rhine was near; that the death of Ario- 
vistus and our previous victories were subjects 
of great indignation to the Germans; that 
Gaul was inflamed that after having received 
so many defeats she was reduced under the 
sway of the Roman people, her pristine glory 
in military matters being extinguished.” 
Lastly, ‘* who would persuade himself of this, 
that Ambiorix had resorted to a design of that 
nature without sure grounds? That his own 
opinion was safe on either side; if there be 
nothing very formidable, they would go with- 


164 CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


out danger to the nearest legion; if all Gaul 
conspired with the Germans, their only safety 
lay in despatch. What issue would the advice 
of Cotta and of those who differed from him, 
have? from which, if immediate danger was 
not to be dreaded, yet certainly famine, by a 
protracted siege, was.” 

Cuap. XXX.— This discussion having been 
held on the two sides, when opposition was 
offered strenuously by Cotta and the principal 
officers, ‘* Prevail,” said Sabinus, ‘‘ if so you 
wish it’; and he said it with a louder voice, 
that a great portion of the soldiers might hear 
him; **nor am I the person among you,” he 
said, ‘‘ who is most powerfully alarmed by the 
danger of death; these will be aware of it, 
and then, if anything disastrous shall have 
occurred, they will demand a reckoning at 
your hands; these, who, if it were permitted 
by you. united three days hence with the near- 
est winter quarters, may encounter the com- 
mon condition of war with the rest, and not, 
as if forced away and separated far from 
the rest, perish either by the sword or by 
famine.” 

Cuap. XXXI.— They rise from the council, 
detain both, and entreat, that ‘‘they do not 
bring the matter into the greatest jeopardy by 
their dissension and obstinacy; the affair was 
an easy one, if only they all thought and 
approved of the same thing, whether they 
remain or depart; on the other hand, they saw 
no security in dissension.” The matter is 
prolonged by debate until midnight. At’ las¢ 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 165 


Cotta, being overruled, yields his assent; the 
opinion of Sabinus prevails. It is proclaimed 
that they will march at daybreak; the re- 
mainder of the night is spent without sleep, 
since every soldier was inspecting his property, 
[to see] what he could carry with him, and 
what, out of the appurtenances of the winter 
quarters, he would be compelled to leave; 
every reason is suggested to show why they 
could not stay without danger, and how that 
danger would be increased by the fatigue of 
the soldiers and their want of sleep. At break 
of day they quit the camp, in a very extended 
line and with a very large amount of baggage. 
in such a manner as men who were convinced 
that the advice was given by Ambiorix, not 
as an enemy, but as most friendly [towards 
them ]. 

Cuar. XXXII.— But the enemy, after they 
had made the discovery of their intended 
departure by the noise during the night and 
their not retiring to rest, having placed an 
ambuscade in two divisions in the woods, in a 
suitable and concealed place, two miles from 
the camp, waited for the arrival of the Romans ; 
and when the greater part of the line of march 
had descended into a considerable valley, they 
suddenly presented themselves on either side 
of that valley, and began both to harass the 
rear aud hinder the van from ascending, and to 
give battle in a p!ace exceedingly disadvanta- 
geous to our men. 

Cuap. XXXIIJ. — Then at length Titurius, 
as one who had provided nothing beforehand, 


166 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


was confused, ran to and fro, and set about 
arranging his troops; these very things, how- 
ever, he did timidly and in such a manner that 
all resources seemed to fail him: which gen- 
erally happens to those who are compelled to 
take council in the action itself. But Cotta, 
who had reflected that these things might occur 
on the march, and on that account had not been 
an adviser of the departure, was wanting to the 
common safety in no respect; beth in address- 
ing and encouraging the soldiers, he performed 
the duties of a general, and in the battle those 
of a soldier. And since they [Titurius and 
Cotta] could less easily perform everything by 
themselves, and provide what was to be done 
in each place, by reason of the length of the 
line of march, they ordered [the officers] to 
give the command that they should leave the 
baggage and form themselves into an orb, which 
measure, though in a contingency of that na- 
ture it was not to be condemned, still turned 
out unfortunately; for it both diminished the 
hope of our soldiers and rendered the enemy 
more eager ‘for the fight, because it appeared 
that this was not done without the greatest 
fear and despair. Besides that happened, 
which would necessarily be the case, that the 
soldiers for the most part quitted their ensigns 
and hurried to seek and carry off from the bag- 
gage whatever each thought valuable, and all 
parts were filled with uproar and lamentation. 
Cuap. XXXIV.— But judgment was not 
wanting to the barbarians; for their leaders 
ordered [the officers] to proclaim through the 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 167 


ranks ‘* that no man should quit his place ; that 
the booty was theirs, and for them was reserved 
whatever the Romans should leave; therefore 
let them consider that aJl things depended on 
their victory.”? Our men were equal to them in 
fighting, both in courage and in number, and 
though they were deserted by their leader 
and by fortune, yet they still placed all hope of , 
safety in their valor, and as often as any 
cohort sallied forth on that side, a great num- 
ber of the enemy usually fell. Ambiorix, when 
he observed this, orders the command to be 
issued that they throw their weapons from a 
distance and do not approach too near, and in 
whatever direction the Romans should make 
an attack, there give way (from the lightness 
of their appointments and from their daily 
practice no damage could be done them) ; 
[but] pursue them when betaking themselves 
to their standards again. 

CHap. XXXV.— Which command having 
been most carefully obeyed, when any cohort 
had quitted the circle and made a charge, the 
enemy fled very precipitately. In the mean 
time, that part of the Roman army, of neces- 
sity, was left unprotected, and the weapons 
received on their open flank. Again, when 
they had begun to return to that place from 
which they had advanced, they were surrounded 
both by those who had retreated and by those 
who stood next them ; but if, on the other hand, 
they wished lo keep their place, neither was an 
opportunity left for valor, nor could:they, being 
crowded together, escape the weapons cast by 


168 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


so largea body of men. Yet, though assailed 
by so many disadvantages, [and] having 
received many wounds, they withstood the 
enemy, and, a great portion of the day being 
spent, though they fought from daybreak till 
the eighth hour, they did nothing which was 
unworthy of them. At length, each thigh of 
T. Balventius, who the year before had been 
chief centurion, a brave man and one of great 
authority, is pierced with a javelin; Q. Luca- 
nius, of the same rank, fighting most valiantly, 
is slain while he assists his son when sur- 
rounded by the enemy; L. Cotta, the leuten- 
ant, when encouraging all the cohorts and 
companies, is wounded full in the mouth by a 
sling. 

CuHap. XXXVI.—Much troubled by these 
events, Q. Titurius, when he had perceived 
Ambiorix in the distance encouraging his men, 
sends to him his interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to 
beg that he would spare him and his soldiers. 
He, when addressed, replied, ‘‘ If he wished 
to confer with him, it was permitted; that he 
hoped what pertained to the safety of the sol- 
diers could be obtained from the people; that 
to him, however, certainly no injury would be 
done, and that he pledged his faith to that 
effect.” He consults with Cotta, who had 
been wounded, whether it would appear right 
to retire from battle, and confer with Ambiorix ; 
[saying] that he hoped to be able to succeed 
respecting his own and the soldiers’ safety. 
Cotta says he will not go to an armed enemy, 
and in that perseveres. 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 169 


Cuarp. XXXVII.—Sabinus orders those 
tribunes of the soldiers whom he had at the 
time around him, and the centurions of the 
first ranks, to follow him, and when he had 
approached near to Ambiorix, being ordered 
to throw down his arms, he obeys the order 
and commands his men to do the same. In 
the mean time, while they treat upon the terms 
and a longer debate than necessary is design- 
edly entered into by Ambiorix, being sur- 
rounded by degrees, he is slain. Then they 
according to their custom shout out ‘* Victory,” 
and raise their war-cry, and, making an attack 
on our men, break their ranks. There L. 
Cotta, while fighting, is slain, together with 
the greater part of the soldiers; the rest be- 
take themselves to the camp, from which they 
had marched forth, and one of them, L. Petro- 
sidius, the standard bearer, when he was over- 
powered by the great number of the enemy, 
threw the eagle within the intrenchments and 
is himself slain while fighting with the great- 
est courage before the camp. They with diffi- 
culty sustain the attack till night; despairing 
of safety, they all to a man destroy themselves 
in the night. A few escaping from the battle, 
make their way to Labienus at winter quarters, 
after wandering at random through the woods, 
and inform him of these events. 

Cuap. XX XVIII. — Elated by this victory, 
Ambiorix marches immediately with his cay- 
alry to the Aduatuci, who bordered on his 
kingdom ; he halts neither day nor night, and 
orders the infantry to follow him closely. 


170 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Having related the exploit and roused the 
Aduatuci, the next day he arrived among the 
Nervii, and entreats ‘‘that they should not 
throw away the opportunity of liberating them- — 
selves forever and of punishing the Romans 
for those wrongs which they had received from 
them; [he tells them] ‘‘ that two lieutenants 
have been slain, and that a large portion of 
the army has perished; that it was not a mat- 
ter of difficulty for the legion which was win- 
tering with Cicero to be cut off, when suddenly 
assaulted; he declares himself ready to co- 
operate in that design.” He easily gains over 
the Nervii by this speech. 

Cuap. XXXIX.— Accordingly, messen- 
gers having been forthwith despatched to 
the Centrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the 
Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, all of whom are 
under their government, they assemble as large 
bodies as they can, and rush unexpectedly to 
the winter quarters of Cicero, the report of 
the death of Titurius not having as yet been 
conveyed to him. ‘That also occurred to him, 
which was the consequence of a necessary 
work, — that some soldiers who had gone off 
into the woods for the purpose of procuring 
timber and therewith constructing fortifica- 
tions, were intercepted by the sudden arrival 
of [the enemy’s] horse. These having been 
entrapped, the Eburones, the Nervii, and the 
Aduatuci and all their allies and dependants, 
begin to attack the legion: our men quickly 
run together to arms and mount the rampsrt: 
they sustained the attack that day with great 


CHSAR*S COMMENTARIES. 171 


difficulty, since the enemy placed all their hope 
in despatch, and felt assured that, if they 
obtained this victory, they would be conquerors 
forever. 

Cuap. XL.— Letters are immediately sent to 
Cresar by Cicero, great rewards being offered 
[to the messengers] if they carried them 
through. All the passes having been_beset, 
those who were sent are intercepted. During 
the night as many as 120 towers are raised 
with incredible despatch out of the timber 
which they had collected for the purpose of 
fortification: the things which seemed neces- 
sary to the work are completed. The follow- 
ing day the enemy, having collected far greater 
forces, attack the camp [and] fill up the ditch. 
Resistance is made by our men in the same 
manner as the day before: this same thing is 
done afterwards during the remaining days. 
The work is carried on incessantly in the night: 
not even to the sick, or wounded, is oppor- 
tunity given for rest: whatever things are 
required for resisting the assault of the next 
day are provided during the night: many 
stakes burnt at the end, and a large number of 
mural pikes are procured : towers are built up, 
battlements and parapets are formed of inter- 
woven hurdles. Cicero himself, though he 
was in very weak health, did not leave him- 
self the night-time for repose, so that he was 
forced to spare himself by the spontaneous 
movement and entreaties of the soldiers. 

Cuar. XLI.—Then these leaders and 
chiefs of the Nervii, who had any intimacy 


172 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


and grounds of friendship with Cicero, say 
they desire to confer with him. When per- 
mission was granted, they recount the same 
things which Ambiorix had related to Titurius, 
namely, ‘‘ that all Gaul was in arms, that the 
Germans had passed the Rhine, that the win- 
ter quarters of Cesar and of the others were 
attacked.” They report in addition also, 
about the death of Sabinus. They point to 
Ambiorix for the purpose of obtaining cre- 
dence; ‘‘they are mistaken,” say they, ‘‘if 
they hoped for any relief from those who dis- 
trust their own affairs; that they bear such 
feelings towards Cicero and the Roman peo- 
ple that they deny them nothing but winter 
quarters and are unwilling that this practice 
should become constant; that through their 
[the Nervii’s] means it is possible for them 
[the Romans] to depart from their winter 
quarters safely and to proceed without fear 
into whatever parts they desire.” To these 
Cicero made one reply: ‘that it is not the 
custom of the Roman people to accept any 
condition from an armed enemy: if they are 
willing to lay down their arms, they may em- 
ploy him as their advocate and send ambassa- 
dors to Cesar: that he believed, from his [Cz- 
sar’s| justice, they would obtain the things 
which they might request.” 

Cuap. XLII. —Disappointed in this hope, 
the Nervii surround the winter quarters with a 
rampart eleven feet high, and a ditch thirteen 
feet in depth. These military works they had 
learnt from our men in the intercourse of for- 


CHSAR'S COMMENTARIES. 173 


mer years, and, having taken some of our army 
prisoners, were instructed by them: but, as 
they had no supply of iron tools which are 
requisite for this service, they were forced to 
cut the turf with their swords, and to empty out 
the earth with their hands and cloaks, from 
which circumstance, the vast number of the 
men could be inferred; for in less than three 
hours they completed a fortification of ten 
miles in circumference ; and during the rest of 
the days they began to prepare and construct 
towers of the height of the ramparts, and grap- 
pling irons, and mantlets, which the same pris- 
oners had taught them. 

Cuap. XLIII.—On the seventh day of the 
attack, avery high wind having sprung up, 
they began to discharge by their slings hot 
balls made of burnt or hardened clay, and 
heated javelins, upon the huts, which, after 
the Gallic custom, were thatched with straw. 
These quickly tock tire, and by the violence of 
the wind, scattered their flames in every part 
of the camp. The enemy following up their 
success with a very loud shout, as if victory 
were already obtained and secured, began to 
advance their towers and mantlets, and climb 
the rampart with ladders. But so great was 
the courage of our soldiers, and such their 
presence of mind, that though they were 
scorched on all sides, and harassed by a vast 
number of weapons, and were aware that their 
baggage and their possessions were burning, 
not only did no one quit the rampart for the 
purpose of withdrawing from the scene, but 


174 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


scarcely did any one even then look behind ; 
and they all fought most vigorously and most 
valiantly. This day was by far the most calami- 


tous to our men; it had this result, however, 


that on that day the largest number of the 
enemy was wounded and slain, since they had 
crowded beneath the very rampart, and the 
hindmost did not afford the foremost a retreat. 
The flame having abated a little, and a tower 
having been brought up in a particular place 
and touching the rampart, the centurions of 
the third cohort retired from the place in 
which thev were standing, and drew off all 
their men: they began to call on the enemy 
by gestures and by words, to enter if they 
wished; but none of them dared to advance. 
Then stones having been cast from every 
quarter, the enemy were dislodged, and their 
tower set on fire. 

Cuap. XLIV.—In that legion there were 
two very brave men, centurions, who were now 
approaching the first ranks, T. Pulfio, and L. 
Varenus. ‘These used to have continual dis- 
putes between them which of them should be 
preferred, and every year used to contend for 
promotion with the utmost animosity. When 
the fight was going on most vigorously before 
the fortifications, Pulfio, one of them, says, 
‘¢ Why do you hesitate, Varenus? or what 
[better] opportunity of signalizing your valor 
do you seek? ‘This very day shall decide our 
disputes.”” Whenhe had uttered these words, 
he proceeds beyond the fortifications, and 
rushes on that part of the enemy which ap- 


) 


a 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 175- 


peared the thickest. Nor does Varenus re- 
main within the rampart, but respecting the 
high opinion of all, follows closeafter. ‘Then, 
when an inconsiderable space intervened, Pulfio 
throws his javelin at the enemy, and pierces. 
one of the multitude who was running up, and 
while the latter was wounded and slain, the 
enemy cover him with their shields, and all 
throw their weapons at the other and afford 
him no opportunity of retreating. The shield 
of Pulfio is pierced and a javelin is fastened in 
his belt. This circumstance turns aside his. 
scabbard and obstructs his right hand when 
attempting to draw his sword: the enemy 
crowd around him when [thus] embarrassed. 
His rival runs up to him and succors him in 
this emergency. Immediately the whole host 
turn from Pulfio to him, supposing the other to 
be pierced through by the javelin. Varenus 
rushes on briskly with his sword and carries on 
the combat hand to hand, and having slain 
one man, for a short time drove back the rest : 
while he urges on too eagerly, slipping into a. 
hollow, he fell. To him, in his turn, when 
surrounded, Pulfio brings relief: and both 
having slain a great number, retreat into the 
fortifications amidst the highest applause. 
Fortune so dealt with both in this rivalry and 
conflict, that the one competitor was a succor 
and a safeguard to the other, nor could it be 
determined which of the two appeared worthy 
of being preferred to the other. 

Cuapr. XLV. —In proportion as the attack 
became daily more formidable and violent, and 


176 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


particularly, because, as a great number of 
the soldiers were exhausted with wounds, the 
matter had come to a small number of defend- 
ers. more frequent letters and messages were 
sent to Cesar: a part of which messengers 
were taken and tortured to death in the sight 
of our soldiers. There was within our camp a 
certain Nervian, by name Vertico, born in a 
distinguished position, who in the beginning of 
the blockade had deserted to Cicero, and had 
exhibited his fidelity to him. He persuades 
his slave, by the hope of freedom, and by 
great rewards, to convey a letter to Cesar. 
This he carries out bound about his javelin, 
and mixing among the Gauls without any 
suspicion by being a Gaul, he reaches Cesar. 
From him they received information of the im- 
minent danger of Cicero and the legion. 

Cuap. XLVI. — Cesar having received the 
letter about the eleventh hour of the day, im- 
mediately sends a messenger to the Bellovaci, 
to M. Crassus, questor there, whose winter 
quarters were twenty-five miles distant from 
him. He orders the legion to set forward in 
the middle of the night and come to him 
with despatch. Crassus set out with the mes- 
senger. He sends another to C. Fabius, the 
lieutenant, ordering him to lead forth his legion 
into the territories of the Atrebates, to which 
he knew his march must be made. He writes 
to Labienus to come with his legion to the 
frontiers of the Nervii, if he could do so to the 
advantage of the commonwealth: he does not 
consider that the remaining portion of the 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 177 


army, because it was somewhat farther dis- 
tant, should be waited for; but assembles 
about 400 horse from the neares! winter quar- 
ters. 

Cuap. XLVII. — Having been apprised of 
the arrival of Crassus by the scouts at about 
the third hour, he advances twenty miles that 
day. He appoints Crassus over Samarobriva 
and assigns him a legion, because he was 
leaving there the baggage of the army, the 
hostages of the states, the public documents, 
and all the corn, which he had conveyed 
thither for passing the winter. Fabius, with- 
out delaying a moment, meets him on the 
march with his legion, as he had been com- 
manded. lLabienus, having learnt the death 
of Sabinus and the destruction of the cohorts, 
as all the forces of the Treviri had come 
against him, beginning to fear lest, if he made 
a departure from his winter quarters, resen- 
bling a flight, he should not be able to support 
the attack of the enemy, particularly since he 
knew them to be elated by their recent victory, 
_ sends back a letter to Cwsar. informing him 
with what great hazard he would lead out his 
legion from winter quarters; he relates at 
large the affair which had taken place among 
the Eburones; he informs him that all the in- 
fantry and cavalry of the Treviri had encamped 
at a distance of only three miles from his own 
camp 

Cuap. XLVIITI. — Cesar, approving of his 
motives. although he was disappointed in his 
expectation of three legions, and reduced to 


178 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


two, yet placed his only hopes of the common 
safety in despatch. He goes into the terri- 
tories of the Nervii by long marches. ‘There 
he learns from some prisoners what things are 
going on in the camp of Cicero, and in how 
great jeopardy the affair is. Then with great 
rewards he induces a certain man of the Gallic 
horse to convey a letter to Cicero. This he 
sends written in Greek characters, lest the let- 
ter being intercepted, our measures should be 
discovered by the enemy. He directs him, if 
he should be unable to enter, to throw his 
spear with the letter fastened to the thong, 
inside the fortifications of the camp. He 
writes in the letter, that he having set out with 
his legions, will quickly be there: he entreats 
him to maintain his ancient valor. The Gaul, 
apprehending danger, throws his spear as he 
had been directed. It by chance stuck in a 
tower, and, not being observed by our men 
for two days, was seen by a certain soldier on 
the third day: when taken down, it was car- 
ried to Cicero. He, after perusing it, reads it 
out in an assembly of the soldiers. and fills all 
with the greatest joy. Then the smoke of the 
fires was seen in the distance, a circumstance 
which banished all doubt of the arrival of the 
legions. 

Cuap. XLIX.— The Gauls, having dis- 
covered the matter through their scouts, aban- 
don the blockade, and march towards Cesar 
with all their forces: these were about 60,000 
armed men. Cicero, an opportunity being 
now afforded, again begs of that Vertico, the 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 179 


Gaul, whom we mentioned above, to convey 
back a letter to Caesar; he advises him to per- 
form his journey warily ; ; he writes in the letter 
that the enemy had departed and had turned 
their entire force against him. When this let- 
ter was brought to him about the middle of 
the night, Ceesar apprises his soldiers of its 
contents, and inspires them with courage for 
fighting: the following day, at the dawn, he 
moves his camp, and, having proceeded four 
miles, he espies the forces of the enemy on the 
other side of a considerable valley and rivulet. 
It was an affair of great danger to fight with 
such large forces in a disadvantageous situa- 
tion. For the present, therefore, inasmuch as 
he knew that Cicero was released from the 
blockade, and thought that he might, on that 
account, relax his ‘speed, he halted there and 
fortifies a camp in the most favorable position 
he can. And this, though it was small in 
itself, [there being] scarcely 7,000 men, and 
these too without baggage, still by the narrow- 
ness of the passages, he contracts as much as 
he can, with this object, that he may come into 
the greatest contempt with the enemy. In the 
mean while, scouts having been sent in all di- 
rections, he examines by what most convenient 
path he might cross the valley. 

Cuap. L.— That day, slight skirmishes of 
cavalry having taken place near the river, 
both armies kept in their own positions; the 
Gauls, because they were awaiting larger forces 
which had not then arrived ; Cesar, [to see | 
if perchance by pretence of fear he could allure 


180 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


the enemy towards his position, so that he 
might engage in battle, in front of his camp, 
on this side of the valley ; if he could not ac. 
complish this, that, having inquired about the 
passes, he might cross the valley and the river 
with the less hazard. At daybreak the cay. 
alry of the enemy approaches to the camp and 
joins battle with our horse. Czesar orders the 
horse to give way purposely, and retreat to the ~ 
camp: at the same time he orders the camp 
to be fortified with a higher rampart in all 
directions, the gates to be barricaded, and in 
executing these things as much confusion to 
be shown as possible, and to perform them 
under the pretence of fear. 

Cuap. LI. —Induced by these things, the 
enemy lead over their forces and draw up 
their lines in a disadvantageous position ; and 
as our men also had been led down from the 
ramparts, they approach nearer, and throw 
their weapons into the fortification from all 
sides, and sending heralds round, order it to be 
proclaimed that, if ‘‘ any, either Gaul or No- 
man, was willing to go over to them before the 
third hour, it was permitted; after that time 
there would not be permission ; and so much did 
they disregard our men, that the gates having 
been blocked up with single rows of turf as a 
mere appearance, because they did not seem 
able to burst in that way, some began to pull 
down the rampart with their hands, others to 
fill up the trenches. Then Cesar. making a 
sally from all the gates, and sending out the 
cavalry, soon puts the enemy to flight, so that 


CHSAR'’S COMMENTARIES. 18] 


no one at all stood his ground with the inten- 
tion of fighting ; and he slew a great number 
of them, and deprived all of their arms. 

Cuarp. LIT. — Cesar, fearing to pursue them 
very far, because woods and morasses inter- 
vened, and also [because] he saw that they 
suffered no small loss in abandoning their 
position, reaches Cicero the same day with all 
his forces safe. He witnesses with surprise 
the towers, mantlets, and [other] fortifications 
belonging to the enemy: the legion having 
been drawn out, he finds that even every tenth 
soldier had not escaped without wounds. 
From all these things he judges with what 
danger and with what great courage matters 
had been conducted; he commends Cicero 
according to his desert and likewise the legion ; 
he addresses individually the centurions and 
the tribunes of the soldiers, whose valor he 
had discovered to have been signal. He re- 
ceives information of the death of Sabinus 
and Cotta from the prisoners. An assembly 
being held the following day, he states the 
-occurrence; he consoles and encourages the 
soldiers ; he suggests, that the disaster, which 
had been occasioned by the misconduct and 
rashness of his lieutenant, should be borne 
with a patient mind, because by the favor of 
the immortal gods and their own valor, neither 
was lasting joy left to the enemy, nor very 
lasting grief to them. 

Cuap. LIII. —In the mean while the report 
respecting the victory of Ceasar is conveyed 
to Labienus through the country of the Remi 


182 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


with incredible speed, so that, though he was 
about sixty miles distant from the winter 
quarters of Cicero, and Cesar had arrived 
there after the ninth hour, before midnight a 
shout arose at the gates of the camp, by which 
shout an indication of the victory and a con- 
gratulation on the part of the Remi were given 
to Labienus. ‘This report having been carried 
to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, who had resolved 
to attack the camp of Labienus the following 
day, flies by night and leads back all his forces 
into the country of the Treviri. Czesar sends 
back Fabius with his legion to his winter 
quarters ; he himself determines to winter with 
three legions near Samarobriva in three dif- 
ferent quarters, and, because such great com- 
motions had arisen in Gaul, he resolved to 
remain during the whole winter with the army 
himself. For the disaster respecting the death 
of Sabinus having been circulated among them, 
almost all the states of Gaul were deliberating 
about war, sending messengers and embassies 
into all quarters, inquiring what further meas- 
ure they should take, and holding councils by 
night in secluded places. Nor did any period 
of the whole winter pass over without fresh 
anxiety to Czesar, or, without his receiving 
some intelligence respecting the meetings and 
commotions of the Gauls. Among these, he 
is informed by L. Roscius, the lieutenant 
whom he had placed over the thirteenth le- 
gion, that large forces of those states of the 
Gauls, which are called the Armorice, had 
assembled for the purpose of attacking him 


CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 183 


and were not more than eight miles distant ; 
hut intelligence respecting the victory of Cx- 
sar being carried [to them], had retreated in 
such a manner that their departure appeared 
like a flight. 

Cuap. LIV.— But Cesar, having sum-. 
moned to him the principal persons of each 
state, in one case by alarming them, since he 
declared that he knew what was going on, and 
in another case by encouraging them, retained 
4 great part of Gaul in its allegiance. The 
Sendnes, however, which is a state eminently 
powerful and one of great influence among the 
Gauls, attempting by general design to slay 
Cavarinus whom Ceesar had created king among 
them (whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the 
sovereignty at the period of the arrival of Cx- 
sar in Gaul, and whose ancestors had also pre- 
yiously held it), when he discovered their plot 
and fled, pursued him even to the frontiers [of 
the state], and drove him from his kingdom 
and his home; and, after having sent ambassa- 
dors to Cesar for the purpose of concluding a 
peace, when he ordered all their senate to come 
to him, did not obey that command. So far 
did it operate among those barbarian people, 
that there were found some to be the first to 
wage war ; and so great a change of inclinations 
did it produce in all, that except the A®dui and 
the Remi, whom Cesar had always held in 
especial honor, the one people for their long 
standing and uniform fidelity towards the 
Roman people, the other for their late service in 
the Gallic war, there was scarcely a state which 


184 J ESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


was not suspected by us. And I do not know 
whether that ought much to be wondered at, as 
well for several other reasons, as particularly 
because they who ranked above all nations for 
prowess in war, most keenly regretted that they 
had lost so much of that reputation as to sub- 
mit to commands from the Roman people. 
Cuar. LV.— But the Treviri and Indu- 
tiomarus let no part of the entire winter pass 
without sending ambassadors across the Rhine, 
importuning the states, promising money, and 
asserting that, as a large portion of our army 
had been cut off, a much smaller portion 
remained. However, none of the German 
states could be induced to cross the Rhine, 
since ‘¢ they had twice essayed it,” they said, 
‘¢in the war with Ariovistus and in the passage 
of the Tenchtheri there; that fortune was not 
to be tempted any more.” Indutiomarus, dis- 
appointed in this expectation, nevertheless 
began to raise troops, and discipline them, and 
procure horses from the neighboring people 
and allure to him by great rewards the out- 
laws and convicts throughout Gaul. And such 
great influence had he already acquired for him- 
self'in Gaul by these means, that embassies were 
flocking to him in all directions, and seeking, 
publicly and privately, his favor and friend- 
ship. 
Cuar. LVI. — When he perceived that they 
were coming to him voluntarily; that on the 
one side the Senones and the Carnutes were 
stimulated by their consciousness of guilt, on 
the other side the Nervii and the Aduatuci were 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 185 


preparing war against the Romans, and that 
forces of volunteers would not be wanting to 
him if he began to advance from his own ter- 
ritories, he proclaims an armed council (this 
according to the custom of the Gauls is the 
commencement of war), at which, by a common 
law, all the youth were wont to assemble in 
arms; whoever of them comes /ast is killed in 
the sight of the whole assembly after being 
racked with every torture. In that council he 
declares Cingetorix. the leader of the other 
faction, his own son-in-law (whom we have 
above mentioned, as having embraced the pro- 
tection of Cesar, and never having deserted 
him) an enemy, and confiscates his property. 
When these things were finished, he asserts in 
the council that he, invited by the Senones and 
the Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul, 
was about to march thither through the terri- 
tories of the Remi, devastate their lands, and 
attack the camp of Labienus: before he does 
that, he informs them of what he desires to be 
done. 

Cuap. LVII. —Labienus, since he was con- 
fining himself within a camp strongly fortified 
by the nature of the ground and by art, had 
no apprehensions as to his own and the legion’s 
danger, but was devising that he might throw 
away no opportunity of conducting the war 
successfully. Accordingly, the speech of Indu- 
tiomarus, which he had delivered in the council, 
having been made known [to him] by Cingeto- 
rix and his allies, he sends messengers to the 
neighboring states and summons horse from all 


186 CESAR’ S COMMENTARIES. 


quarters: he appoints to them a fixed day for 
assembling. In the mean time, Indutiomarus, 
with ali his cavalry, nearly every day used to 
parade close to his [ Labienus’s] camp ; at one 
time, that he might inform himself of the situa- 
tion of the camp ; at another time, for the pur- 
pose of conferring with or of intimidating him. 
Labienus confined his men within the fortifica- 
tions and promoted the enemy’s belief of his fear 
by whatever methods he could, 

Cuap. LVIII. —Since Indutiomarus was 
daily advancing up to the camp with greater 
defiance, all the cavalry of the neighboring 
states which he [ Labienus] had taken care to 
have sent for, having been admitted in one 
night, he confined all his men within the camp 
by guards with such great strictness, that the 
fact could by no means be reported or carried to 
the Treviri. In the mean while Indutiomarus, 
according to his daily practice, advances up to 
the camp and spends a great part of the day 
there: his horse cast their weapons, and with 
very insulting language call out our men to 
battle. No reply being given by our men, 
the enemy, when they thought proper, depart 
towards evening in a disorderly and scattered 
manner. Labienus unexpectedly sends out all 
the cavalry by two gates; he gives this com- 
mand and prohibition, that, when the enemy 
should be terrified and put to flight (which he 
foresaw would happen, as it did), they should 
all make for Indutiomarus, and no one wound 
any man before he should have seen him slain, 
because he was unwilling that he should escape, 


§ 
’ 
4 


ae 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 187 


in consequence of gaining time by the delay 
[oceasioned by the pursuit] of the rest. He 
offers great rewards for those who should kill 
him: he sends up the cohorts as a relief to 
the horse. The issue justifies the policy of 
the man, and, since all aimed at one, Indutiom- 
‘irus is slain, having been overtaken at the 
very ford of the river, and his head is carried 
to the camp: the horse, when returning, pur- 
sue and slay all whom they can. This affair 
having been known, all the forces of the 
Eburones and the Nervii which had assembled, 
depart; and for a short time after this action, 


Cesar was less harassed in the government of 
Gaul. 


188 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


BOOK VI. 


THE ARGUMENT. 


I, Cesar, apprehending commotions in Gaul, levies additional 
forces —II.-VI. Defeats the Nervii, Sendnes, Carnutes, 
and Menapii.— VII., VIII. Labienus defeats the Treviri. — 
IX. Cesar again crosses the Rhine; the Ubii send ambas- 
sadors to plead the defence of their state. — XI.-XX. The 
political factions of the Gallic states. The Druids, the sec- 
ond order or knights, the third order or commonalty, and 
the mythology of the Gauls. — XXI.-AXVII. The Ger- 
mans; their customs; account of some remarkable animals 
found in the Hercinian forest. —XXIX.-XXXI. Cesar re- 
turns to Gaul; Ambiorix is worsted; death of Cativoicus. — 
XXXII.- XXXIV. ‘he territories of the Eburones are 
plundered. —XXXV.-XLII. The Sigambri attack the 
Roman camp; some extraordinary incidents connected there- 
with. Cesar arrives and restores confidence.— XLIII., 
XLIV. Cesar holds an investigation respecting the conspi- 
racy of the Sendnes; Acco suffers capital punishment; the 
appointment of winter quarters; Cesar departs for Italy. 


Crap. I. — Cesar, expecting for many rea- 
sons a greater commotion in Gaul, resolves to 
hold a levy by the means of M. Silanus, C. 
Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, his lieu- 
tenants: at the same time he requested of Cn. 
Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was 
remaining near the city invested with military 
command for the interests of the common- 
wealth, he would command those men whom 
when consul he had levied by the military oath 
in Cisalpine Gaul, to join their respective 
corps, and to proceed to him; thinking it of 
great importance, as far as regarded the opinion 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 189 


which the Gauls would entertain for the future, 
that the resources of Italy should appear so 
great, that if any loss should be sustained in 
war, not only could it be repaired in a short 
time, but likewise be further supplied by still 
larger forces. And when Pompey had granted 
this to the interests of the commonwealth and 
‘he claims of friendship, Ceesar having quickly 
completed the levy by means of his lieuten- 
ants, after three legions had been both formed 
and brought to him before the winter [had] 
expired, and the number of those cohorts 
which he had lost under Q. Titurius had been 
doubled, taught the Gauls, both by his de- 
spatch and by his forces, what the discipline 
and the power of the Roman people could 
accomplish. 

Cuap. II. — Indutiomarus having been slain, 
as we have stated, the government was con- 
ferred upon his relatives by the Treviri. They 
cease not to importune the neighboring Ger- 
mans and to promise them money: when they 
could not obtain [their object ] from those near- 
est them, they try those more remote. Hav- 
ing found some states willing to accede to their 
wishes, they enter into a compact with them by 
a mutual oath, and give hostages as a security 
for the money: they attach Ambiorix to them 
by an alliance and confederacy. Cesar, on 
being informed of their acts, since he saw that 
war was being prepared on all sides, that the 
Nervii, Aduatuci, and Menapii, with the addi- 
tion of all the Germans on this side of the Rhine, 
were under arms, that the Senones did not 


190 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


assemble according to his command, and were 
concerting measures with the Carnutes and the 
neighboring states, that the Germans were im- 
portuned by the Treviri in frequent embassies, 
thought that he ought to take measures for the 
war earlier [than usual]. 

Cuap. III. — Accordingly, while the winter 
was not yet ended, having concentrated the four 
nearest legions, he marched unexpectedly into 
the territories of the Nervii, and before they 
could either assemble, or retreat, after captur- 
ing a large number of cattle and of men, and 
wasting their lands and giving up that booty to 
the soldiers, compelled them to enter into a sur- 
render and give him hostages. That business 
having been speedily executed, he again led 
his legions back into winter quarters. Having 
proclaimed a council of Gaul in the beginning 
of the spring, as he had been accustomed (to 
do], when the deputies from the rest, except 
the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri, had 
come, judging this to be the commencement of 
war and revolt, that he might appear to con- 
sider all things of less consequence [than that 
war], he transfers the council to Lutetia of the 
Parisii. These were adjacent to the Senones, 
and had united their state to them during the 
memory of their fathers, but were thought to 
have no part inthe present plot. Having pro- 
claimed this from the tribunal, he advances the 
same day toward the Sendnes with his legions 
and arrives among them by long marches. 

Cuar. 1V.—Acco, who had been the author 
of that enterprise, on being informed of his 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 191 


arrival, orders the people to assemble in the 
towns ; to them, while attempting this and be- 
fore it could be accomplished, news is brought 
that the Romans are close at hand: through 
necessity they give over their design and send 
ambassadors to Ceesar for the purpose of im- 
ploring pardon; they make advances to him 
through the A¢dui, whose state was from 
ancient times under the protection of Rome. 
Ceesar readily grants them pardon and receives 
their excuse, at the request of the Aidui; 
because he thought that the summer season 
was one for an impending war, not for an 
investigation. Having imposed one hundred 
hostages, he delivers these to the AXdui to be 
held in charge by them. To the same place 
the Carnutes send ambassadors and hostages, 
employing as their mediators the Remi, under 
whose protection they were: they receive the 
same answers. Cesar concludes the council 
and imposes a levy of cavalry on the states. 
Cuap. V.— This part of Gaul having been 
tranquillized, he applies himself entirely both 
in mind and soul to the war with the Treviri 
and Ambiorix. He orders Cavarinus to march 
with him with the cavalry of the Senones, lest 
any commotion should arise either out of his 
hot temper, or out of the hatred of the state 
which he had incurred. After arranging these 
things, as he considered it certain that Ambio- 
rix would not contend in battle, he watched 
his other plans attentively. The Menapii bor- 
dered on the territories of the Eburones, and 
were protected by one continued extent of 


192 CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


morasses and woods; and they alone out of 
Gaul had never sent ambassadors to Ceesar on 
the subject of peace. Czesar knew that a tie 
of hospitality subsisted between them and 
Ambiorix: he also discovered that the latter 
had entered into an alliance with the Germans 
by means of the Treviri. He thought that 
these auxiliaries ought to be detached from 
him before he provoked him to war; lest he, 
despairing of safety, should either proceed to 
conceal himself in the territories of the Mena- 
pii, or should be driven to coalesce with the 
Germans beyond the Rhine. Having entered 
upon this resolution, he sends the baggage of 
the whole army to Labienus, in the territories 
of the Treviri, and orders two legions to pro- 
ceed to him: he himself proceeds against the 
Menapii with five lightly equipped legions. 
They, having assembled no troops, as they 
relied on the defence of their position, retreat 
into the woods and morasses, and convey 
thither all their property. 

Cuar. VI.—Cesar, having divided his 
forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant, and M. 
Crassus, his questor, and having hastily con- 
structed some bridges, enters their country in 
three divisions, burns their houses and vil- 
lages, and gets possession of a large number 
of cattle and men. Constrained by these cir- 
cumstances, the Menapii send ambassadors to 
him for the purpose of suing for peace. He, 
after receiving hostages, assures them that he 
will consider them in the nember of his ene- 
mies if they shall receive within their territories 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 198 


either Ambiorix or his ambassadors. Having 
determinately settled these things, he left 
among the Menapii, Commius the Atrebatian 
with some cavalry as a guard; he himself pro- 
ceeds towards the Treviri. 

Cuap. VII.— While these things are being 
performed by Ceesar, the Treviri, having drawn 
together large forces of infantry and of cay- 
alry, were preparing to attack Labienus and 
the legion which was wintering in their terri- 
tories, and were already not farther distant 
from him than a journey of two days, when 
they learn that two legions had arrived by the 
order of Cesar. Having pitched their camp 
fifteen miles off, they resolve to await the 
support of the Germans. Labienus, having 
learned the design of the enemy, hoping that 
through their rashness there would be some 
opportunity of engaging, after leaving a guard 
of five cohorts for the baggage, advances 
against the enemy with twenty-five cohorts 
and a large body of cavalry, and, leaving the 
space of a mile between them, fortifies his 
camp. There was between Labienus and the 
enemy a river difficult to cross and with steep 
banks: this neither did he himself design to 
cross, nor did he suppose the enemy would 
cross it. Their hope of auxiliaries was daily 
increasing. He [Labienus] openly says in a 
council that ‘‘ since the Germans are said to 
be approaching, he would not bring into 
uncertainty his own and the army’s fortunes. 
and the next day would move his camp at 
early dawn.” ‘These words are quickly carried 


194 CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


to the enemy, since out of so large a number 
of cavalry composed of Gauls, nature com: 
pelled some to favor the Gallic interests. 
Labienus, having assembled the tribunes of 
the soldiers and principal centurions by night, 
states what his design is, and, that he may the 
more easily give the enemy a belief of his 
fears, he orders the camp to be moved with 
greater noise and confusion than was usual with 
the Roman people. By these means he makes 
his departure [appear] like a retreat. These 
things, also, since the camps were so near, are 
reported to the enemy by scouts before day- 
hght. 

Cuap. VIIT.—Scarcely had the rear ad- 
vanced beyond the fortifications when the 
Gauls, encouraging one another ‘‘ not to cast 
from their hands the anticipated booty, thnt it 
was a tedious thing, while the Romans were 
pani¢e stricken, to be waiting for the aid of the 
Germans, and that their dignity did not suffer 
them to fear to attack with such great forces 
so small a band, particularly when retreating 
and encumbered,” do not hesitate to cross the 
river and give battle in a disadvantageous 
position. Labienus, suspecting that these 
things would happen, was proceeding quietly, 
and using the same pretence of a march, in 
order that he might entice them across the 
river. Then, having sent forward the baggage 
some short distance and placed it on a certain 
eminence, he says, ‘* Soldiers, you have the 
opportunity you have sought: you hold the 
enemy in anencumbered and disadvantageous 


CAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 195 


position: display to us your leaders the same 
valor you have ofttimes displayed to your gen- 
eral: imagine that he is present and actually 
sees these exploits.” At the same time he 
orders the troops to face about towards the 
enemy and form in line of battle, and, despatch- 
ing a few troops of cavalry as a guard for the 
baggage, he places the rest of the horse on 
the wings. Our men, raising a shout, quickly 
throw their javelins at the enemy. ‘They, 
when, contrary to their expectation, they saw 
those whom they believed to be retreating, 
advance toward them with threatening ban- 
ners, were not able to sustain even the charge, 
and being put to flight at the first onslaught, 
sought the nearest woods ; Labienus pursuing 
them with the cavalry, upon a large num- 
ber being slain, and several taken prisoners, 
got possession of the state a few days after: 
for the Germans, who were coming to the 
aid of the Treviri, having been informed of 
their flight, retreated to their homes. The re- 
lations of Indutiomarus, who had been the pro- 
moters of the revolt, accompaying them, quit- 
ted their own state with them. The supreme 
power and government were delivered to Cin- 
getorix, whom we have stated to have re- 
mained firm in his allegiance from the com- 
mencement. 

Cuap. IX. — Cesar, after he came from the 
territories of the Menapii into those of Tre- 
viri, resolved for tworeasons to cross the Rhine ; 
one of which was, because they had sent as- 
sistance to the Treviri against him ; the other, 


196 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


that Ambiorix might not have a retreat among 
them. Having determined on these matters, 
he began to build a bridge a little above that 
place, at which he had before conveyed over 
his army. ‘The plan having been known and 
laid down, the work is accomplished in a few 
days by the, great exertion of the soldiers. 
Having left a strong guard on the bridge on 
the side of the Treviri, lest any commotion 
should suddenly arise among them, he leads 
over the rest of the forces and the cavalry. 
The Ubii, who before had sent hostages and 
come to a capitulation, send ambassadors to 
him, for the purpose of vindicating themselves, 
to assure him that ‘‘ neither had auxiliaries 
been sent to the Treviri from their state, nor 
had they violated their allegiance”; they en- 
treat and beseech him ‘‘ to spare them, lest, in 
his common hatred of the Germans, the inno- 
cent should suffer the penalty of the guilty: 
they promise to give more hostages, if he de- 
sire them.” Having investigated the case, 
Cesar finds that the auxiliaries had been sent 
by the Suevi; he accepts the apology of the 
Ubii, and makes minute inquiries concerning 
the approaches and the routes to the territories 
of the Suevi. | 

Cuap X.—In the mean time he is informed 
by the Ubii, a few days after, that the Suevi 
are drawing all their forces into one place, and 
are giving orders to those nations which are 
under their government to send auxiliaries of 
infantry and of cavalry. Having learned these 
things, he provides a supply of corn, selects a 


FO ee 


A 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 197 


proper place for his camp, and commands the 
Ubii to drive off their cattle and carry away all 
their possessions from the country parts into 
the towns, hoping that they, being a barbarous 
and ignorant people, when harassed by the 
want of provisions, might be brought to an en- 
gagement on disadvantageous terms : he orders 
them to send numerous scouts among the Suevi, 
and learn what things are going onamong them. 
They execute the orders, and, a few days hav- 
ing intervened, report that all the Suevi, after 
certain intelligence concerning the army of the 
Romans had come, retreated with all their own 
forces and those of their allies, which they had 
assembled, to the utmost extremities of their 
territories: that there is a wood there of very 
ereat extent, which is called Bacénis; that 
this stretches a great way into the interior, 
and, being opposed as a natural barrier, de- 
fends from injuries and incursions the Cherusci 
against the Suevi, and the Suevi against the 
Cherusci: that at the entrance of that forest 
the Suevi had determined to await the coming 
up of the Romans. 

Cuap. XI.—Since we have come to this 
place, it does not appear to be foreign to our 
subject to lay before the reader an account 
of the manners of Gaul and Germany, and 
wherein these nations differ from each other. 
In Gaul there are factions not only in all the 
states, and in all the cantons and their divis- 
ions, but almost in each family, and of these 
factions those are the leaders who are con- 
sidered according to their judgment to possess 


198 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


the greatest influence, upon whose will and 
determination the management of all affairs 
and measures depends. And that seems to 
have been instituted in ancient times with this 
view, that no one of the common people should 
be in want of support against one more pow- 
erful; for none [of those leaders} suffers his 
party to be oppressed and defrauded, and if 
he do otherwise, he has no influence among 
his party. ‘This same policy exists throughout 
the whole of Gaul; for all the states are 
divided into two factions. 

Cuap. XII. — When Cesar arrived in Gaul, 
tne /Edui were the leaders of one faction, ch 
Sequani of the other. Since the latter were 
less powerful by themselves, inasmuch as the 
chief influence was from of old among the 
/Edui, and their dependencies were oreat, 
they had united to themselves the Germans 
and Ariovistus, and had brought them over to 
their party by great sacrifices and promises. 
And having fought several successful battles 
and slain all the nobility of the dui, they 
had so far surpassed them in power, that they 
brought over, from the ‘dui to themselves, 
a large portion of their dependants and 
received from them the sons of their leading 
men as hostages, and compelled them to swear 
in their public character that they would enter 
into no design against them; and held a por- 
tion of the neighboring land, seized on by 
force, and possessed the sovereignty of the 
whole of Gaul. Divitiacus, urged by this neces- 
sity, had proceeded to Rome to the senate, for 


Ch ae eae 


CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 199 


the purpose of entreating assistance, and had 
returned without accomplishing his object. A 
change of affairs ensued on the arrival of 
Cesar, the hostages were returned to the 
“dui, their old dependencies restored, and 
new acquired through Cesar (because those 
who had attached themselves to their alliance 
saw that they enjoyed a better state and a 
milder government), their other interests, 
their influence, their reputation were likewise 
increased, and, in consequence, the Sequani 
lost the sovereignty. The Remi succeeded to 
their place, and, as it was percvived that they 
equalled the Edui in favor with Cesar, those, 
who on account of their old animosities could 
by no means coalesce with the A&dui, con- 
signed themselves in clientship to the Remi. 
The latter carefully protected them. ‘lhus 
they possessed both a new and_ suddenly 
acquired influence. Affairs were then in that 
position, that the A"dui were considered by 
far the leading people, and the Remi held the 
second post of honor. 

Cuape. XIMI.—Throughout all Gaul there 
are two orders of those men who are of any 
rank and dignity: for the commonalty is 
held almost in the condition of slaves, and 
dares to undertake nothing of itself and is 
admitted to no deliberation. The greater part, 
when they are pressed either by debt, or the 
large amount of their tributes, or the oppres- 
sion of the more powerful, give themselves up 
in vassalage to the nobles, who possess ove 
them the same rights without exception as mas- 


200 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


ters over their slaves. Butof these two orders, 
one is that of the Druids, the other that of 
the knights. The former are engaged in 
things sacred, conduct the public and the pri- 
vate sacrifices, and interpret all matters of 
religion. To these a large number of the 
young men resort for the purpose of instruc- 
tion, and they [the Druids] are in great honor 
among them. For they determine respecting 
almost all controversies, public and private ; 
and if any crime has been perpetrated, if 
murder has been committed, if there be any 
dispute about an inheritance, if any about 
boundaries, these same persons decide it; 
they decree rewards and punishments, if any 
one, either in a private or public capacity, has 
not submitted to their decision, they interdict 
him from the sacrifices. This among them is 
the most heavy punishment. Those who have 
been thus interdicted are esteemed in the num- 
ber of the impiou, and the criminal: all shun 
them, and avoid their society and conversation, 
lest they receive some evil from their contact ; 
nor is justice administered to them when seeking 
it, nor is any dignity bestowed on them. Over 
all these Druids one presides, who possesses 
supreme authority among them. Upon his 
death, if any individual among the rest is pre- 


eminent in dignity, he succeeds; but, if there 


are many equal, the election is made by the 
suffrages of the Druids; sometimes they even 
contend for the presidency with arms. These 
assemble at a fixed period of the year in a con- 
secrated place in the territories of the Car 


a aR Nr ia i an OR 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 201 


nutes, which is reckoned the central region of 
the whole of Gaul. Hither all, who have dis- 
putes, assemble from every part, and submit 
to their decrees and determinations. This 
institution is supposed to haye been devised in 
Britain, and to have been brought over from it 
into Gaul; and now those who desire to gain 
a’ more accurate knowledge of that system 
generally proceed thither for the purpose of 
studying it. 

Cuap. XIV.—The Druids do not go to 
war, nor pay tribute together with the rest; 
they have an exemption from military service 
and a dispensation in all matters. “Induced 
by such great advantages, many embrace this 
profession of their own accord, and [many ] 
are sent to it by their parents and relations. 
They are said there to learn by heart a great 
number of verses ; accordingly some remain in 
the course of training twenty years. Nor do 
they regard it lawful to commit these to writ- 
ing, though in almost all other matters, in their 
public and private transactions, they use Greek 
characters. That practice they seem to me to 
_ have adopted for two reasons; because they 
neither desire their doctrines to be divulged 
ainong the mass of the people, nor those who 
learn, to devote themselves the less to the 
efforts of memory, relying on writing ; since 
it generally occurs to most men, that, in their 
dependence on writing, they relax their dili- 
gence in learning thoroughly, and their em- 
ployment of the memory. They wish to incul- 
cate this as one of their leading tenets, that 


202 CHSAR’S COMMENTALIES. 


souls do not become extinct, but pass after 
death from one body to another, and then 
think that men by this tenet are in a great 
degree excited to valor, the fear of deatlf 
being disregarded. They likewise discuss and 
impart to the youth many things respecting 
the stars and their motion, respecting the ex- 
tent of the world and of our earth, respecting 
the nature of things, respecting the power and 
the majesty of the immortal gods. 

Cuar. XV.— The other order is that of the 
knights. These, when there is oceasion and 
any war occurs (which before Ceesar’s arrival 
was for the most part wont to happen every 
year, as either they on their part were inflict- 
ing injuries or repelling those which others 
inflicted on them), are all engaged in war. 
And those of them most distinguished by birth 
and resources, have the greatest number of 
vassals and dependants about them. ‘They 
acknowledge this sort of influence and power 
only. 

Cuap. XVI. —The nation of. all the Gauls 
is extremely devoted to superstitious rites ; 
and on that account they who are troubled 
with unusually severe diseases and they whe 
are engaged in battles and dangers. either sac- 
rifice men as victims, or vow that they will 
sacrifice them, and employ the Druids as the 
performers of those sacrifices; because they 
think that unless the life of a man be offered 
for the life of a man, the mind of the immortal 
gods cannot be rendered propitious, and they 
have sacrifices of that kind ordained for na- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 203 


tional purposes. Others have figures of vast 
size, the limbs of which formed of osiers they 
fill with living men, which being set on fire, 
the men perish enveloped in the flames. They 
consider that the oblation of such as have been 
taken in theft, or in robbery, or any other 
offence, is more acceptable to the immortal 
gods ; but when a supply of that class is want- 
ing, they have recourse to the oblation of even 
the innocent. 

Cuap. XVII. —They worship as their di- 
vinity, Mercury in particular, and have many 
images of him, and regard him as the inventor 
of all arts, they consider him the guide of 
their journeys and marches, and believe him 
to have very great influence over the acqui- 
sition of gain and mercantile transactions. 
Next to him they worship Apollo, and Mars, 
and Jupiter, and Minerva; respecting these 
deities they have for the most part the same 
belief as other nations: that Apollo averts 
diseases, that Minerva imparts the invention 
of manufactures, that Jupiter possesses the 
sovereignty of the heavenly powers, that Mars 
presides over wars. To him, when they have 
determined to engage in battle, they commonly 
vow those things which they shall take in wa 
When they have conquered, they sacrifice what- 
ever captured animals muy have survived the 
conflict, and collect the other things into one 
place. In many states you may see piles of 
these things heaped up in their consecrated 
spots ; nor does it often happen that any one, 
disregarding the sanctity of the case, dares 


204 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


either to secrete in his house things captured, 
or take away those deposited; and the most 
severe punishment, with torture, has been 
established for such a deed. 

Cuar. XVIII. — All the Gauls assert that 
they are descended from the god Dis, and say 
that this tradition has been handed down by 
the Druids. For that reason they compute 
the divisions of every season, not by the 
number of days, but of nights; they keep 
birthdays an@ the beginnings of months and 
years in such an order that the day follows 
the night. Among the other usages of their 
life, they differ in this from almost all other na- 
tions, that they do not permit their children to 
approach them openly until they are grown up 
so as to be able to bear the service of war; 
and they regard it as indecorous for a son of 
boyish age to stand in public in the presenca 
of his father. 

Cuap. XIX.— Whatever sums of money 
the husbands have received in the name of 
dowry from their wives, making an estimate 
of it, they add the same amount out of their 
own estates, An account is kept of all this 
money conjointly, and the profits are laid by: 
whichever of them shall have survived [the 
other], to that one the portion of both reverts 
together with the profits of the previous time. 
Husbands have power of life and death over 
their wives as well as over their children: and 
when the father of a family, born in a more | 
than commonly distinguished rank, has died, © 
his relations assemble, and, if the circum: 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 205 


stances of his death are suspicious, hold an- © 


investigation upon the wives in the manner 
adopted towards slaves; and, if proof be ob- 
tained, put them to severe torture, and kill 
them. ‘Their funerals, considering the state 
of civilization among the Gauls, are magnifi- 
cent and costly ; and they cast into the fire all 
things, including living creatures, which they 
suppose to have been dear to them when alive ; 
and. a little before this period, slaves and de- 
ante who were ascertained to have been 
beloved by them, were, after the regular 
funeral rites were completed, burnt together 
with them. 

Cuap. XX.— Those states which are con- 
sidered to conduct their commonwealth more 
judiciously, have it ordained by their laws, 
that, if any person shall have heard by rumor 
and report from his neighbors anything con- 
cerning the commonw ealth, he shall convey it 
to the magistrate and not impart it to any 
other ; because it has been discovered that 
inconsiderate and inexperienced men were 
often alarmed by false reports and driven to 
- some rash act, or else took hasty measures in 
affairs of the highest importance. The magis- 
trates conceal those things which require to 
be kept unknown; and they disclose to the 
people whatever they determine to be expe- 
dient. It is not lawful to speak of the com- 
monwealth, except in council. 

Cuap. XXI.—The Germans differ much 
from these usages, for they have neither 
Druids to preside over sacred offices, nor do 


206 CESAR’ S COMMENTARIES. 


they pay great regard to sacrifices. They 


rank in the number of the gods those alone — 


whom they behold, and by whose instrumen- 


tality they are obviously benefited, namely, 


the sun, fire, and the moon; they have not 
heard of the other deities even by report. 
Their whole life is occupied in hunting and in 
the pursuits of the military art; from child- 
hood they devote themselves to fatigue and 
hardships. Those who have remained chaste 
for the longest time, receive the greatest com- 


mendation among their people: they think that: 


by this the growth is promoted, by this the 
physical powers are increased and the sinews 
are strengthened. And to have had knowl- 
edge of a woman before the twentieth year 
they reckon among the most disgraceful acts ; 
of which matter there is no concealment, be- 
cause they bathe promiscuously in the rivers 
and [only] use skins or small cloaks of deer’s 
hides, a large portion of the body being in 
consequence naked. 

Cuap. XXIJI.—They do not pay much 
attention to agriculture, and a large portion of 
their food consists in milk, cheese, and flesh ; 
nor has any one a fixed quantity of land or 
his own individual limits; but the magistrates 
and the leading men each year apportion to 
the tribes and families, who have united 
together, as much land as, and in the place in 
which, they think proper, and the year after 
compel them to remove elsewhere. For this 
enactment they advance many reasons —lest 
seduced by long-continued custom, they may 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 207 


exchange their ardor in the waging of war 
for agriculture; lest they may be anxious to 
acquire extensive estates, and the more power- 
ful drive the weaker from their possessions 5 
lest they construct their houses with too great 
a desire to avoid cold and heat; lest the desire 
of wealth spring up, from which cause divis- 
ions and discords arise; and that they may 
keep the common people in a contented state 
of mind, when each sees his own means 
placed on an equality with [those of | the most 
powerful. 

Cuap. XXIII. —It is the greatest glory to 
the several states to have as wide deserts as 
possible around them, their frontiers having 
been laid waste. They consider this the real 
evidence of their prowess, that their neighbors 
shall be driven out of their lands and abandon 
them, and that no one dare settle near them ; 
at the same time they think that they shall be 
on that account the more secure, because they 
have removed the apprehension of a sudden 
incursion. When a state either repels war 
waged against it, or wages it against another, 
magistrates are chosen to preside over that 
war with such authority, that they have power 
of life and death. In peace there is no com- 
mon magistrate, but the chiefs of provinces 
and cantons administer justice and determine 
controversies among their own people. Rob- 
beries which are committed beyond the boun- 
daries of each state bear no infamy, and they 
avow that these are committed for the pur- 
pose of disciplining their youth and of pre- 


208 «=6CLASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


venting sloth. And when any of their chiefs 
has said in an assembly ‘‘ that he will be their 
leader, let those who are willing to follow, 
give in their names”; they who approve of 
both the enterprise and the man arise and 
promise their assistance and are applauded by 
the people ; such of them as have not followed 
him are accounted in the number of deserters 
and traitors, and confidence in all matters is 
afterwards refused them. To injure guests 
they regard as impious; they defend from 
wrong those who have come to them for any 
purpose whatever, and esteem them inviolable ; 
to them the houses of all are open and main- 
tenance is freely supplied. 

Cuar. XXIV.— And there was formerly a 
time when the Gauls excelled the Germans in 
prowess, and waged war on them offensively, 
and, on account of the great number of their 
people and the insufficiency of their land, sent 
colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the Vol- 
ce Tectosages seized on those parts of Germany 
which.are the most fruitful [and lie] around 
the Hercynian forest (which, I perceive, was 
known by report to Eratosthenes and some 
other Greeks, and which they call Orcynia) and 
settled there. Which nation to this time re- 
tains its position in those settlements, and has 
a very high character for justice and military 
merit: now also they continue in the same 
scarcity, indigence, hardihood, as the Ger- 
mans, and use the same food and dress; but 
their proximity to the Province and knowledge 
of commodities from countries beyond the sea 


CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. - 209 


supplies to the Gauls many things tending to 
Juxury as well as civilization. Accustomed 
by degrees to be overmatched and worsted in 
many engagements, they do not even compare 
themselves to the Germans in prowess. 

Cuap. XXV. — The breadth of this Hercy- 
nian forest, which has been referred to above, 
is to a quick traveller a journey of nine days. 
For it cannot be otherwise computed, nor are 
they acquainted with the measures of roads. 
It begins at the frontiers of the Helvetii, Ne- 
metes, and Rauraci, and extends in aright line 
along the river Danube to the territories of the 
Daci and the Anartes: it bends thence to the 
left in a different direction from the river, and 
owing to its extent touches the confines of 
many nations; nor is there any person belong- 
ing to this part of Germany who says that he 
either has gone to the extremity of that 
forest, though he had advanced a journey 
of sixty days, or has heard in what place it 
begins. It is certain that many kinds of 
wild beast are produced in it which have not 
been seen in other parts; of which the fol- 
lowing are such as differ principally from other 
animals, and appear worthy of being commit- 
ted to record. 

Cuar. XXVI.—There is an ox of the 
shape of a stag, between whose ears a horn 
rises from the middle of the forehead, higher 
and straighter than those horns which are 
known to us. From the top of this, branches, 
like palms, stretch out a considerable distance. 
The shape of the female and of the male is the 


210 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


same ; the appearance and the size of the horng 
is the same. 

Cuap. XXVII.— There are also [animals] 
which are called elks. The shape of these, 
and the varied color of their skins, is much like 
roes, but in size they surpass them a little and 
are destitute of horns, an:i have legs without 
joints and ligatures ; nor do they lie down for 
the purpose of rest, nor, if they have been 
thrown down by any accident, can they raise 
or lift themselves up. Trees serve as beds to 
them; they lean themselves against them, and 
thus reclining only slightly, they take their 
rest; when the huntsmen have discovered 
from the footsteps of these animals whither 
they are accustomed to betake themselves, 
they either undermine all the trees at the 
roots, or cut into them so far that the upper 
part of the trees may appear to be left stand- 
ing. When they have leant upon them, ac- 
cording to their habit, they knock down by 
their weight the unsupported trees, and fall 
down themselves along with them. 

Cuar. XXVIII.—There is a third kind, 
consisting of those animals which are called 
uri. These are a little below the elephant in 
size, and of the appearance, color, and shape 
of a bull. Their strength and speed are ex- 
traordinary ; they spare neither man nor wild 
beast which they have espied. These the 
Germans take with much pains in pits and 
kill them. The young men harden themselves 
with this exercise, and practise themselves in 
this kind of hunting, and those who have 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 211 


slain the greatest number of them, having pro- 
duced the horns in public, to serve as evidence, 
receive great praise. But not even when taken 
very young can they be rendered familiar to 
men and tamed. The size, shape, and appear- 
ance of their horns differ much from the horns 
of our oxen. These they anxiously seek after, 
and bind at the tips with silver, and use as 
cups at their most sumptuous entertainments. 
Cuap, XXIX.— Cesar, after. he discovered 
through the Ubian scouts that the Suevi had 
retired into their woods, apprehending a scarcity 
of corn, because, as we have observed above, 
all the Germans pay very little attention to 
agriculture, resolved not to proceed any farther ; 
but, that he might not altogether relieve the 
barbarians from the fear of his return, and that 
he might delay their succors, having led back 
his army, he breaks down, to the length of 200 
feet, the farther end of the bridge, which joined 
the banks of the Ubii, and at the extremity of 
the bridge raises towers of four stories, and sta- 
tions a guard of twelve cohorts for the purpose 
of defending the bridge, and strengthens the 
place with considerable fortifications. Over 
that fortand guard he appointed C. Volcatius 
Tullus, a young man ; he himself, when the corn 
began to ripen, having set forth for the war 
with Ambiorix (through the forest Arduenna, 
whichis the largest of all Gaul, and reaches 
from the banks of the Rhine and the frontiers 
of the Treviri to those of the Nervii, andextends 
over more than 500 miles), he sends forward 
L. Minucius Basilus with all the cavalry, to try 


212 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


if he might gain any advantage by rapid marches 
and the advantage of time, he warns him to 
forbid fires being made in the camp, lest any 
indication of his approach be given at a dis- 
tance: he tells him that he will follow imme- 
diately. 

Cuap. XXX.— Basilus does as ap was 
commanded ; having performed his march rap- 
idly, and even surpassed the expectations of 
all, he surprises in the fields many not expect- 
ing him ; through their information ‘he advances 
towards Ambiorix himself, to the place in which 
he was said to be with a few horse. Fortune 
accomplishes much, not only in other matters, 
out also in the art of war. For as it happened 
by a remarkable chance, that he fell upon 
[ Ambiorix ] himself unguarded and unprepared, 
and that his arrival was seen by the people 
before the report or information of his arrival 
was carried thither; so it was an incident of 


extraordinary fortune that, although every | 


implement of war which he was accustomed to 
have about him was seized, and his chariots 
and horses surprised, yet he himself escaped 
death. Butit was effected owing to this cir- 
cumstance, that his house being surrounded by 
a wood (as are generally the dwellings of the 
Gauls, who, for the purpose of avoiding heat, 
mostly seek the neighborhood of woods and 
rivers), his attendants and friends in a narrow 
spot sustained for a short time the attack of our 
horse. While they were fighting, one of his 
followers mounted him on a horse: the woods 
sheltered him as he fled. Thus fortune tended 


ROR Oe Sai tk: 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 218 
much both towards his encountering and his 
escaping danger. 

Cuar. XX XI.—Whether Ambiorix did not 
collect his forces from cool deliberation, 
because he considered he ought not to engage 
in a battle, or [whether] he was debarred by time 
and prevented by the sudden arrival of our 
horse, when he supposed the rest of the army 
was closely following, is doubtful: but cer- 
tainly, despatching messengers through the 
country, he ordered every one to provide for 
himself; and a part of them fled into the forest 
Arduenna, a part into the extensive morasses ; 
those who were nearest the ocean, concealed 
themselves in the islands which the tides usu- 
ally form: many, departing from their territo- 
ries, committed themselves and all their posses- 
sions to perfect strangers. Cativoleus, king 
of one half of the Eburones, who had entered 
into the design together with Ambiorix, since, 
being now worn out by age, he was unable to 
endure the fatigue either of war or flight, hav- 
jug cursed Ambiorix with every imprecation, 
as the person who had been the contriver of 
that measure, destroyed himself with the juice 
of the yew-tree, of which there is a great abun- 
dance in Gaul and Germany. 

Cuap. XXXIJ.— The Segni and Condrusi, 
of the nation and number of the Germans, and 
who are between the Eburones and the Treviri, 
sent ambassadors to Ceesar to entreat that he 
would not regard them in the number of his 
enemies, nor consider that the cause of all the 
Germans on this side the Rhine was one and 


214 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


the same; that they had formed no plans of 
war, and had sent no auxiliaries to Ambiorix. 
Ceesar, having ascertained this fact by an 
examination cf his prisoners, commanded that 
if any of the Eburones in their flight had 
repaired to them, they should be sent back to 
him ; he assures them that if they did that, he 
will not injure their territories. Then, having 
divided his forces into three parts, he sent the 
baggage of all the legions to Aduatuca. That 
is the name of a fort. This is nearly in the 
middle of the Eburones, where Titurius and 
Aurunculeius had been quartered for the pur- 
pose of wintering. This place he selected as 
well on other accounts as because the fortifi- 
cations of the previous year remained, in order 
that he might relieve the labor of the soldiers. 
He left the fourteenth legion as a guard for the 
baggage, one of those three which he had lately 
raised in Italy and brought over. Over that 
legion and camp he places Q. Tullius Cicero and 
gives him 200 horse. 

Cuap. XXXIII.—Having divided the army, 
he orders T. Labienus to proceed with three 
legions towards the ocean into those parts 
which border on the Menapii; he sends C. Tre- 
bonius with a like number of legions to lay 
waste that district which lies contiguous to 
the Aduatuci ; he himself determines to go with 
the remaining three to the river Sambre, which 
flows into the Meuse, and to the most remote 
parts of Arduenna, whither he heard that Am- 
biorix had gone with a few horse. When 
departing, he promises that he will return before 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 215 


the end of the seventh day, on which day he was 
aware corn was due to that legion which was 
being left in garrison. He directs Labienus 
and Trebonius to return by the same day, if 
they can do so agreeably to the interests of the 
republic; so that their measures having been 
mutually imparted, and the plans of the enemy 
having been discovered, they might be able to 
commence a different line of operations. 

Cuar. XXXIV.—There was, as we have 
above observed, no regular army, nor a town, 
nor a garrison which could defend itself by 
arms; but the people were scattered in all 
directions. Where either a hidden valley, ora 
woody spot, or a difficult morass furnished any 
hope of protection or of security to any one, 
there he had fixed himself. These places were 
known to those that dwelt in the neighborhood, 
and the matter demanded great attention, 
not so much in protecting the main body of 
the army (for no peril could occur to them 
altogether from those alarmed and scattered 
troops), as in preserving individual soldiers ; 
’ which in some measure tended to the safety of 
the army. For both the desire of booty was 
leading many too far, and the woods with their 
unknown and hidden routes would not allow 
them to go in large bodies. If he desired the 
business to be completed and the race of those 
infamous people to be cut off, more bodies of 
men must be sent in several directions and the 
soldiers must be detached on all sides; if he 
were disposed to keep the companies at their 
standards, as the established discipline and 


216 CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


practice of the Roman army required, the situa- 
tion itself was a safeguard tu the barbarians, 
nor was there wanting to individuals the daring 
to lay secret ambuscades and beset scattered 
soldiers. But amidst difficulties of this nature, 
as far as precautions could be taken by vigi- 
lance, such precautions were taken; so that 
some opportunities of injuring the enemy were 
neglected, though the minds of all were burn- 
ing to take revenge, rather than that injury 
should be effected with any loss to our soldiers. 
Czesar despatches messengers to the neighbor- 
ing states ; by the hope of booty he invites all 
to him, for the purpose of plundering the 
Eburones, in order that the life of the Gauls 
might be hazarded in the woods rather than 
the legionary soldiers; at the same time, in 
order that a large force being drawn around 
them, the race and name of that state may be 
annihilated for such a crime. A large number 
from all quarters speedily assembles. 

Cuap. XXXV.—These things were going on 
in all parts of the territories of the Eburones, 
and the seventh day was drawing near, by 
which day Cesar had purposed to return to 
the baggage and the legion. Here it might be 
learned how much fortune achieves in war, 
and how great casualties she produces. The 
enemy having been scattered and alarmed, as — 
we related above, there was no force which 
might produce even a slight occasion of fear. 
The report extends beyond the Rhine to the 
Germans that the Eburones are being pillaged, 
and that all were without distinction invited to 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 217 


the plunder. The Sigambri, who are nearest 
to the Rhine, by whom, we have mentioned 
above, the Tenchtheri and Usipetes were re- 
ceived after their retreat, collect 2,000 horse 3 
they cross the Rhine in ships and barks thirty 
miles below that place where the bridge was en- 
tire and the garrison left by Cesar ; they arrive 
at the frontiers of the Eburones, surprise many 
who were scattered in flight, and get possession 
of alarge amount of cattle, of which barbarians 
are extremely covetous. Allured by booty, 
they advance farther ; neither morass nor for- 
est obstructs these men, born amidst war and 
depredations ; they inquire of their prisoners in 
what parts Cesar is; they find that he has 
advanced farther, and learn that all the army 
has removed. Thereon one of the prisoners 
says, ‘‘Why do you pursue such wretched and 
trifling spoil; you, to whom it is granted to 
become even now most richly endowed by for- 
tune? In threehours you can reach Aduatuca ; 
there the Roman army has deposited all its 
fortunes ; there is so little of a garrison that 
_not even the wall can be manned, nor dare any 
one go beyond the fortifications.” A hope 
having been presented them, the Germans 
leave in concealment the plunder they had ac- 
quired ; they themselves hasten to Aduatuca, 
employing as their guide the same man by 
whose information they had become informed 
of these things 

Cuap. XXXVI.—Cicero, who during all 
the foregoing days had kept his soldiers in 
camp with the greatest exactness, and agrees 


218 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


ably to the injunctions of Ceesar, had not pet. 
mitted even any of the camp-followers to 
go beyond the fortification, distrusting on 
the seventh day that Cesar would keep his 
promise as to the number of days, because he 
heard that he had proceeded farther, and no 
report as to his return was brought to him, and 
being urged at the same time by the expres- » 
sions of those who called his tolerance almost 
a siege, if, forsooth, it was not permitted them 
to go out of the camp, since he might expect 
no disaster, whereby he could be injured, 
within three miles of the camp, while nine 
legions and all the cavalry were under arms, 
and the enemy scattered and almost annihi- 
lated, sent five cohorts into the neighboring 
corn-lands, between which and the camp only 
one hill intervened, for the purpose of for- 
aging. Many soldiers of the legions had been 
left invalided in the camp, of whom those who 
had recovered in this space of time, being 
about 300, are sent together under one stand- 
ard; a large number of soldiers’ attendants 
besides, with a great number of beasts of 
burden, which had remained in the camp, per- 
mission being granted, follow them. 

Cuar. XXXVIJI.— At this very time, the 
German horse by chance come up, and imme- 
diately, with the same speed with which they 
had advanced, attempt to force the camp at 
the Decuman gate, nor were they seen, in con- 
sequence of woods lying in the way on that 
side, before they were just reaching the camp: 
so much so, that the sutlers who had their 


CA4ISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 219 


booths under the rampart had not an opportu- 
nity of retreating within the camp. Our men, 
not anticipating it, are perplexed by the sud. 
den affair, and the cohort on the outpost 
scarcely sustains the first attack. The enemy 
spread themselves on the other sides to ascer- 
tain if they could find any access. Our men 
with difficulty defend the gates ; the very posi- 
tion of itself and the fortification secures the 
other accesses. There is a panic in the entire 
camp, and one inquires of another the cause of 
the confusion, nor do they readily determine 
whither the standards should be borne, nor into 
what quarter each should betake himself. One 
avows that the camp is already taken, another 
maintains that, the enemy having destroyed 
the army and commander-in-chief, are come 
thither as conquerors; most form strange su- 
perstitious fancies from the spot, and place 
before their eyes the catastrophe of Cotta and 
Titurius, who had fallen in the same fort. All 
being greatly disconcerted by this alarm, the 
belief of the barbarians is strengthened that 
‘there is no garrison within, as they had heard 
from their prisoner. They endeavor to force 
an entrance and encourage one another not to 
east from their hands so valuable a prize. 
CHap. XXXVIII.—P. Sextius Baculus, 
who had led a principal century under Cesar 
(of whom we have made mention in previous 
engagements), had been left an invalid in the 
garrison, and had now been five days without 
food. He, distrusting his own safety and that 
of all, goes forth from his tent unarmed: he 


220 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


sees that the enemy are close at hand and that 
the matter is in the utmost danger ; he snatches 
arms from those nearest, and stations himself 
at the gate. The centurions of that cohort 
which was on guard follow him; for a short 
time they sustain the fight together. Sextius 
faints, after receiving many wounds; he is with. 
difficulty saved, drawn away by the hands of 
the soldiers. This space having intervened, 
the others resume courage so far as to venture 
to take their place on the fortifications and pre- 
sent the aspect of defenders. 

Cuap. XXXIX.— The foraging having in | 
the mean time been completed, our soldiers dis- 
tinctly hear the shout; the horse hasten on be- 
fore and discover in what danger the affair is. 
But here there is no fortification to receive 
them, in their alarm: those last enlisted, and 
unskilled in military discipline, turn their faces 
to the military tribune and the centurions; 
they wait to find what orders may be given by 
them. No one is so courageous as not to be 
disconcerted by the suddenness of the affair. 
The barbarians, espying our standard in the — 
distance, desist from the attack; at first they — 
suppose that the legions, which they had — 
learned from their prisoners had removed far- — 
ther off, had returned; afterwards, despis- 
ing their small number, they make an attack 
on them at all sides. 

Cuar. XL.—The camp-followers run for- — 
ward to the nearest rising ground; being — 
speedily driven from this, they throw them- 
selves among the standards and companies: © 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 221 


they thus so much the more alarm the soldiers 
already affrighted. Some propose that, form- 
ing a wedge, they suddenly break through, 
since the camp was so near; and if any part 
should be surrounded and slain, they fully 
trust that at least the rest may be saved; 
others, that they take their stand on an emi- 
nence, and all undergo the same destiny. The 
veteran soldiers, whom we stated to have set 
out together [with the others] under a stand- 
ard, do not approve of this. Therefore en- 
couraging each other, under the conduct of 
Caius Trebonius, a Roman knight, who had 
been appointed over them, they break through 
the midst of the enemy, and arrive in the 
camp safe toa man. The camp-attendants 
and the horse followi: g close upon them with 
the same impetuosity, are sived by the cour- 
age of the soldiers. But those who had taken 
their stand upon the eminence, having even 
how acquired no experience of military mat- 
ters, neither could persevere in that resolution 
which they approved of, namely, to defend 
themselves from their higher position, nor imi- 
tate that vigor and speed which they had ob- 
served to have availed others ; but, attempting 
to reach the camp, had descended into an 
unfavorable situation. The centurions, some 
of whom had been promoted for their valor 
from the lower ranks of other legions to 
higher ranks in this legion, in order that they 
might not forfeit their glory for military ex- 
ploits previously acquired, fell together fight- 
ing most valiantly. The enemy having been 


222 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


dislodged by their valor, a part of the soldiers 
arrived safe in camp contrary to their expec- 
tations; a part perished, surrounded by the 
barbarians. 

Cuap. XLI.—The Germans, despairing of 
taking the camp by storm, because they saw 
that our men had taken up their position on 
the fortifications, retreated beyond the Rhine 
with that plunder which they had deposited in 
the woods. And so great was the alarm, even 
after the departure of the enemy, that when 
C. Volusenus, who had been sent with the 
cavalry, arrived that night, he could not gain 
credence that Ceesar was close at hand with 
his army safe. Fear had so preoccupied the 
minds of all, that, their reason being almost 
estranged, they said that all the other forces 
having been cut off, the cavalry alone had 
arrived there by flight, and asserted that, if 
the army were safe, the Germans would not 
have attacked the camp: which fear the arrival 
of Ceesar removed. 

Cuapr. XLII.—He, on his return, being 
well aware of the casualties of war, complained 
of one thing [only], namely, that the cohorts 
had been sent away from the outposts and 
garrison [duty], and pointed out that room 
ought not to have been left for even the most 
trivial casualty; that fortune had exercised 
great influence in the sudden arrival of their 
enemy ; much greater, in that she had turned 
the barbarians away from the very rampart 
and gates of the camp. Of all which events, 
it seemed the most surprising, that the Ger- 


CH4ISAhK’S COMMENTARIES. 223 


mans, who had crossed the Rhine with this 
object, that they might plunder the territories 
of Ambiorix, being led to the camp of the 
Romans, rendered Ambiorix a most acceptable. 
service. 

Cuap. XLIII.—Cesar, having again 
marched to harass the enemy, after collecting 
a large number [of auxiliaries] from the neigh. 
boring states, despatches them in all direc. 
tions. All the villages and all the buildings, 
which each beheld, were on fire: spoil was 
being driven off from all parts; the corn not 
only was being consumed by so great numbers 
of cattle and men, but also had fallen to the 
earth, owing to the time of the year and the 
storms; so that if any had concealed them- 
selves for the present, still, it appeared likely 
that they must perish through want of all 
things, when the army should be drawn off. 
And frequently it came to that point, as so 
large a body of cavalry had been sent abroad 
in all directions, that the prisoners declared 
Ambiorix had just then been seen by them in 
ight, and had not even passed out of sight, 
so that the hope of overtaking him being raised, 
and unbounded exertions having, been resorted 
to, those who thought they should acquire the 
highest favor with Cesar, nearly overcame 
nature by their ardor, and continually, a little 
only seemed wanting to complete success ; but 
he rescued himself by [means of] Jurking- 
places and forests, and, concealed by the 
night, made for other districts and quarters, 
with no greater guard than that of four horse- 


224 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


men, to whom alone he ventured to confide his 
life. 

Cuarp. X LIV.—Having devastated the 
country in such a manner, Cesar leads back 
his army with the loss of two cohorts to Du- 
rocortorum of the Remi, and, having sum- 
moned a council of Gaul to assemble at that 
place, he resolved to held an investigation 
respecting the conspiracy of the Sendnes and 
Carnutes, and having pronounced a most se- 
vere sentence upon Acco, who had been the 
contriver of that plot, he punished him after 
the custom of our ancestors. Some fearing a 
trial, fled; when he had forbidden these fire 
and water, he stationed in winter quarters two 
legions at the frontiers of the Treviri, two 
among the Lingones, the remaining six at 
Agendicum, in the territories of the Senones ; 
and, having provided corn for the army, he 
set out for Italy, as he had determined, to hold 
the assizes. 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 225 


BOOK VII. 


THE ARGUMENT. 


I.-III. Many of the Gallic nations conspire to assert their free. 
dom, ~IV.-VII. Andselect Vercingetorix the Arvernian as 
Commander-in-chief. — VIII., IX. Czesar suddenly invades 
the country of the Arverni,—X. Succors the Boii,— XI. 
Takes Vellaunodunum and Genabum,— XII.-XIV, And 
Noviodunum. —XV.-XIX. The Gauls burn all the towns 
of the Bituriges, except Avaricum, into which they throw a 
strong garrison, as Caesar was then besieging it. —XX., XXI. 
In the mean time Vercingetorix, being accused of treachery 
by his countrymen, completely vindicates himself. — XXII.- 
XXVIII. Avaricum is for some time ably defended,— 
XXVIIL.-XXXI. Butisatlength taken by storm. — XXXIL., 
XXXIII. Commiotions among the Aidui divert Cesar from 
the war.—XXXIV.-XXXVI. After quelling them, he 
marches at the head of his army to Gergovia.— XXXVII.- 
XLV. Whilst he is carrying on the war there, disturbances 
break out a second time among the Aldui.— XLVI. The 
Romans take possession of three different camps belonging 
to the enemy,— XLVII.-LII. But attacking the town too 
impetuously, are repulsed with great loss, — LIII.-LVII. 
Cesar, despairing of being able to take the town, removes 
his camp into the country of the Aldui.— LVIT.-LXI. 
Labienus, after carrying on the war successfully against the 
Parisii, — LXII. Joinshim.—LXIIL-LXV. <All the Gauls, 
with very few exceptions, follow the example of the Afdui, 
and revolt. - LXVI., LXVII. Under the command of Ver- 
cingetorix, they attack Cesar while marching into the 
country of the Sequani, and are completely defeated. — 
LXVIIL-LXXIV. He pursues them as faras Alesia, and 
surrounds both the town and themselves with a line of 
circumyallation.—LXXV.-LXXXVI. The Gauls select the 
bravest men in their respective states, and endeavor to 
relieve their besieged countrymen.—LXXXVII They 
sustain a total defeat. — LXXXIX. Alesia and Vercinget- 
orix surrender, likewise the AZdui and several other states, 


Cuar. I. — Gaul being tranquil, Cesar, as 
he had determined, sets out for Italy to hold 
the provincial assizes. There he receives intel- 
ligence of the death of Clodius; and, being 


226 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


informed of the decree of the senate, [to the 
effect | that all the youth of Italy should take 
the military oath, he determined to hold a levy 
throughout the entire province. Report of 
these events is rapidly borne into Transalpine 
Gaul. The Gauls themselves add to the report, 
and invent, what the case seemed to require. 
[namely] that Cassar was detained by com- 
motions in the city, and could not, amidst so 
violent dissensions, come to his army. Ani- 
mated by this opportunity, they who already, 
previously to this occurrence, were indignant 
that they were reduced beneath the dominion 
of Rome, begin to organize their plans for war 
more openly and daringly. The leading men 
of Gaul, having convened councils among 
themselves in the woods and retired places, 
complain of the death of Acco: they point out 
that this fate may fallin turn on themselves : 
they bewail the unhappy fate of Gaul; anc 
by every sort of promises and rewards, they 
earnestly solicit some to begin the war, and 
assert the freedom of Gaul at the hazard of 
their lives. They say that special care should 
be paid to this, that Cesesar should be cut off 
from his army, before their secret plans should 
be divulged. That this was easy, because 
neither would the legions, in the absence of 
their general, dare to leave their winter quar- 
ters, nor could the general reach his army 
without a guard: finally, that it was better to 
be slain in battle, than not to recover their 
ancient glory in war, and that freedom which 
they had received from their forefathers. 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 227 


Cuap. II. — Whilst these things are in agi- 
tation, the Carnutes declare ‘‘ that they would 
decline no danger for the sake of the general 
safety,”’ and promise ‘‘ that they would be the 
first of all to begin the war; and since they 
cannot at present take precautions, by giving 
and receiving hostages, that the affair shall not 
be divulged, they require that a solemn assur- 
ance be given them by oath and plighted honor, 
their military standards being brought together 
(in which manner their most sacred obligations 
are made binding), that they should not be de- 
serted by the rest of the Gauls on commencing 
the war.” 

Cuap. IIJ.—When the appointed day came, 
the Carnutes, under the command of Cotuatus 
and Conetodunus, desperate men, meet together 
at Genabum, and slay the Roman citizens who 
had settled there for the purpose of trading, 
(among the rest, Caius Fusius Cita, a distin- 
guished Roman knight, who by Czsar’s orders 
had presided over the provision department, ) 
and plunder their property. The report is 
quickly spread among all the states of Gaul; 
for, whenever a more important and remark- 
able event takes place, they transmit the in- 
telligence through their lands and districts by 
a shout; the others take it up in succession, 
and pass it to their neighbors, as happened on 
this occasion; for the things which were done 
at Genabum at sunrise were heard in the ter- 
ritories of the Arverni before the end of the 
first watch. which is an extent of more than a 
hundred and sixty miles. 


228 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Cuap. [V.—There in like manner, Vercins 
getorix, the son of Celtillus the Arvernian, a 
young man of the highest power (whose father 
had held the supremacy of entire Gaul, and 
had been put to death by his fellow-citizens, 
for this reason, because he aimed at sovereign 
power), summoned together his dependants, 
and easily excited them. On his design being 
made known, they rush to arms: he is expelled 
from the town of Gergovia, by his uncle Go- 
banitio and the rest of the nobles, who were of 
opinion, that such an enterprise ought not to 
be hazarded: he did not, however, desist, but 
held in the country a levy of the needy and 
desperate. Having collected such a body of 
troops, he brings over to his sentiments such 
of his fellow-citizens as he has access to: he 
exhorts them to take up arms in behalf of the 
general freedom, and having assembled great 
forces, he drives from the state his opponents, 
by whom he had been expelled a short time 
previously. Heis saluted king by his partisans ; 
he sends ambassadors in every direction, he 
conjures them to adhere firmly to their promise. 
He quickly attaches to his interests the Senones, 
Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, 
Lemovices, and all the others who border on 
the ocean ; the supreme command is conferred 
on him by unanimous consent. On obtaining 
this authority, he demands hostages from all 
these states, he orders a fixed number of sol- 
diers to be sent to him immediately ; he deter- 
mines what quantity of arms each state shall 
prepare at home, and before what time; he 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 229 


pays particular attention to the cavalry. To 
the utmost vigilance he adds the utmost rigor 
of authority ; and by the severity of his punish- 
ments brings over the wavering: for on the 
commission of a greater crime he puts the 
perpetrators to death by fire and every sort of 
tortures ; for a slighter cause, he sends home 
the offenders with their ears cut off, or one of 
their eyes put out, that they may be an ex- 
ample to the rest, and frighten others by the 
severity of their punishment. 
Cuap. V.—Hayving quickly collected an army 
by these punishments, he sends Lucterius, one 
of the Cadurci, a man of the utmost daring, 
with part of his forces, into the territory of 
the Ruteni; and marches in person into the 
country of the Bituriges. On-his arrival, the 
Bituriges send ambassadors to the Atdui, under 
whose protection they were. to solicit aid in order 
that they might more easily resist the forces of 
the enemy. ‘The A&dui, by the advice of the 
lieutenants whom Ceesar had left with the army, 
send supplies of horse and foot to succor the 
Bituriges. When they came to the river Loire, 
which separates the Bituriges from the A¢dui, 
they delayed a few days there, and, not daring to 
pass the river, return home, and send back word 
to the lieutenants that they hadreturned through 
fear of the treachery of the Bituriges, who, they 
ascertained, had formed this design, that if 
the 7Edui should cross the river, the Bituriges 
on the one side, and the Arverni on the other, 
should surround them. Whether they did this 
for the reason which they alleged to the lieu- 


230 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


tenants, or influenced by treachery, we think 
that we ought not to state as certain, because 
we have no proof. On their departure, the 
Bituriges immediately unite themselves to the 
Arverni. 

Cuapr. VI.— These affairs being announced 
to Ceesar in Italy, at the time when he under- 
stood that matters in the city had been reduced 
toa more tranquil state by the energy of Cneius 
Pompey, he set out for Transalpine Gaul. 
After he had arrived there, he was greatly ata 
loss to know by what means he could reach his 
army. Forif he should summon the legions 
into the province, he was aware that on their 
march they would have to fight in his absence ; 
he foresaw too, that if he himself should en- 
deavor to reach the army, he would act inju- 
diciously, in trusting his safety even to those 
who seemed to be tranquillized. 

Cuap. VII.—In the mean time Lucterius 
the Cadurcan, having been sent into the coun- 
try of the Ruteni, gains over that state to the 
Arverni. Having advanced into the country 
of the Nitiobriges, and Gabali, he receives host- 
ages from both nations, and, assembling a 
numerous force, marches to make a descent on 
the province in the direction of Narbo. Cesar, 
when this circumstance was announced to him, 
thought that the march to Narbo ought to taka 
the precedence of all his other plans. When 
he arrived there, he encourages the timid, and 
stations garrisons among the Ruteni, in the 
province of the Volcz Arecomici, and the coun- 
try around Narbo which was in the vicinity of 


CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 231 


the enemy ; he orders a portion of the forces 
from the province, and the recruits which he 
had brought from Italy, to rendezvous among 
the Helvii who border on the territories of the 
Arvernl. 

Cuap. VIII. — These matters being ar- 
ranged, and Lucterius now checked and forced 
to retreat, because he thought it dangerous 
to enter the line of Roman garrisons, Cesar 
marches into the country of the Helvii; al- 
though mount Cevennes, which separates the 
Arverni from the Helvii, blo.ked up the way 
with very deep snow, as it was the severest 
season of the year; yet having cleared away 
the snow to the depth of six feet, and having 
opened the roads, he reaches the territories of 
the Arverni, with infinite labor to his soldiers. 
This people being surprised, because they con- 
sidered themselves defended by the Cevennes 
as by a wall, and the paths at this season of 
the year had never before been passable even to 
individuals, he orders the cavalry to extend 
themselves as far as they could, and strike 
as great a panic as possible into the enemy. 
These proceedings are speedily announced to 
Vercingetorix by rumor and his messengers. 
Around him all the Arverni crowd in alarm, and 
solemnly entreat him to protect their property, 
and not to suffer them to be plundered by the 
enemy, especially as he saw that all the war 
was transferred into their country. Being pre- 
vailed upon by their entreaties, he moves his 
camp from the country of the Bituriges in the 
direction of the Arverni. 


232 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Cap. IX. —Cesar, having delayed two 
days in that place, because he had anticipated 
that, in the natural course of events, such 
would be the conduct of Vercingetorix, leaves 
the army under pretence of raising recruits 
and cavalry: he places Brutus, a young man, 
in command of these forces; he gives him 
instructions that the cavalry should range as 
extensively as possible in all directions; that 
he would exert himself not to be absent from 
the camp longer than three days. Having 
arranged these matters, he marches to Vienna 
by as long journeys as he can, when his own 
soldiers did not expect him. Finding there a 
fresh body of cavalry, which he had sent on to 
that place several days before, marching inces- 
santly night and day, he advanced rapidly 
through the territory of the AZdui into that of 
the Lingones, in which two legions were win- 
tering, that, ifany plan affecting his own safety 
should have been organized by the A¢dui, he 
might defeat it by the rapidity of his move- 
ments. When he arrived there, he sends infor- 
mation to the rest of the legions, and gathers 
all his army into one place before intelligence 
of his arrival could be announced to the Arverni. 
Vercingetorix, on hearing this circumstance, 
leads back his army into the country of the 
Bituriges ; and after marching from it to Ger- 
govia, a town of the Boii, whom Cesar had 
settled there after defeating them in the Hel- 
vetian war, and had rendered tributary to the 
/E dui, he determined to attack it. 

Cuap, X.— This action caused great per- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 233 


plexity to Ceesar in the selection of his plan ; 
[he feared] lest, if he should confine his le- 
gions in one place for the remaining portion 
of the winter, all Gaul should revolt when the 
tributaries of the Afdui were subdued, because 
it would appear that there was in him no pro- 
tection for his friends; but if he should draw 
them too soon out of their winter quarters, he 
might be distressed by the want of provisions, 
in consequence of the difficulty of conveyance. 
It seemed better, however, to endure ev ery 
hardship than to alienate the affections of all 
his allies, by submitting to such an insult. 
Having, therefore, impressed on the Acdui the 
necessity of supplying him with provisions, he 
sends forward messengers to the Boii to inform 
them of his arrival, and encourage them to re- 
main firm in their allegiance, and resist the 
attack of the enemy with great resolution. 
Having left two legions and the luggage of 
the entire army at Agendicum, he marches to 
the Boii. 

Cuap. XI.—On the second day, when he 
- came to Vellaunodunum, a town of the Sen- 
Ones, he determined to attack it, in order, 
that he might not leave an enemy in his rear, 
and might the more easily procure supplies of 
provisions, and draw a line of circumvallation 
around it in two days: on the third day, am- 
bassadors being sent from the town to treat 
- of a capitulation, he orders their arms to be 
brought together, their cattle to be brought 
forth, and six hundred hostages to be given. 
He leaves Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to 


234 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


complete these arrangements; he himself sets 
out with the intention of marching as soon at 
possible to Genabum, a town of the Carnutes, 
who, having then for the first time received in- 
formation of the siege of Vellaunodunum, as 
they thought that it would be protracted to a 
longer time, were preparing a garrison to send 
to Genabum for the defence of that town. 
Ceesar arrived here in two days; after pitching 
his camp before the town, being prevented by 
the time of the day, he defers the attack to 
the next day, and orders his soldiers to pre- 
pare whatever was necessary for that enter- 
prise ; and as a bridge over the Loire connected 
the town of Genabum with the opposite bank, 
fearing lest the inhabitants should escape by 
aight from the town, he orders two legions to 
keep watch under arms. ‘The people of Gena- 
bum came forth silently from the city before 
midnight, and began to cross the river. When 
this circumstance was announced by scouts, 
Ceesar, having set fire to the gates, sends in 
the legions which he had ordered to be ready, 
and obtains possession of the town so com- 
pletely, that very few of the whole number of 
the enemy escaped being taken alive, because 
vhe narrowness of the bridge and the roads 
prevented the multitude from escaping. He 
pillages and burns the town, gives the booty 
to the soldiers, then leads his army over the 
Loire, and marches into the territories of the 
Bituriges. 

Cuap. XII. — Vercingetorix, when he as- 
certained the arrival of Cesar, desisted from 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 235 


the siege [of Gergovia], and marched to meet 
Cesar. The latter had commenced to besiege 
Noviodunum; and when ambassadors came 
from this town to beg that he would pardon 
them and spare their lives, in order that he 
might execute the rest of his designs with the 
rapidity by which he had accomplished most 
of them, he orders their arms to be collected, 
their horses to be brought forth, and hostages 
to be given. A part of the hostages being 
now delivered up, when the rest of the terms 
were being performed, a few centurions and 
soldiers being sent into the town to collect the 
arms and horses, the enemy’s cavalry which 
had outstripped the main body of Vercingeto- 
rix’s army, was seen at a distance; as soon 
as the townsmen beheld them, and entertained 
hopes of assistance, raising a shout, they began 
to take up arms, shut the gates, and line the 
walls. When the centurionsin the town under- 
stood from the signal-imaking of the Gauls that 
they were forming some new design, they drew 
their swords and seized the gates, and re- 
’ covered all their men safe. 

Cuap. XIII.— Cesar orders the horse to 
be drawn out of the camp, and commences a 
cavalry action. His men being now distressed, 
Cesar sends to their aid about four hundred 
German horse, which he had determined, at 
the beginning, to keep with himself. The 
Gauls could not withstand their attack, but 
were put to flight, and retreated to their main 
body, after losing a great number of men. 
When they were routed, the townsmen, again 


236 C4iSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


intimidated, arrested those persons by whose 
exertions they thought that the mob had been 
roused, and brought them to Cesar, and sur- 
rendered themselves to him. When these af- 
fairs were accomplished, Cesar marched to 
Avaricum, which was the largest and best 
fortified town in the territories of the Bituri- 
ges, and situated in a most fertile tract of 
country ; because he confidently expected that 
on taking that town, he would reduce beneath 
his dominion the state of the Bituriges. 

Cuap. XIV.— Vercingetorix, after sustain- 
ing such a series of losses at Vellaunodunum, 
Genabum, and Noviodunum, summons his 
men to a council. He impresses on them 
‘‘ that the war must be prosecuted on a very 
different system from that which had been 
previously adopted; but they should by all 
means aim at this object, that the Romans 
should be prevented from foraging and pro- 
curing provisions ; that this was easy, because 
they themselves were well supplied with cav- 
alry, and were likewise assisted by the season 
of the year ; that forage could not be cut; that 
the enemy must necessarily disperse, and look 
for it in the houses, that all these might be 
daily destroyed by the horse. Besides that 
the interests of private property must be neg- 
lected for the sake of the general safety ; that 
the villages and houses ought to be fired, over 
such an extent of country in every direction 
from Boia, as the Romans appeared capable 
of scouring in their search for forage. That 
apn abundance of these necessaries could be 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 287 


supplied to them, because they would be as- 
sisted by the resources of those in whose terri- 
tories the war would be waged: that the 
Romans either would not bear the privation, 
or else would advance to any distance from 
the camp with considerable danger; and that 
it made no difference whether they slew them 
or stripped them of their baggage, since, if it 
was lost, they could not carry on the war. 
Besides that, the towns ought to be burnt 
which were not secured against every danger 
by their fortifications or natural advantages ; 
that there should not be places of retreat for 
their own countrymen for declining military 
service, nor be exposed to the Romans as 
inducements to carry off abundance of provis- 
ions and plunder. If these sacrifices should 
appear heavy or galling, that they ought ta 
consider it much more distressing that their 
wives and children should be dragged off to 
slavery, and themselves slain; the evils which 
must necessarily befall the conquered.” 

Cuap. XV.— This opinion having been ap. 
proved of by unanimous consent, more than 
’ twenty towns of the Bituriges are burnt in one 
day. Conflagrations are beheld in every quar- 
ter; and although all bore this with great re- 
gret, yet they laid before themselves this con- 
solation, that, as the victory was certain, they 
could quickly recover their losses. ‘There is a 
debate concerning Avaricum in the general 
council, whether they should decide, that it 
should be burnt or defended. The Bituriges 
threw themselves at the feet of all the Gauls, 


238 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


and entreat that they should not be compelled 
to set fire with their own hands to the fairest 
city of almost the whole of Gaul, which was 
both a protection and ornament to the state ; 
they say that ‘‘they could easily defend it 
owing to the nature of the ground, for, being 
enclosed almost on every side by a river and a 
marsh, it had only one entrance, and that very 
narrow.” Permission being granted to them 
at their earnest request, Vercingetorix at first 
dissuades them from it, but afterwards con- 
cedes the point, owing to their entreaties and 
the compassion of the soldiers. A proper gar- 
rison is selected for the town. 

Cuap. XVI. — Vercingetorix follows closely 
upon Cesar by shorter marches, and selects 
for his camp a place defended by woods and 
marshes, at the distance of fifteen miles from 
Avaricum. ‘There he received intelligence by 
trusty scouts, every hour in the day, of what 
was going on at Avaricum, and ordered what- 
ever he wished to be done; he closely watched 
all our expeditions for corn and forage, and 
whenever they were compelled to go to a 
oreater distance, he attacked them when dis- 
persed, and inflicted severe loss upon them ; 
although the evil was remedied by our men, as 
far as precaution could be taken, by going 
forth at irregular times, and by different ways. 

Cuap. XVII. — Cesar, pitching his camp 
at that side of the town which was not defended 
by the river and marsh, and had a very narrow 
approach, as we have mentioned, began to raise 
the vinese and erect two towers ; for the nature 


CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 239 


of the place prevented him from drawing a line 
of circumvallation. He never ceased toimpor- 
tune the Boii and /Edui for supplies of corn; 
of whom the one [the /Edui], because they 
were acting with no zeal, did not aid him much ; 
the others [the Boii], as their resources were 
not great, quickly consumed what they had. 
Although the army was distressed by the great- 
est want of corn, through the poverty of the 
Boii, the apathy of the A«dui, and the burning 
of the houses, tosuch a degree, that for several 
days the soldiers were without corn, and satis- 
fied their extreme hunger with cattle driven 
from the remote villages ; yet no language was 
heard from them unworthy of the majesty of 
the Roman people and their former victories. 
Moreover when Ceesar addressed the legions, 
one by one, when at work, and said that he 
would raise the siege, if they felt the scarcity 
too severely, they unanimously begged him 
‘‘not to do so; that they had served for several 
years under his command in such a manner, 
that they never submitted to insult, and never 
abandoned an enterprise without accomplish- 
ing it; that they should consider it a disgrace 
if they abandoned the siege after commencing 
it; that it was better to endure every hard- 
ship than not to avenge the manes of the 
Roman citizens who perished at Genabum by 
the perfidy of the Gauls.” They intrusted the 
same declarations to the centurions and mili- 
tary tribunes, that through them they might 
Ye communicated to Ceesar. 

Cuap. XVIII. — When the towers had now 


240 C.ESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


approached the walls, Czesar ascertained from 
the captives that Vercingetorix, after destroy- 
ing the forage, had pitched his camp nearer 
Avaricum, and that he himself with the cavalry 
and light-armed infantry, who generally fought 
among the horse, had gone to lay an ambus- 
cade in that quarter, to which he thought that 
our troops would come the next day to forage. 
On learning these facts, he set out from the 
camp secretly at midnight, and reached the 
camp of the enemy early in the morning. 
They, having quickly learned the arrival of 
Ceesar by scouts, hid their cars and baggage in 
the thickest parts of the woods, and drew up 
all their forces in a lofty and open space : which 
circumstance being announced, Cesar imme- 
diately ordered the baggage to be piled, and 
the arms to be got ready. 

Cuap. XIX. — There was a hill of a gentle 
ascent from the bottom; a dangerous and im- 
passable marsh, not more than fifty feet broad 
begirtiton almost every side. ‘The Gauls, hay- 
ing broken down the bridges, posted themselves 
on this hill, in confidence of their position, and 
being drawn up in tribes according to their 
respective states, held all the fords and passages 
of that marsh with trusty guards, thus deter- 
mined that if the Romans should attempt to 
force the marsh, they would overpower them 
from the higher ground while sticking in it, so 
that whoever saw the nearness of the position 
would imagine that the two armies were pre- 
pared to fight on almost equal terms ; but who- 
ever should view accurately the disadvantage 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 24) 


of position, would discover that they were 
showing off an empty affectation of courage. 
Ceesar clearly points out to his soldiers, who 
were indignant that the emeny could bear the 
sight of them at the distance of so short a 
space, and were earnestly demanding the sig- 
nal for action, ‘* with how great loss and the 
death of how many gallant men the victory 
would necessarily be purchased: and when he 
saw them so determined to decline no danger 
for his renown, that he ought to be considered 
guilty of the utmost injustice if he did not hold 
their life dearer than his personal safety.” 
Having thus consoled his soldiers, he leads 
them back on the same day to the camp, and 
determined to prepare the other things which 
were necessary for the siege of the town. 
Cuar. XX. — Vercingetorix, when he had 
returned to his men, was accused of treason. 
in that he had moved his camp nearer the 
Romans, in that he had gone away with all the 
caval'y, in that he had left so great forces 
without a commander, in that, on his depart- 
ure, the Romans had come at such a favor- 
able season, and with such despatch; that all 
these circumstances could not have happened 
accidentally or without design; that he pre- 
ferred holding the sovereiynty of Gaui by the 
erant of Cesar, to acquiring it by their favor. 
Being accused in such a manner, he made the 
following reply to these charges: ** That his 
moving his camp had been caused by want of 
forage, and had been done even by their 
advice ; that his approaching near the Romans 


249 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


had been a measure dictated by the favorable 
nature of the ground, which would defend him 
by its natural strength; that the service of 
the cavalry could not have been requisite in 
marshy ground, and was useful in that place 
to which they had gone ; that he, on his depart- 
ure, had given the supreme command to no 
one intentionally, lest he should be induced by 
the eagerness of the multitude to hazard an 
engagement, to which he perceived that all 
were inclined, owing to their want of energy, 
because they were unable to endure fatigue 
any longer. That, if the Romans in the mean 
time came up by chance, they [the Gauls] 
should feel grateful to fortune; if invited by 
the information of some one they should feel 
grateful to him, because they were enabled to 
see distinctly from the higher ground the 
smallness of the number of their enemy, and 
despise the courage of those who, not daring 
to fight, retreated disgracefully into their 
camp. That he desired no power from Cesar 
by treachery, since he could have it by victory, 
which was now assured to himself and to all 
the Gauls; nay, that he would even give them 
back the command, if they thought that they 
conferred honor on him, rather than received 
safety from him. That you may be assured,” 
said he, ‘‘ that I speak these words with truth ; 
listen to these Roman soldiers!” He pro- 
duces some camp-followers whom he had sur- 
prised on a foraging expedition some days 
before, and had tortured by famine and con- 
finement. They, being previously instructed 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 242 


what answers they should make when ex- 
amined, say, ‘‘ That they were legionary sol- 
diers, that, urged by famine and want, they 
had recently gone forth from the camp, [to 
see] if they could find any corn or cattle in the 
fields ; that the whole army was distressed by 
a similar scarcity, nor had any one now sufft 
cient strength, nor could bear the labor of the 
work ; and therefore that the general was de- 
termined, if he made no progress in the siege, 
to draw off his army in three days.” ‘‘ These 
benefits,” says Vercingetorix, ‘* you receive 
from me, whom you accuse of treason— me, 
by whose exertions you see so powerful and 
victorious an army almost destroyed by famine, 
without shedding one drop of your blood ; and 
I have taken precautions that no state shall 
admit within its territories this army in its 
ignominious flight from this place.” 

Cuap. XXI.— The whole multitude raise 
a shout and clash their arms, according to 
their custom, as they usually do in the case 
of him of whose speech they approve; [they 
exclaim] that Vercingetorix was a consum- 
mate general, and that they had no doubt of 
his honor; that the war could not be con- 
ducted with greater prudence. ‘They deter- 
mine that ten thousand men should be picked 
out of the entire army and sent into the town, 
and decide that the general safety should not 
be intrusted to the Bituriges alone, because 
they were aware that the glory of the victory 
must rest with the Bituriges, if they made 
good the defence of the town. 


244 CLESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Cuar. XXII. — To the extraordinary valor 
of our soldiers, devices of every sort were 
opposed by the Gauls; since they are a nation 
of consummate ingenuity, and most skilful 
in imitating and making those things which 
are imparted by any one; for they turned 
aside the hooks with nooses, and when they 
had caught hold of them firmly, drew them 
on by means of engines, and undermined the 
mound the more skilfully on this account, 
because there are in their territories extensive 
iron mines, and consequently every description 
of mining operations is known and practised 
by them. ‘They had furnished, moreover, the 
whole wall on every side with turrets, and had 
covered them with skins. Besides, in their fre- 
quent sallies by day and night, they attempted 
either to set fire to the mound, or attack our 
soldiers when engaged in the works; and, 
moreover, by splicing the upright timbers of 
their own towers, they equalled the height of 
ours, as fast as the mound had daily raised 
them, and countermined our mines, and im- 
peded the working of them by stakes bent and 
sharpened at the ends, and boiling pitch, and 
stones of very great weight, and prevented 
them from approaching the walls. 

Cuap. XXIII. — But this is usually the form 
of all the Gallic walls. Straight beams, con- 
nected lengthwise and two feet distant from 
each other at equal intervals, are placed to- 
gether on the ground; these are mortised on 
the inside, and covered with plenty of earth. 
But the intervals which we have mentioned 


JUHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 245 


are closed up in front by large stones. These 
being thus laid and cemented together, another 
row is added above, in such a manner, that 
the same interval may be observed, and that 
the beams may not touch one another, but 
equal spaces intervening, each row of beams 
is kept firmly in its place by a row of stones. 
In this manner the whole wall is consolidated, 
until the regular height of the wall be com- 
pleted. This work, with respect to appear- 
ance and variety, is not unsightly, owing to 
the alternate rows of beams and stones, which 
preserve their order.in right lines ; and, besides, 
it possesses great advantages as regards utility 
and the defence of cities; for the stone pro. 
tects it from fire, and the wood from the bat: 
tering ram, since it [the wood] being mortised 
in the inside with rows of beams, generally 
forty feet each in length, can neither be broken 
through nor torn asunder. 

Cuap. XXIV.— The siege having been 
impeded by so many disadvantages, the sol- 
diers, although they were retarded during the 
whole time, by the mud, cold, and constant 
showers, yet by their incessant labor overcame 
all these obstacles, and in twenty-five days 
raised a mound three hundred and thirty feet 
broad and eighty feet high. When it almost 
touched the enemy’s walls, and Cesar, accord- 
ing to his usual custom, kept watch at the work, 
and encouraged the soldiers not to discontinue 
the work for a moment, a little before the third 
watch they discovered that the mound was 
sinking, since the enemy had set it on fire by 


246 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


a mine; and at the same time a shout was 
raised along the entire wall, and a sally was 
made from two gates on each side of the tur- 
rets. Some at a distance were casting torches 
and dry wood from the wall on the mound. 
others were pouring on it pitch, and other mate- 
rials, by which the flame might be excited, so 
that a plan could hardly be formed, as to where 
they should first run to the defence, or to what 
part aid should be brought. However, as two 
legions always kept guard before the camp by 
Ceesar’s orders, and several of them were at 
stated times at the work, measures were 
promptly taken, that some should oppose the 
sallying party, others draw back the towers and 
make acut in the rampart ; and, moreover, that 
the whole army should hasten from the camp 
to extinguish the flames. 

Cuarp. XXV.— When the battle was going 
on in every direction, the rest of the night 
being now spent, and fresh hopes of victory 
always arose before the enemy: the more so on 
this account because they saw the coverings of 
our towers burnt away, and perceived, that we, 
being exposed, could not easily go to give 
assistance, and they themselves were always 
relieving the weary with fresh men, and con- 
sidered that all the safety of Gaul rested on 
this crisis; there happened in my own view a 
circumstance which, having appeared to be 
worthy of record, we thought it ought not to 
be omitted. A certain Gaul before the gate of 
the town, who was casting into the fire oppo- 
site the turret balls of tallow and fire which 


CHSAR’'S COMMENTARIES. 247 


were passed along to him, was pierced with a 
dart on the right side and fell dead. One of 
those next him stepped ov.r him as _ he lay, 
and discharged the same office : when the second 
man was slain in the same manner by a wound 
from a cross bow, a third succeeded him, anda 
fourth succeeded the third: nor was this post 
left vacant by the besieged, until, the fire of 
_ the mound having been extinguished, and the 
enemy repulsed in every direction, an end was 
put to the fighting. 

Cuar. XXVI.—The Gauls having tried 
every expedient, as nothing had succeeded, 
adopted the design of fleeing from the town the 
next day, by the advice and order of Vercinget: 
orix. They hoped that, by attempting it atthe 
dead of night, they would effect it without any 
great loss of men, because the camp of Vercin 
getorix was not far distant from the town, ana 
the extensive marsh which intervened was 
likely to retard the Romans in the pursuit. 
And they were now preparing to execute this 
by night, when the matrons suddenly ran out 
into the streets, and weeping cast themselves at 
the feetof their husbands, and requested of thei, 
with every entreaty, that they should not aban- 
don themselves and their common children to 
the enemy for punishment, because the weak- 
ness of their nature and physical powers pres 
vented them from taking to flight. When they 
saw that they (as fear does not generally admit 
of mercy in extreme danger) persisted in their 
resolution, they began to shout aloud, and give 
intelligence of their flightto the Romans. The 


248 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Gauls, being intimidated by fear of this, lest 
the passes should be preoccupied by the Roman 
cavalry, desisted from their design. 

Cuar. XXVII. — The next day Cesar, the 
tower being advanced, and the works ary he 
had determined to raise being arranged, a vio- 
lent storm arising, thought this no bad time 
for execr:ting his designs, because he observed 
the guards arranged on the walls a little too 
negligently, and therefore ordered his own men 
to engage in their work more remissly, and 
pointed out what he wished to be done. He 
drew up his soldiers in a secret position within 
the vineze, and exhorts them to reap, at least, 
the harvest of victory proportionate to their 
exertions. He proposed a reward for those 
who should first scale the walls, and gave the 
signal to the soldiers. They suddenly flew out 
Srom all quarters and quickly filled the wall. 

Cuap. XXVIII. —The enemy being alarmed 
by the suddenness of the attack, were dislodged 
from the wall and towers, and drew up, in form 
of a wedge, inthe market-place and the open 
streets, with this intention, that, if an attack 
should be made on any side, they should fight 
with their line drawn up to receive it. When — 
they saw no one descending to the level ground, 
and the enemy extending themselves along 
the entire wall in every direction, fearing lest 
every hope of flight should be cut off, they cast 
away their arms, and sought, without stopping, 
the most remote parts of the town. A part 
was then slain by the infantry when they were 
crowding upon one another in the narrow pas- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 249 


sage of the gates; and a part having got with- 
out the gates, were cut to pieces by the cavalry : 
nor was there one who was anxious for the 
plunder. Thus, being excited by the massacre 
at Genabum and the fatigue of the sieze, they 
spared neither those worn out with years, 
women, nor children. Finally, out of all that 
number, which amounted to about forty thou- 
sand, scarcely eight hundred, who fled from the 
town when they heard the first alarm, reached 
Vercingetorix in safety: and he, the night 
being now far spent, received them in silence 
after their flight (fearing that any sedition 
should arise in the camp from their entrance in 
a body and the compassion of the soldiers), so 
that, having arranged his friends and _ the 
chiefs of the states at a distance on the road, 
he took precautions that they should be sepa- 
rated and conducted to their fellow-country- 
men, to whatever part of the camp had been 
assigned to each state from the beginning. 
Cuar. XXIX. — Vercingetorix having con- 
vened an assembly on the following day, con- 
soled and encouraged his soldiers in the follow- 
ing words: ‘* That they should not be too 
much depressed in spirit, nor alarmed at their 
loss ; that the Romans did not conquer by valor 
nor in the field, but by a kind of art and skill 
in assault, with which they themselves were 
unacquainted; that whoever expected every 
event in the war to be favorable. erred; that it 
* never was his opinion that Avaricum should be 
defended, of the truth of which statement he 
had themselves as witnesses, but that it was 


250 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


owing to the imprudence of the Bituriges, and 
the too ready compliance of the rest, that this 
loss was sustained; that, however, he would 
soon compensate it by superior advantages ; 
for that he would, by his exertions, bring over 
those states which severed themselves from the 
rest of the Gauls, and would create a general 
unanimity throughout the whole of Gaul, the 
union of which not even the whole earth could 
withstand, and that he had it already almost 
effected ; that in the mean time it was reasonable 
that he should prevail on them, for the sake of the 
general safety, to begin to fortify their camp, 
in order that they might the more easily sus- 
tain the sudden attacks of the enemy.” 

Cuap. XXX.—This speech was not disa- 
greeable to the Gauls, principally because he 
himself was not disheartened by receiving sq 
severe a loss, and had not concealed himself, 
nor shunned the eyes of the people: and he 
was believed to possess greater foresight and 
sounder judgment than the rest, because, when 
the affair was undecided, he had at first been 
of opinion that Avaricum should be burnt, 
and afterwards that it should be abandoned. 
Accordingly, as ill success weakens the authority 
of other generals, so, on the contrary, his dignity 
increased daily, although a loss was sustained : 
at the same time they began to entertain hopes, 
on his assertion, of uniting the rest of the 
states to themselves, and on this occasion, for 
the first time, the Gauls began to fortify their 
camps, and were so alarmed that although they 
were men unaccustomed to toil, yet they were 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 251 


of opinion that they ought to endure and suf- 
fer everything which should be imposed upon 
them. 

Cuar. XXXI.—WNor did Vercingetorix use 
less efforts than he had promised, to gain over 
the other states, and [in consequence ] endeav- 
ored to entice their leaders by gifts and prom- 
ises. For this object he selected fitting emis- 
saries, by whose subtle pleading or private 
friendship each of the nobles could be most 
easily influenced. He takes care that those 
who fled to him on the storming of Avaricum 
should be provided with arms and clothes. 
At the same time, that his diminished forces 
should be recruited, he levies a fixed quota of 
soldiers from each state, and defines the num- 
ber and day before which he should wish them 
brought to the camp, anorders all the archers, 
of whom there was a very great number in Gaul, 
to be collected and sent to him. By these 
means, the troops which were lost at Avaricum 
are speedily replaced. In the meantime, Teu- 
tomarus, the son of Ollovicon, the king of the 
Nitiobriges, whose father had received the 
appellation of friend from our senate, came to 
him with a great number of his own horse and 
those whom he had hired from Aquitania. 

Cuar. XXXII.—Cesar, after delaying 
several days at Avaricum, and, finding there 
the greatest plenty of corn and other provis- 
ions, refreshed his army after their fatigue 
and privation. The winter being almost 
ended, when he was invited by the favorable 
season of the year to prosecute the war and 


252 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


march against the enemy, [and try] whether 
he could draw them from the marshes and 
woods, or else press them by a _ blockade; 
some noblemen of the AZdui came to him as 
ambassadors to entreat ‘‘ that in an extreme 
emergency he should succor their state; that 
their affairs were in the utmost danger, because, 
whereas single magistrates had been usually 
appointed in ancient times and held the power 
of king for a single year, two persons now 
exercised this office, and each asserted that 
he was appointed according to their laws. 
That one of them was Convictolitanis, a pow- 
erful and illustrious youth; the other Cotus, 
sprung from a most ancient family, and per- 
sonally a man of very great influence and 
extensive connections. His brother Valetiacus 
had borne the same office during the last year : 
that the whole state was up in arms; the sen- 
ate divided, the people divided; that each of 
them had his own adherents; and that, if the 
animosity should be fomented any longer, the 
result would be that one part of the state 
would come to a collision with the other; that 
it rested with his activity and influence to pre- 
vent it.” 

Cnar. XXXIII.— Although Cesar con- 
sidered it ruinous to leave the war and the, 
enemy, yet, being well aware what great evils 
generally arise from internal dissensions, lest 
a state so paqwerful and so closely connected 
with the Roman people, which he himself had 
always fostered and honored in every respect, 
should have recourse to violence and arms, 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 253 


and that the party which had less confidence 
in its own power should summon aid from 
Vercingetorix, he determined to anticipate this 
movement; and because, by the laws of the 
AE dui, it was not permitted those who held the 
supreme authority to leave the country, he 
determined to go in person to the Atdui, lest 
he should appear to infringe upon their gov- 
ernment and laws, and summoned all the sen- 
ate, and those between whom the dispute was, 
to meet him at Decetia. When almost all the 
state had assembled there, and he was in- 
formed that one brother had been declared 
magistrate by the other, when only a few per- 
sons were privately summoned for the pur- 
pose, at a different time and place from what 
he ought, whereas the laws not only forbade 
two belonging to one family to be elected 
magistrates while each was alive, but even 
deterred them from being in the senate, he 
compelled Cotus to resign his office ; he ordered 
Convictolitanis, who had been elected by the 
priests, according to the usage of the state, 
in the presence of the magistrates, to hold the 
supreme authority. 

Cuarp. XXXIV.— Having pronounced this 
decree between [the contending parties], he 
exhorted the /Xdui to bury in oblivion their 
disputes and dissensions, and, laying aside all 
these things, devote themselves to the war, 
and expect from him, on the conquest of Gaul, 
those rewards which they should have earned, 
and send speedily to him all their cavalry and 
ten thousand infantry, which he might place 


254 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


in different garrisons to protect his convoys of 
provisions, and then divided his army into 
two parts: he gave Labienus four legions to 
lead into the country of the Senones and Pa- 
risii ; and led in person six into the country of 
the Arverni, in the direction of the town of 
Gergovia, along the banks of the Allier. He 
gave part of the cavalry to Labienus, and kept 
part to himself. Vercingetorix, on learning 
this circumstance, broke down all the bridges 
over the river and began to march on the other 
yank of the Allier. 

Cuap. XXXV.— When each army was ir 
sight of the other, and was pitching their camp 
almost opposite that of the enemy, scouts 
being distributed in every quarter, lest the 
Romans should build a bridge and bring over 
their troops ; it was to Cesar a matter attended 
with great difficulties, lest he should be hin- 
dered from passing the river during the greatcr 
part of the summer, as the Allier cannot gen- 
erally be forded before the autumn. There- 
fore, that this might not happen, having 
pitched his camp in a woody place cpposite to 
one of those bridges which Vercingetorix had 
taken care sould be broken down, the next 
day he stopped behind with two legions in a 
secret place: he sent on the rest of the forces 
as usual, with all the baggage, after having 
selected some cohorts, that the nuinber of the 
legions might appear to be complete. Having 
ordered these to advance as far as they could, 
when now, from the time of day, he conjec- 
tured they had come to an encampment, he 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 255 


began to rebuild the bridge on the same piles, 
the lower part of which remained entire. 
Ilaving quickly finished the work and led his 
legions across, he selected a fit place for a 
camp and recalled the rest of his troops. Ver- 
cingetorix, on ascertaining this fact, went 
before him by forced marches, in order that he 
might not be compelled to come to an action 
against his will. 

Cuap. XXXVI.—Cesar, in five days’ 
march, went from that place to Gergovia, and 
after engaging in a slight cavalry skirmish 
that day, on viewing the situation of the city, 
which, being built on a very high mountain. 
was very difficult of access, he despaired of 
taking it by storm, and determined to take no 
measures with regard to besieging it before he 
should secure a supply of provisions. But 
Vercingetorix, having pitched his camp on the 
mountain near the town, placed the forces of 
each state separately and at small intervals 
around himself, and having occupied all the 
hills of that range as far as they commanded 
_ a view [of the Roman encampment], lie pre- 
sented « formidable appearance; he ordered 
the rulers of the states, whom he had selected 
as his council of war, to come to him daily at 
the dawn, whether any measure seemed to 
require deliberation or execution. Nor did he 
allow almost any day to pass without testing 
in a cavalry action, the archers being inter- 
_mixed, what spirit and valor there was in each 
of his own men. There was a hill opposite. 
the town, at the very foot of that mountain, 


256 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


strongly fortified and precipitous on every 
side (which if our men could gain, they seemed 
likely to exclude the enemy from a great share 
of their supply of water, and from free for- 
aging ; but this place was occupied by them 
with a weak garrison): however, Cesar set 
out from the camp in the silence of night, and 
dislodging the garrison before succor could 
come from the town, he got possession of the 
place and posted two legions there, and drew 
from the greater camp to the less a double 
trench twelve feet broad, so that the soldiers 
could even singly pass secure from any sudden 
attack of the enemy. | 
Cuap. XXXVII. — Whilst these affairs were 
going on at Gergovia, Convictolitanis, the 
Aduan, to whom we have observed the magis- 
tracy was adjudged by Cesar, being bribed 
by the Arverni, holds a conference with cer- 
tain young men, the chief of whom were Lita- 
vicus and his brothers, who were born of a 
most noble family. He shares the bribe with 
them, and exhorts them to ‘‘ remember that 
they were free and born for empire; that the 
state of the Aidui was the only one which 
retarded the most certain victory of the Gauls ; 
that the rest were held in check by its author- 
ity and, if it was brought over, the Romans 
would not have room to stand on in Gaul ; that 
he had received some kindness from Ceesar, 
only so far, however, as gaining a most just 
cause by his decision; but that he assigned - 
more weight to the general freedom ; for, why 
should the Aidui go to Cesar. to decide con= 


CH4ISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 257 


cerning their rights and laws, rather than the 
Romans come to the Adui?” The young 
men being easily won over by the speech of 
the magistrate and the bribe, when they 
declared that they would even be leaders in 
the plot, a plan for accomplishing it was con- 
sidered, because they were confident their state 
could not be induced to undertake the war on 
slight grounds. It was resolved that Litavicus 
should have the command of the ten thousand, 
which were being sent to Cesar for the war, 
and should have charge of them on their march, 
and that his brothers should go before him to 
Cesar. They arrange the other measures, 
and the manner in which they should have 
them done. 

Cuar. XXXVIII.— Litavicus, having re- 
ceived the command of the army, suddenly 
convened the soldiers, when he was about 
thirty miles distant from Gergovia, and, weep- 
ing, said, ** Soldiers, whither are we going? 
All our knights and all our nobles have per- 
ished. Eporedirix and Viridomarus, the prin- 
cipal men of the state, being accused of trea- 
son, have been slain by the Romans without 
ever permission to plead their cause. Learn 
this intelligence from those who have escaped 
from the massacre; for I, since my brothers 
and all my relations have been slain, am pre- 
vented by grief from declaring what has taken 
place.” Persons are brought forward whom 
he had instructed what he would have them 
say, and make the same statements to the sol- 
diery as Litavicus had made: that all the 


258 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


knights of the /Xdui were slain because they 
were said to have held conferences with the 
Arverni; that they had concealed themselves 
among the multitude of soldiers, and had 
escaped from the midst of the slaughter. The 
/Edui shout aloud and conjure Litavicus to 
provide for their safety. ‘‘Asif,” said he, “it 
were a matter of deliberation, and not of neces- 
sity, for us to go to Gergovia and unite our- 
selves to the Arverni. Or have we any rea- 
sons to doubt that the Romans, after perpe- 
trating the atrocious crime, are now hastening 
to slay us? Therefore, if there be any spirit 
in us, let us avenge the death of those who 
have perished in a most unworthy manner, 
and let us slay these robbers.” He points to 
the Roman citizens, who had accompanied 
them, in reliance on his protection. He im- 
mediately seizes a great quantity of corn and 
provisions, cruelly tortures them, aad then puts — 
them to death, sends messengers throughout 
the entire state of the Atdui, and rouses them 
completely by the same falsehood concerning 
the slaughter of their knights and nobles; he 
earnestly advises them to avenge, in the same 
manner as he did, the wrongs which they had 
received. 

Cuap. XXXIX.— Eporedirix, the A.duan, 
a young man born in the highest rank and pos- 
sessing very great influence at home, and, along 
with Viridomarus, of equal age and influence, 
but of inferior birth, whom Cesar had raised 
from a humble position to the highest rank, on 
being recommended to him by Divitiacus, had 


CHAISAR'S COMMENTARIES. 259 


come in the number of horse, being summoned 
by Cesar by name. These had a dispute with 
veach other for precedence, and in the struggle 
between the magistrates they had contended 
with their utmost efforts, the one for Convicto- 
litanis, the other for Cotus. Of these Epore- 
dirix, on learning the design of Litavicus, lays 
the matter before Cesar almost at midnight ; 
he entreats that Ceesar should not suffer their 
State to swerve from the alliance with the 
Roman people, owing to the depraved counsels 
of a few young men, which he foresaw would 
be the consequence if so many thousand men 
should unite themselves to the enemy, as their 
relations could not neglect their safety, nor the 
state regard it as a matter of slight importance. 

Cuap. XL. —Ceesar felt great anxiety on 
this intelligence, because he had always espe- 
cially indulged the state of the ‘dui, and, 
without any hesitation, draws out from the 
camp four light-armed legions and all the cav- 
alry : nor had he time, at such a crisis, to con- 
tract the camp, because the affair seemed to 
depend upon despatch. He leaves Caius Fa- 
bius, his lieutenant, with two legions to guard 
the camp. When he ordered the brothers of 
Litavicus to be arrested, he discovers that they 
had fled a short time before to the camp of the 
enemy. He encouraged his soldiers ‘‘not to 
be disheartened by the labor of the journey on 
such a necessary occasion,” and, after advan- 
cing twenty-five miles, all being most eager, he 
came in sight of the army of the A2dui, and, 
by sending on his cavalry, retards and impedes 


260 CHANSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


their march; he then issues strict orders to all 
his soldiers to kill no one. He commands 
Eporedirix and Viridomarus, who they though¢ 
were killed, to move among the cavalry and 
address their friends. When they were recog- 
nized and the treachery of Litavicus dis- 
covered, the Aidui began to extend their hands 
to intimate submission, and, laying down their 
arms, to deprecate death. Litavicus, with his 
clansmen, who, after the custom of the Gauls 
consider it a crime to desert their patrons, even 
in extreme misfortune, flees forth to Gergovia. 

Cuap. XLI.— Cesar, after sending messen- — 
gers to the state of the A‘dui, to inform them 
that they whom he could have put to death by 
the right of war were spared through his kind- 
ness, and after giving three hours of the night 
to his army for repose, directed his march 
to Gergovia. Almost in the middle of the 
journey, a party of horse that were sent by 
Fabius stated in how great danger matters 
were; they inform him that the camp was 
attacked by a very powerful army, while fresh 
men were frequently relieving the wearied, 
and exhausting our soldiers by the incessant 
toil, since, on account of the size of the camp, 
they had constantly to remain on the rampart ; 
that many had been wounded by the immense 
number of arrows and all kinds of missiles ; 
that the engines were of great service in With- 
standing them; that Fabius, at their depart- 
ure, leaving only two gates open, was blocking 
up the rest, and was adding breastworks to 
the ramparts, and was preparing himself for a 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 261 


similar casualty on the following day. Cesar, 
after receiving this information, reached the 
camp before sunrise owing to the very great 
zeal of his soldiers. | | 

Cuar. XLII.— Whilst these things are go 
ing on at Gergovia, the JEdui, on receiving 
the first announcements from Litavicus, leave 
themselves no time to ascertain the truth of 
these statements. Some are stimulated by 
avarice, others’ by revenge and credulity, which 
is an innate propensity in that race of men 
to such a degree that they consider a slight 
rumor as an ascertained fact. They plunder 
the property of the Roman citizens, and either 
massacre them or drag them away to slavery. 
Convictolitanis increases the evil state of affairs, 
and goads on the people to fury, that by the 
commission of some outrage they may be 
ashamed to return to propriety. They entice 
from the town of Cabillonus, by a promise of 
safety, Marcus Aristius, a military ’ tribune, 
who was on his march to his legion ; they com- 
pel those who had settled there for the purpose 
of trading to do the same. By constantly 
attacking them on their march they strip them 
of all their baggage; they besiege day and 
night those that resisted; when many were 
slain on both sides, they excite a greater num- 
ber to arms. 

Cuap. XLIII.—In the mean time, when 
intelligence was brought that all their soldiers 
were in Cesar’s power; they run in a body to 
Aristius; they assure him that nothing had 
been done by public authority ; they order an 


262 CAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


inquiry to be made about the plundered prop. 

erty ; they confiscate the property of Litavicus 
and his brothers; they send ambassadors to 
Cesar for the purpose of clearing themselves. 
They do all this with a view to recover their 
soldiers ; but being contaminated by guilt, and 
charmed by the gains arising from the plun- 
dered property, as that act was shared in by 
many, and being tempted by the fear of pun- 
ishment, they began to form plans of war and 
stir up the other states by embassies. Al- 
though Cesar was aware of this proceeding, 

yet he addresses the ambassadors with as much 
mildness as he can: ‘* That he did not think 
worse of the state on account of the ignorance 
and fickleness of the mob, nor would diminish 
his regard for the dui.” He himself, fearing 
a greater commotion in Gaul, in order to pre- 
vent his being surrounded by all the states, 
began to form plans as to the manner in which 
he should return from Gergovia and again con- 
centrate his forces. lest a departure arising 
from the fear of a revolt should seem like a 
flight. 

Cuap. XLIV.— Whilst he was considering 
these things an opportunity of acting success- 
fully seemed to offer. For, when he had come. 
into the smaller camp for the purpose of secur- 
ing the works, he noticed that the hill in the 
possession of the enemy was stript of men, 
although, on the former days, it could scarcely 
be seen on account of the numbers on it. 
Being astonished, he inquires the reason of it 
from the deserters, a great number of whom 


CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 263 


flocked to him daily. They all concurred in 
asserting, what Cesar himself had already 
ascertained by his scouts, that the back of that 
hill was almost level; but likewise woody and 
narrow, by which there was a pass to the other 
side of the town; that they had serious appre- 
hensions for this place, and had no other idea, 
on the occupation of one hill by the Romans, 
than that, if they should lose the other, they 
would be almost surrounded, and cut off from 
all egress and foraging; that they were all 
summoned by Vercingetorix to fortify this 
place. 

Cuar. XLV.— Cesar, on being informed 
of this circumstance, sends several troops of 
horse to the place immediately after midnight ; 
he orders them to range in every quarter with 
more tumult than usual. At dawn he orders 
a large quantity of baggage to be drawn out 
of the camp, and the inuleteers with helmets, 
in the appearance and guise of horsemen, to 
ride round the hills To these he adds a few 
cavalry, with instructions to range more widely 
to make a show. He orders them all to s ek 
the same quarter by a long cireuit; these pro- 
ceedings were seen at a distance from the 
town, as Gergovia commanded a view of the 
camp, nor could the Gauls ascertain at so 
great a distance, what certainty there was in 
the manceuvre. He sends one legion to the 
same hill, and after it had marched a little, 
stations it in the lower ground, and conceals 
it in the woods. The suspicions of the Gauls 
are increased, and all their forces are marched 


264 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


to that place to defend it. Czesar, having per- 
ceived the camp of the enemy deserted, covers 
the military insignia of his men, conceals the 
standards, and transfers his soldiers in small 
bodies from the greater to the less camp, and. 
points out to the lieutenants whom he had 
placed in command over the respective legions, 
what be should wish to be done; he particu- 
larly advises them to restrain their men from 
advancing too far, through their desire of fight- 
ing, or their hope of plunder; he sets before 
them what disadvantages the unfavorable nature 
of the ground carries with it; that they could 
be assisted by despatch alone; that success 
depended on a surprise, and not on a battle. 
After stating these particulars, he gives the 
sional for action, and detaches the Aidui at 
the same time by another ascent on the right. 

Cuar. XLVI.—The town wall was 1200 
paces distant from the plain and foot of the 
ascent, ina straight line, if no gap intervened ; 
whatever circuit was added to this ascent, to 
make the hill easy, increased the length of the 
route. But almost in the middle of the hill, 
the Gauls had previously built a wall six feet 
high, made of large stones, and extending in 
length as far as the nature of the ground per- 
mitted, as a barrier to retard the advance of 
our men; and, leaving all the lower space 
empty, they had filled the upper part of the 
hill, as far as the wall of the town, with their 
camps very close to one another. The sol- 
diers, on the signal being given, quickly 
advance to this fortification, and, passing over 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 265 


it, make themselves masters of the separate 
camps. And so great was their activity in 
taking the camps, that Teutomarus, the king 
of the Nitiobriges, being suddenly surprised in 
his tent, as he had gone to rest at noon, with 
difficulty escaped from the hands of the plun- 
derers, with the upper part of his person naked, 
and his horse wounded. 

Cuap. XLVII.—Cesar, having accom- 
plished the object which he had in view, ordered 
the signal to be sounded for a retreat ; and the 
soldiers of the tenth legion, by which he was 
then accompanied, halted. But the soldiers 
of the other legions, not hearing the sound of 
tne trumpet, because there was a very large 
valley between them, were. however, kept back 
by the tribunes of the soldiers and the lieuten- 
ants, according to Ceesar’s orders; but, being 
animated by the prospect of speedy victory,- 
and the flight of the enemy, and the favorable 
battles of former periods, they thought nothing 
so difficult that their bravery could not accom- 
plish it ; nor did they put an end to the pursuit, 
- until they drew nigh to the wall of the town and 
the gates. But then, when a shout arose in 
every quarter of the city, those who were at a 
distance, being alarmed by the sudden tumult, 
fled hastily from the town, since they thought 
that the enemy were within the gates. The 
matrons begin to cast their clothes and silver 
over the wall, and bending overas far as the 
lower part of the bosom, with outstretched 
hands beseech the Romans to spare them, and 
not to sacrifice to their resentment even women 


266 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


and children, as they had done at Avaricum. 
Some of them let themselves down from the 
walls by their hands, and surrendered to our 
soldiers. Lucius Fabius, a centurion of the 
eighth legion, who, it was ascertained, had said 
that day among his fellow-soldiers that he was 
excited by the plunder of Avaricum, and would 
not allow any one to mount the wall before 
him, finding three men of his own company, 
and being raised up by. them, scaled the wall. 
He himself, in turn, taking hold of them one 
by one, drew them up to the wall. 

Cuarp. XLVIII —In the mean time those 
who had gone to the other part of the town to 
defend it, as we have mentioned above, at first, 
aroused by hearing the shouts, and, afterwards, 
by frequent accounts, that the town was in pos- 
session of the Romans, sent forward their cav- 
alry, and hastened in larger numbers to that 
quarter. As each first came he stood beneath 
the wali, and increased the number of his 
countrymen engaged in action. Whena great 
multitude of them had assembled, the matrons, 
who a little before were stretching their hands 
from the walls to the Romans, began to beseech 
their countrymen, and after the Gallic fashion 
to show their dishevelled hair, and bring their 
children into public view. Neither in position 
nor in numbers was the contest an equal one 
to the Romans; at the same time, being ex- 
hausted by running and the long continuation 
of the fight, they could not easily withstand 
fresh and vigorous troops. 

Cuap. XLIX. — Cesar, when he perceived 


CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 267 


that his soldiers were fighting on unfavorable 
ground, and that the enemy’s forces were 
increasing, being alarmed for the safety of his 
troops, sent orders to Titus Sextius, one of his 
lieutenants, whom he had left to guard the 
smaller camp, to lead out his cohorts quickly 
from the camp, and post them at the foot of 
the hill, on the right wing of the enemy ; that if 
he should see our men driven from the ground, 
he should deter the enemy from following too 
closely. He himself.advancing with the legion 
a little from that place where he had taken his 
post, awaited the issue of the battle. 

Cuap. L.— While the fight was going on 
most vigorously hand to hand. and the enemy 
depended on their position and numbers, our 
men on their bravery, the A<dui suddenly ap- 
peared on our exposed flank, as Cesar had 
sent them by another ascent on the right, for 
the sake of creating a diversion. ‘These, from 
the similarity of their arms, greatly terrified 
our men; and although they were discovered 
to have their right shoulders bare, which was 
- usually the sign of those reduced to peace, yet 
the soldiers suspected that this very thing was 
done by the enemy to deceive them. At the 
same time Lucius Fabius the centurion, and 
those who had scaled the wall with him, being 
surrounded and slain, were cast from the wall. 
Marcus Petreius, a centurion of the same 
legion, after attempting to hew down the 
gates, was overpowered by numbers, and, de: 
spairing of his safety. having already received 
many wounds, said to the soldiers of his own 


268 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


company who followed him: ‘‘ Since I canna. 
save you as well as myself, I shall at least pro- 
vide for your safety; since I, allured by the 
love of glory, led you into this danger, do you 
save yourselves when an opportunity is given.” 
At the same time he rushed into the midst of 
the enemy, and slaying two of them, drove 
back the rest a little from the gate. When his 
men attempted to aid him, ** In vain,” he says, 
‘vou endeavor to procure my safety, since 
blood and strength are now failing me, there- 
fore leave this, while you have the opportunity, 
and retreat to the legion.” Thus he fell fignt- 
ing a few moments after, and saved his men 
by his own death. 

Cuar. LI.—Our soldiers, being hard pressed 
on every side, were dislodged from their posi- 
tion, with the loss of forty-six centurions ; but 
the tenth legion, which had been posted in re- 
serve on ground a little more level, checked 
the Gauls in their eager pursuit. It was sup- 
ported by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, 
which, being led from the smaller camp, had, 
under the command of Titus Sextius, occupied 
the higher ground. The legions, as soon as 
they reached the plain, halted and faced the 
enemy. Vercingetorix led back his men from 
the part of the hill within the fortifications. 
On that day little less than seven hundred of 
the soldiers were missing. 

Cuap. LIT. —On the next day, Cesar, 
having called a meeting, censured the rashness 
and avarice of his soldiers, ‘‘ In that they had 
judged for themselves how far they ought to 


CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 269 


proceed, or what they ought to do, and could 
not be kept back by the tribunes of the sol- 
diers and the lieutenants” ; and stated, ‘‘ what 
the disadvantage of the ground could effect, 
what opinion he himself had entertained at 
Avaricum, when having surprised the enemy 
without either general or cavalry, he had given 
up a certain victory, lest even a trifling loss 
should occur in the contest owing to the disad- 
vantage of position. That as much as he ad- 
mired the greatness of their courage, since 
neither the fortifications of the camp, nor the 
height of the mountain, nor the wall of the town 
could retard them ; in the same degree he cen- 
sured their licentiousness and arrogance, be- 
cause they thought that they knew more than 
their general concerning victory, and the issue 
of actions: and that he required in his soldiers 
forbearance aud self-command, not less than 
valor and magnanimity.” 

Cuap. LIII. — Having held this assembly, 
and having encouraged the soldiers at the con- 
clusion of his speech, ‘‘ That they should not 
be dispirited on this account, nor attribute to 
the valor of the enemy, what the disadvantage 
of position had caused ”’ ; entertaining the same 
views of his departure that he had previously 
had, he led forth the legions from the camp, 
and drew up his army in order of battle in a 
suitable place. When Vercingetorix, never- 
theless, would not descend to the level ground, 
a slight cavalry action, and that a successful 
one, having taken place, he led back his army 
into the camp. When he had done this, the 


270 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


next day, thinking that he had done enough to 
lower the pride of the Gauls, and to encourage 
the minds of his soldiers, he moved his camp 
in the direction of the 7Xdui. The enemy not 
even then pursuing us, on the third day he re- 
paired the bridge over the river Allier, and led 
over his whole army. 

Cuap. LIV.— Having then held an inter- 
view with Viridomarus and Eporedirix the 
ZEduans, he learns that Litavicus had set out 
with all the cavalry to raise the A®dui ; that it 
was necessary that they too should go before 
him to confirm the state in their allegiance. 
Although he now saw distinctly the treachery 
of the A<dui in many things, and was of opin- 
ion that the revolt of the entire state would be 
hastened by their ‘departure; yet he thought 
that they should not be detained, lest he should 
appear either to offer an insult, or betray some 
suspicion of fear. He briefly states to them 
when departing his services towards the A¢dui : 
in what a state and how humbled he had found 
them, driven into their towns, deprived of their 
lands, stripped of all their forces, a tribute 
imposed on them, and hostages wrested from 
them with the utmost insult; and to wnat con- 
dition and to what greatness he had raised them, 
[so much so] that they had not only recovered 
their former position, but seemed to surpass 
the dignity and influence of all the previous 
eras of their history. After giving these 
admonitions he dismissed them. 

Cuap. LV. — Noviodunum was a town of the 
4Edui, advantageously situated on the banks 


CHSAR'S COMMENTARIES. 271 


of the Loire. Cesar had conveyed hither all 
the hostag:s of Gaul, the corn, public money, 
a great part of his own baggage and that of 
his army ; he had sent hither a great number 
of horses, which he had purchased in Italy and 
Spain on account of this war. When Epore- 
dirix and Viridomarus came to this place, and 
received information of the disposition of the 
state, that Litavicus had been admitted by the 
/Edui into Bibracts, which is a town of the 
greatest importance among them, that Convic- 
tolitanis, the chief magistrate, and a great part. 
of the senate had gone to meet him, that am- 
bassadors had been publicly sent to Vercinget- 
orix to negotiate a peace and alliance, they 
thought that so great an opportunity ought 
not to be neglected. ‘Therefore, having put 
to the sword the garrison of Noviodunum, and 
those who had assembled there for the pur- 
pose of trading or were on their march, they 
divided the money and horses among them- 
selves ; they took care that the hostages of the 
[different] states should be brought to Bi- 
bracte, to the chief magistrate ; they burnt the 
town to prevent its being of any service to the 
Romans, as they were of opinion that they 

could not hold it; they carried away in their 
vessels whatever corn they could in the hurry ; 
they destroyed the remainder, by [throw- 
ing it] into the river or setting it on fire ; 
they themselves began to collect forces from 
the neighboring country, to place guards and 
garrisons in different positions along the banks 
of the Loire, and to display the cavalry on all 


272 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


sides to strike terror into the Romans, [to try] 
if they could cut them off from a supply of 
provisions. In which expectation they were 
much aided, from the circumstance that the 
Loire had swollen to such a degree from the 
melting of the snows, that it did not seem 
capable of being forded at all. 

Cuap. LVI. — Cesar on being informed of 
these movements was of opinion that he ought 
to make haste, even if he should run some risk 
in completing the bridges, in order that he 
might engage before greater forces of the 
enemy should be collected in that place. For 
no one even then considered it an absolutely 
necessary act, that changing his design he 
should direct his march into the Province, 
both because the infamy and disgrace of the 
thing, and the intervening mount Cevennes, 
and the difficulty of the roads prevented him ; 
and especially because he had serious appre- 
hensions for the safety of Labienus whom he 
had detached, and those legions whom he had 
sent with him. Therefore, having made very 
long marches by day and night, he came to 
the river Loire, contrary to the expectation 
of all; and having, by means of the cavalry, 
found out a ford, suitable enough considering 
the emergency, of such depth that their arms 
and shoulders would be above water for sup- 
porting their accoutrements, he dispersed his 
cavalry in such a manner as to break the force 
of the current, and having confounded the 
enemy at the first sight, led his army across 
the river in safety ; and finding corn and cattle 


CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 273 


in the fields, after refreshing his army with 
them, he determined to march into the country 
of the Senones. 

Cuap. LVII. — Whilst these things are being 
done by Ceesar, Labienus, leaving at Agendi- 
cum the recruits who had lately arrived from 
Italy, to guard the baggage, marches with four 
legions to Lutetia (which is a town of the 
Parisii, situated on an island of the river Seine), 
whose arrival being discovered by the enemy, 
numerous forces arrived from the neighboring 
states. The supreme command is intrusted 
to Camalugenus one of the Aulerci, who, 
although almost worn out with age, was called 
to that honor, on account of his extraordinary 
knowledge of military tactics. He, when he 
observed that there was a large marsh which 
communicated with the Seine, and rendered 
all that country impassable, encamped there, 
and determined to prevent our troops from 
passing it. 

Cuar. LVIII. — Labienus at first attempted 
to raise vineze, fill up the marsh with hurdles 
and clay, and secure a road. After he per- 
ceived that this was too difficult to accomplish, 
he issued in silence from his camp at the third 
watch. and reached Melodunum by the same 
route by which he came. This is a town of 
the Senones, situated on an island in the Seine, 
as we have just. before observed of Lutetia. 
Having seized upon about fifty ships and 
quickly joined them together, and having 
placed soldiers in them, he intimidated by his 
unexpected arrival the inhabitants, of whom a 


274 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


great number had been called out to the war, 
and obtains possession of the town without a 
contest. Having repaired the bridge, which 
the enemy had broken down during the preced- 
ing days, he led over his army, and began to 
march along the banks of the river to Lutetia. 
The enemy, on learning the circumstance from 
those who had escaped fiom Melodunum, set 
fire to Lutetia, and order the bridges of that 
town to be broken down: they themselves set 
out from the marsh, and take their position on 
the banks of the Seine, over against Lutetia 
and opposite the camp of Labienus. 

Cuap. LIX. — Cvesar was now reported to 
have departed from Gergovia ; intelligence was 
likewise brought to them concerning the revolt 
of the Acdui, and a successful rising in Gaul ; 
and that Caesar, having been prevented from 
prosecuting his journey and crossing the Loire, 
and having been compelled by the want of 
corn, had marched hastily to the province. 
But the Bellovaci, who had been previously 
disaffected of themselves, on learning the 
revolt of the AZdui, began to assemble forces 
and openly to prepare for war. Then Labie- 
nus, as the change in affairs was so great, 
thought that he must adopt a very different 
system from what he had previously intended, 
and he did not now think of making any new 
acquisitions, or of provoking the enemy to an 
action ; but that he might bring back his army 
safe to Agendicum. For, on one side, the 
Bellovaci, a state which held the highest repu- 
tation fur prowess in Gaul, were pressing on 


CESAR’? S COMMENTARIES. 275 


him ; and Camulogenus, with a disciplined and 
well-equipped army, held the other side ; more- 
over, a very great river separated and cut off 
the legions from the garrison and baggage. 
He saw that, in consequence of such great 
difficulties being thrown in his way, he must 
seek aid from his own energy of disposition. 

Cuap. LX.—Having, therefore, called a 
council of war a little before evening, he ex- 
horted his soldiers to execute with diligence 
and energy such commands as he should give ; 
he assigns the ships which he had brought from 
Melodunum to Roman knights, one to each, 
and orders them to fall down the river silently 
for four miles, at the end of the fourth watch, 
and there wait for him. He leaves the five 
cohorts, which he considered to be the most 
steady in action, to guard the camp ; he orders 
the five remaining cohorts of the same legion 
to proceed a little after midnight up the river 
with all their baggage, in a great tumult. He 
collects also some small boats ; and sends them 
in the same direction, with orders to make a 
loud noiseinrowing. He himself, alittle after, 
marched out in silence, and, at the head of 
three legions, seeks that place to which he had 
ordered the ships to be brought. 

Cuap. LXI. — When he had arrived there, 
the enemy’s scouts, as they, were stationed 
along every part of the river, not expecting an 
attack, because a great storm had suddenly 
arisen, were surprised by our soldiers: the 
infantry and cavalry are quickly transported, 
under the superintendence of the Roman 


aris CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


knights, whom he had appointed to that office. 
Almost at the same time, a little before day- 
light, intelligence was given to the enemy that 
there was an unusual tumult in the camp of 
the Romans, and that a strong force was 
marching up the river, and that the sound of 
oars was distinctly heard in the same quarter, 
and that soldiers were being conveyed across 
in ships a little below. On hearing these 
things, because they were of opinion that the 
legions were passing in three different places, 
and that the entire army, being terrified by 
the revolt of the A%dui, were preparing for 
flight, they divided their forces also into three 
divisions. For leaving a guard opposite to 
the ‘camp and sending a small body in the 
direction of Metiosedum, with orders to advance 
as far as the ships would proceed, they led 
the rest of their troops against Labienus. 
Cuap. LXII.—By daybreak all our sol- 
diers were brought across and the army of the 
enemy was in sight. lLabienus, having en- 
couraged his soldiers ‘‘ to retain the memory of 
their ancient valor, and so many most success- 
ful actions, and imagine Cesar himself, under 
whose command they had so often routed the en- 
emy, to be present,” gives the signal for action. 
At the first onset the enemy are beaten and 
put to flight in the right wing, where the sey- 
enth legion stood: on the left wing, which po- | 
sition the twelfth legion held, although the first 
ranks fell transfixed by the javelins of the 
Romans, yet the rest resisted most bravely ; 
nor did any one of them show the slightest 


CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. (277 


intention of flying. Camulogenus, the general 
of the enemy, was present and encouraged his 
troops. But when the issue of the victory 
was still uncertain, and the circumstances 
which were taking place on the left wing were 
announced to the tribunes of the seventh 
legion, they faced about their legion to the en- 
emy’s rear and attacked it: not even then did 
any one retreat, but all were surrounded and 
slain. Camulogenus met the same fate. But 
those who were left as a guard opposite the 
camp of Labienus, when they heard that the 
battle was commenced, marched to aid their 
countrymen and take possession of a hill, but 
were unable to withstand the attack of the vic- 
torious soldiers. In this manner, mixed with 
their own fugitives, such as the woods and 
mountains did not shelter were cut to pieces by 
our cavalry. When this battle was finished, 
Labienus returns to Agendicum, where the 
baggage of the whole army had been left: 
from it he marched with all his forces to Cesar. 

Cuap. LXIII.—The revolt of the Atdui 
being known, the war grows more dangerous. 
Embassies are sent by them in all directions: 
as far as they can prevail by influence, author- 
ity, or money, they strive to excite the state 
[to revolt]. Having got possession of the 
hostages whom Cesar had deposited with 
them, they terrify the hesitating by putting 
them to death. The Aidui request Vercinget- 
‘orix to come to them and communicate his 
plans of conducting the war. On obtaining 
this request they insist that the chief command 


278 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


should be assigned to them; and when the 
affair became a disputed question, a council of 
all Gaul is summoned to Bibracte. They come 
together in great numbers and from every 
quarter to the same place. The decision is 
left to the votes of the mass: all to a man ap- 
prove of Vercingetorix as their general. The 
Remi, Lingones, and Treviri were absent from 
this meeting ; the two former because they at- 
tached themselves to the alliance of Rome; 
the Treviri because they were very remote and 
were hard pressed by the Germans; which was 
also the reason of their being absent during 
the whole war, and their sending auxiliaries 
to neither party. The Aidui are highly indig- 
nant at being deprived of the chief command ; 
they lament the change of fortune, and miss 
Cesar’s indulgence towards them; however, 
after engaging in the war, they do not dare to 
pursue their own measures apart from the rest. 
Eporedirix and Viridomarus, youths of the 
greatest promise, submit reluctantly to Ver- 
cingetorix 

Cuap. LXIV.—The latter demands host- 
ages from the remaining states: nay, more, 
appointed a day for this proceeding ; he orders 
all the cavalry, fifteen thousand in number, to 
quickly assemble here ; he says that he will be 
content with the infantry which he had before, 
and would not tempt fortune nor come to a 
regular engagement; but since he had abun- 
dance of cavalry, it would be very easy for 
him to prevent the Romans from obtaining 
forage or corn, provided that they themselves 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 279 


should resolutely destroy their corn and set 
fire to their houses; by which sacrifice of 
private property they would evidently obtain 
perpetual dominion and freedom. After ar- 
ranging these matters he levies ten thousand 
infantry on the /Edui and Segusiani, who 
border on our province: to these he adds eight 
hundred horse. He sets over them the brother 
of Eporedirix, and orders him to wage war 
against the Allobroges. On the other side he 
sends the Gabali and the nearest cantons of the 
Arverni against the Helvii; he likewise sends . 
the Ruteni and Cadurci to lay waste the territo- 
ries of the Volcze Arecomici. Besides, by secret 
messages and embassies, he tampers with the 
Allobroges, whose minds, he hopes, had not 
yet settled down after the excitement of the 
latewar. Totheir nobles he promises money, 
and to their state the dominion of the whole 
province. 

Cuap. LXV.—The only guards provided 
against all these contingencies were twenty- 
two cohorts, which were collected from the 
entire province by Lucius Ceesar, the lieuten- 
ant, and opposed to the enemy in every quar- 
ter. The Helvii, voluntarily engaging in battle 
with their neighbors, are defeated, and Caius 
Valerius Donotaurus, the son of Caburus, the 
principal man of the state, and several others, 
being slain, they are forced to retire within 
their townsand fortifications. The Allobroges, 
placing guards along the course of the Rhine, 
defend their frontiers with great vigilance and 
energy. Cvesar, as he perceived that the 


280 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


enemy were superior in vavalry, and he himself 
could receive no aid from the Province or Italy, 
while all communication was cut off, sends 
across the Rhine int) Germany to those states 
which he had subdued in the preceding cam- 
paigns, and summons from them cavalry and 
the light-armed infantry, who were accustomed 
to engage among them. On their arrival, as 
they were mounted on unserviceable horses, he 
takes horses from the military tribunes and the 
rest, nay, even from the Roman knights and 
veterans, and distributes them among the 
Germans. Be 

Cuap. LXVI.—In the mean time, whilst 
these things are going on, the forces of the 
enemy from the Arverni, and the cavalry 
which had been demanded from all Gaul, meet 
together. A great number of these having 
been collected, when Czesar was marching into 
the country of the Sequani, through the con- 
fines of the Lingones, in order that he might 
the more easily render aid to the province, 
. Vercingetorix encamped in three camps, about 
ten miles from the Romans: and haying sum- 
moned the commanders of the cavalry to a 
council, he shows that the time of victory was 
come ; that the Romans were fleeing into the 
province and leaving Gaul; that this was suf- 
ficent for obtaining immediate freedom; but 
was of little moment in acquiring peace and 
tranquillity for the future; for the Romans 
would return after assembling greater forces, 
and would not put an end to the war. There- 
fore they should attack them on their march, 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 281: 


when encumbered. If the infantry should 
[be obliged to] relieve their cavalry, and be 
retarded by doing so, the march could not be 
accomplished; if, abandoning their baggage 
they should provide for their safety (a result, 
which, he trusted, was more likely to ensue), 
thev would lose both property and character. 
For as to the enemy’s horse, they ought not to 
entertain a doubt that none of them would dare 
to advance beyond the main body. In order 
that they [the Gauls] may do so with greater 
spirit, he would marshal all their forces before 
the camp, and intimidate the enemy. The cay- 
alry unanimously shout out, “ That they ought 
to bind themselves by a most sacred oath, that 
he should not be received under a roof, nor 
have access to his children, parents, or wife, 
who shall not twice have ridden through the 
enemy’s army.” 

Cuap. LXVII.—This proposal receiving 
general approbation, and all being forced to 
take the oath, on the next day the cavalry 
were divided into three parts, and two of these 
_ divisions made a demonstration on our two 
flanks ; while one in front began to obstruct 
our march. On this circumstance being an- 
nounced, Cesar orders his cavalry also to form 
three divisions and charge the enemy. Then 
the action commences simultaneously in every 
part: the main body halts; the baggage is 
received within the ranks of the legions. If 
our men seemed to be distressed. or hard 
pressed in any quarter, Cvesar usually ordered 
the troops to advance, and the army to wheel 


282 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


round in that quarter ; which conduct retarded 
the enemy in the pursuit, and encouraged our 
men by the hope of support. At length the 
Germans, on the right wing, having gained 
the top of the hill, dislodge the enemy from 
their position and pursue them even as far as 
the river at which Vercingetorix with the infan- 
try was stationed, and slay several of them. 
The rest, on observing this action, fearing lest 
they should be surrounded, betake themselves 
to flight. A slaughter ensues in every direc- 
tion, and three of the noblest of the A‘dui are 
taken and brought to Cesar: Cotus, the com- 
mander of the cavalry, who had been engaged 
in the contest with Convictolitanis the last 
election, Cavarillus, who had held the com- 
mand of the infantry after the revolt of Lita- 
vicus, and Eporedirix, under whose command 
she AXdui had engaged in war against the 
Sequani, before the arrival of Cesar. 

Cuap. LXVIII. — All his cavalry being 
routed, Vercingetorix led back his troops in 
the same order as he had arranged them before 
the camp, and immediately began to march to 
Alesia, which is a town of the Mandubii, and 
ordered the baggage to be speedily brought 
forth from the camp, and follow him closely. 
Cesar, having conveyed, his baggage to the 
nearest hill, and. having left two legions to 
guard it, pursued as far as the time of day 
would permit, and after slaying about three 
thousand of the rear of the enemy, encamped 
at Alesia on the next day. On reconnoitring © 
the situation of the city, finding that the enemy 


CHAISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 283 


were panic-stricken, because the cavalry in 
which they placed their chief reliance were 
beaten, he encouraged his men to endure the 
toil, and began to draw a line of circumvalla- 
tion round Alesia. 

Cuap. LXIX.—The town itself was situated 
on the top of a hill, in a very lofty position, so 
that it did not appear likely to be taken, except 
by a regular siege. Two rivers, on two differ- 
ent sides, washed the foot of the hill. Before 
the town lay a plain of about three miles in 
length ; on every other side hills at a moderate 
distance, and of an equal degree of height, 
surrounded the town. The army of the Gauls 
had filled all the space under the wall, com- 
prising the part of the hill which looked to the 
rising sun, and had drawn in front a trench 
and a stone wall six feet high. The circuit of 
that fortification, which was commenced by the 
Romans, comprised eleven miles. The camp 
was pitched in a strong position, and twenty- 
three redoubts were raised in it, in which sen- 
tinels were placed by day, lest any sally should 
be made suddenly ; and by night the same were _ 
occupied by watches and strong guards. 

Cuap. LXX.—The work having been be- 
gun, a cavalry action ensues in that plain, 
which we have already described as broken 
by hills, and extending three miles in length. 
The contest is maintained on both sides with 
the utmost vigor; Cesar sends the Germans 
to aid our troops when distressed, and draws 
up the legions in front of the camp, lest any 
sally should be suddenly made by the enemy’s 


284 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


infantry. The courage of our men is increased 
by the additional support of the legions; the 
enemy being put to flight, hinder one another 
by their numbers, and as only the narrower 
gates were left open, are crowded together in 
them; then the Germans pursue them with 
vigor even to the fortifications. A great 
slaughter ensues; some leave their horses, 
and endeavor to cross the ditch and climb the 
wall. Czesar orders the legions which he had 
drawn up in front of the rampart to advance a 
little. The Gauls, who were within the forti- 
fications, were no less panic-stricken, thinking 
that the enemy were coming that moment 
against them, and unanimously shout ‘*‘ to 
arms’; some in their alarm rush into the town 3 
Vercingetorix orders the gates to be shut, lest 
the camp should be left undefended. The 
Germans retreat, after slaying many and tak- 
ing several horses. 

Cuap. LXXI.— Vercingetorix adopts the 
design of sending away all his cavalry by night, 
before the fortifications should be completed 

by the Romans. He charges them when de- 
parting ‘‘ that each of them should go to his 
respective state, and press for the war all who 
were old enough to bear arms; he states his 
own merits, and conjures them. to consider his 
safety, and not surrender him who had de- 
served so well of the general freedom, to the 
enemy for torture; he points out to them that, 
if they should be remiss, eighty thousand chosen 
men would perish with him ; that, upon making 
a calculation, he had barely corn for thirty 


CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 285 


days, but could hold out a little longer by 
economy.” After giving these instructions he 
silently dismisses the cavalry in the second 
watch, [on that side] where our works were 
not completed; he orders all the corn to be 
brought to himself; he ordains capital punish- 
ment to such as should not obey; he distrib- 
utes among them, man by man, the cattle, 
great quantities of which had been driven 
there by the Mandubii; he began to measure 
out the corn sparingly, and by little and little ; 
he receives into the town all the forces which 
he had posted in front of it. In this manner 
he prepares to await the succors from Gaul, 
and carry on the war. 

Cuap. LXXE.— Cesar, on learning these 
proceedings from the deserters and captives, 
adopted the following system of fortification : 
he dug a trench twenty feet deep, with per- 
pendicular sides, in such a manner that the 
base of this trench should extend so far as the 
edges were apart at the top. He raised all 
his other works at a distance of four hundred 
- feet from that ditch; [he did] that with this 
intention, lest (since he necessarily embraced 
so extensive an area, and the whole works 
could not be easily surrounded by a line of 
soldiers) a large number of the enemy should 
suddenly, or by night, sally against the forti- 
fications; or lest they should by day cast 
weapons against our men while occupied with 
the works. Having left this interval, he drew 
two trenches fifteen feet broad, and of the 
same depth; the innermost of them, being 


286 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


in low and level ground, he filled with water 
conveyed from the river. Behind these he 
raised a rampart and wall twelve feet high; 
to this he added a parapet and battlements, 
with large stakes cut liks stags’ horns, project- 
ing from the junction of the parapet and bat- 
tlements, to prevent the enemy from scaling 
it, and surrounded the entire work with turrets, 
which were eighty feet distant from one an- 
other. 

Cap. LXXIII. —It was necessary, at one 
and the same time, to procure timber [for the 
rampart], lay in supplies of corn, and raise 
also extensive fortifications, and the available 
troops were in consequence of this reduced in 
number, since they used to advance to some 
distance from the camp, and sometimes the 
Gauls endeavored to attack our works, and to 
make a sally from the town by several gates 
and in great force. On which Cesar thought 
that further additions should be made to these 
works, in order that the fortifications might be 
defensible by a small number of soldiers. 
Having, therefore, cut down the trunks of 
trees or very thick branches, and having 
stripped their tops of the bark, and sharpened 
them into a point, he drew a continued trench 
everywhere five feet deep. These stakes be- 
ing sunk into this trench, and fastened firmly 
at the bottom, to prevent the possibility of 
their being torn up, had their branches only 
projecting from the ground. There were five 
rows in connection with, and intersecting each 
other ; and whoever entered within them were 


CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 287 


likely to empale themselves on very sharp 
stakes. The soldiers cailed these ** cippi.” 
Before these, which were arranged in oblique 
rows in the form of a quincunx, pits three feei 
aeep were dug, which gradually diminished 
in width to the bottom. In these pits taper-. 
ing stakes, of the thickness of a man’s thigh, 
sharpened at the top and hardened in the fire, 
were sunk in such a manner as to project. 
from the ground not more than four inches ; 
at the same time, for the purpose of giving 
them strength and stability, they were each 
filled with trampled clay to the height of one: 
foot from the bottom: the rest of the pit was 
covered over with osiers and twigs, to conceal 
the deceit. Eight rows of this kind were dug, 
and were three feet distant from each other. 
They called this a lily from its resemblance 
to that flower. Stakes a foot long, with iron 
hooks attached to them, were entirely sunk in 
the ground before these, and were planted in 
every place at smailintervals ; these they called 
spurs. 

Cuap. LXXIV.— After completing these 
works, having selected as level ground as he 
could, considering the nature of the country, 
and having enclosed an area of fourteen miles, 
he constructed, against an external enemy, 
fortifications of the same kind in every re- 
spect, and separate from these, so that the 
guards of the fortifications could not be sur- 
rounded even by immense numbers, if such a 
circumstance should take place owing to the 
departure of the enemy’s cavalry ; and in order. 


288 CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


that the Roman soldiers might not be compelled 
to go out of the camp with great risk, he or- 
ders all to provide forage and corn for thirty 
days. 

Cuap. LXXV.— Whilst those things are 
carried on at Alesix, the Gauls, having con- 
vened a council of their chief nobility, deter- 
mine that all who could bear arms should not 
be called out, which was the opinion of Ver- 
cingetorix, but that a fixed number should be 
levied from each state; lest, when so great 
a multitude assembled together, they could 
neither govern nor distinguish their men, nor 
have the means of supplying them with corn. 
They demand thirty-five thousand men from 
the /Adui and their dependants, the Segusi- 
ani, Ambivareti, and Aulerci Brannovices ; an 
equal number from the Arverni in conjunction 
with the Eleuteti Cadurci, Gabali, and Ve- 
launi, who were accustomed to be under the 
command of the Aryerni; twelve thousand 
each from the Senones, Sequani, Bituriges, 
Santones, Ruteni, and Carnutes; ten thousand 
from the Be lovaci; the same number from the 
Lemovici; eight thousard each from the Pic. 
tones, and Turoni, and Parisil, and Helvii; 
five thousand each from the Suessiones, Am- 
biani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorii, Nervii, Morini, 
and Nitiobriges; the same number from the 
Aulerci Cenomani; four thousand from the 
Atrebates; three thousand each from the 
Bellocassi, Lexovii, and Aulerci Eburovices ; 
thirty thousand from the Rauraci, and Boil; six 
thousand from all the states together, which 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 289 


border on the Atlantic, and which in their dia- 
lect are called Armoricz (in which number 
are compreliended the Curisolites, Rhedones, 
Ambibari, Caltes, Osismii, Lemovices. Veneti, 
and Unelli). Of these the Bellovaci did not 
contribute their number, as they said that they 
would wage war against the Romans on their 
own account, and at their own discretion, and 
would not obev the order of anyone : however, 
at the request of Commius, they sent two 
thousand, in consideration of a tie of hospital- 
ity which subsisted between him and them. 
Cuap. LXXVI.— Cesar had, as we have 
previously narrated, availed himself of the 
faithful and valuable services of this Commius, 
in Britain, in former years: in consideration 
of which merits he had exempted from taxes 
his [Commius’s] state, and had conferred on 
Commius himself the country of the Morini. 
Yet such was the unanimity of the Gauls in 
asserting their freedom, and recovering their 
ancient renown in war, that they were influ- 
enced neither by favors, nor by the recollec- 
tion of private friendship; and all earnestly 
directed their energies and resources to that 
war, and collected eight thousand cavalry, 
and about two hundred and forty thousand 
infantry. These were reviewed in the country 
of the Adui, and a calculation was mace of 
their numbers: commanders were appointed: 
the supreme command is intrusted to Com- 
mius the Atrebatian, Viridomarus and Epore- 
dirix the A¢duans, and Vergasillaunus the 
Arvernian, the cousin-german of Vercingetorix. 


290 CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


To them are assigned men selected from each 
state, by whose advice the war should be con. 
ducted. All march to Alesia, sanguine and 
full of confidence: nor was there a single in- 
dividual who imagined that the Romans could 
withstand the sight of such an immense host: 
especially in an action carried on both in front 
and rear, when [on the inside] the besieged 
would sally from the town and attack the 
enemy, and on the outside so great forces of 
cavalry and infantry would be seen. 

Cuap. LXXVII. — But those who were 
blockaded at Alesia, the day being past, on 
which they had expected auxiliaries from their 
countrymen, and all their corn being consumed, 
ignorant of what was going on among the 
AXdui, convened an assembly and deliberated 
on the exigency of their situation. After vari- 
ous Opinions had been expressed among them, 
some of which proposed a surrender, others a 
sally, whilst their strength would support it, 
the speech of Critognatus ought not to be 
omitted for its singular and detestable cruelty. 
He sprung from the noblest family among the 
Arverni, and possessing great influence, says, 
‘-[ shall pay no attention to the opinion of 
those who call a most disgraceful surrender by 
the name of a capitulation; nor do I think 
that they ought to be considered as citizens, or 
summoned to the council. My business ig 
with those who approve of a sally: in whose 
advice the memory of our ancient prowess 
seems to dwell in the opinion of you all. To 
be unable to bear privation for a short time is 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 291 


disgraceful cowardice, not true valor. Those 
who voluntarily offer themselves to death are 
more easily found than those who would calmly 
endure distress. And I would approve of this 
opinion (for honor is a powerful motive with 
me), could I foresee no other loss, save that of 
life; but let us, in adopting our design, look 
back on all Gaul, which we have stirred up to 
our aid. What courage do you think would 
our relatives and friends have, if eighty thou- 
sand men were butchered in one spot, suppos- 
ing that they should be forced to come to an 
action almost over our corpses? Do not ut- 
terly deprive them of your aid, for they have 
spurned all thoughts of personal danger on 
account of your safety ; nor by your folly, rash- 
ness, and cowardice, crush all Gaul and doom 
if to an eternal slavery. Do you doubt their 
fidelity and firmness because they have not 
come at the appointed day? What then? Do 
you suppose that the Romans are employed 
every day in the outer fortifications for mere 
snusement? If you cannot be assured by 
their despatches, since every avenue is blocked 
ap, take the Romans as evidence that their 
approach is drawing near; since they, intimi- 
dated by alarm at this, labor night and day at 
their works. What, therefore, is my design? 
To do as our ancestors did in the war against 
the Cimbri and Teutones, which was by no 
means equally momentous ; who, when driven 
into their towns, and oppressed by similar pri- 
vations, supported life by the corpses of those 
who appeared useless for war on account of 


~ 


292 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


their age, and did not surrender to the enemy: 
and even if we had not a precedent for such 
cruel conduct, still I should consider it most 
glorious that one should be established, and 
delivered to posterity. For in what was that 
war like this? The Cimbri, after laying Gaul 
waste, and inflicting great calamities, at length 
departed from our country, and sought other 
lands ; they left us our rights, laws, lands, and 
liberty. But what other motive or wish have 
the Romans, than, induced by envy, to settle 
in the lands and states of those whom they 
have learned by fame to be noble and powerful 
in war, and impose on them perpetual slavery ? 
For they never have carried on wars on any 
other terms. But if you know not these things 
which are going on in distant countries, look 
to the neighboring Gaul, which, being reduced 
to the form of a province, stripped of its rights 
and laws, and subjected to Roman despotism, 
is oppressed by perpetual slavery.” 

Cuar. LXXVIII.— When different opin- 
ions were expressed, they determined that 
those who, owing to age or ill health, were 
unserviceable for war, should depart from the 
town, and that themselves should try every 
expedient before they had recourse to the ad- 
vice of Critognatus : however, that they would 
rather adopt that design, if circumstances 
should compel them and their allies should 
delay, than accept any terms of a surrender or 
peace. The Mandubii, who had admitted them 
into the town, are compelled to go forth with 
their wives and children. When these came 


CHISAR’S COMMENTARIES. 293 


to the Roman fortifications, weeping, they 
begged of the soldiers by every entreaty to 
receive them as slaves and relieve them with 
food. But Cesar, placing guards on the ram- 
part, forbade them to be admitted. 

Cuap. LXXIX.—JIn the mean time, Com- 
mius and the rest of the leaders, to whom the 
supreme command had been intrusted, came 
with all their forces to Alesia, and having oc- 
cupied the entire hill, encamped not more than 
a mile from our fortifications. The following 
day, having led forth their cavalry from the 
camp, they fill all that plain, which we have 
related extended three miles in length, and 
drew out their infantry a little from that place, 
and post them on the higher ground. ‘The 
town Alesia commanded a view of the whole 
plain. The besieged run together when these 
auxiliaries were seen; mutual congratulations 
ensue, and the minds of all are elated with 
joy. Accordingly, drawing out their troops, 
they encamp before the town, and cover the 
nearest trench with hurdles and fill it up with 
earth, and make ready for a sally and every 
casualty. 

Cuap. LXXX.—Cesar, having stationed 
his army on both sides of the fortifications, in 
order that, if occasion should arise, each should 
hold and know his own post, orders the cay- 
alry to issue forth from the camp and com- 
mence action. There was a commanding view 
from the entire camp, which occupied a ridge 
of hills; and the minds of all the soldiers 
anxiously awaited the issue of the battle. The 


294 CEASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


Gauls had scattered archers and light-armeé 
infantry here and there, among their cavalry, 
to give relief to their retreating troops, and 
sustain the impetuosity of our cavalry. Sev- 
eral of our soldiers were unexpectedly wounded 
by these, and left the battle. When the Gauls 
were confident that their countrymen were the 
conquerors in the action, and beheld our men 
hard pressed by numbers, both those who were 
hemmed in by the line of circumyallation ana 
those who had come to aid them, supported 
the spirits of their men by shouts and yells 
from every quarter. As the action was car- 
ried on in sight of all, neithera brave nor cow- 
ardly act could be concealed; both the desire 
of praise and the fear of ignominy urged or 
each party to valor. After fighting from 
noon almost to sunset, without victory inclin- 
ing in favor of either, the Germans, on one 
side, made a charge against the enemy in a 
compact body, and drove them back; and, 
when they were put to flight, the archers were 
surrounded and cut to pieces. In other parts, 
likewise, our men pursued to the camp the 
retreating enemy, and did not give them an 
opportunity of rallying. But those who had 
come forth from Alesia returned into the town 
dejected and almost despairing of success. 
Cuap. LXXXI.— The Gauls, after the 
interval of a day, and after making, during 
that time, an immense number of hurdles, 
scaling ladders, and iron hooks, silently went 
forth from the camp at midnight and 
approached the fortifications in the plain, 


CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 298 


Raising a shout suddenly, that by this intima- 
tion those who were besieged in the town might 
learn their arrival, they began to cast down 
hurdles and dislodge our men from the ram- 
parts by slings, arrows, and stones, and exe- 
cuted the other movements which are requisite 
instorming. Attne same time, Vercingetorix, 
having heard the shout, gives the signal to his 
troops by a trumpet, and leads them forth 
from the town. Our troops, as each man’s 
post had been assigned him some days before, 
man the fortifications; they intimidate the 
Gauls by slings, large stones, stakes which 
they had placed along the works, and bullets. 
All view being prevented by the darkness, 
many wounds are received on both sides ; sev- 
eral missiles are thrown from the engines. 
But Marcus Antonius and Caius Trebonius, 
the lieutenants, to whom the defence of these 
parts had been allotted, drafted troops from 
the redoubts which were more remote, and sent 
them to aid our troops, in whatever direction 
they understood that they were hard pressed. 
Cuap. LXXXII. — Whilst the Gauls were 
at a distance from the fortification, they did 
more execution, owing to the immense number 
of their weapons: after they.came nearer, they 
either unawares empaled themselves on the 
spurs, or were pierced by the mural darts from 
the ramparts and towers, and thus perished. 
After receiving many wounds on all sides, and 
having forced no part of the works, when day 
drew nigh, fearing lest they should be sur- 
rounded by a sally made from the higher camp 


296 CESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


on the exposed flank, they retreated to their 
countrymen. But those within, whilst they 
bring forward those things which had been 
prepared by Vercingetorix for a sally, fill up 
the nearest trenches; having delayed a long 
time in executing these movements, they 
Jearned the retreat of their countrymen before 
they drew nigh to the fortifications. Thus they 
returned to the town without accomplishing 
their object. 

Cuap. LXXXIII.—The Gauls, having 
been twice repulsed with great loss, consult 
what they should do: they avail themselves 
of the information of those who were well 
acquainted with the country; from them they 
ascertain the position and fortification of the 
upper camp. There was, on the north side, 
a hill, which our men could not include in their 
works, on acccunt of the extent of the circuit, 
and had necessarily made their camp in ground 
almost disadvantageous, and pretty steep. 
Caius Antistius Reginus and Caius Caninius 
Rebilus, two of the lieutenants, with two 
legions, were in possession of thiscamp. The 
leaders of the enemy, having reconnoitred the 
country by their scouts, select from the entire 
army sixty thousand men, belonging to those 
states which bear the highest character for 
courage: they privately arrange among them- 
selves what they wished to be done, and in 
what manner; they decide that the attack 
should take place when it should seem to be 
noon. ‘They appoint over their forces Verga- 
sillaunus, the Arvernian, one of the four gen- 


CHESAR’S COMMENTARIES. 297 


erals, and a near relative of Vercingetorix. 
He, having issued from the camp at the first 
watch, and having almost completed his march 
a little before the dawn, hid himself behind 
the mountain, and ordered his soldiers to 
refresh themselves after their labor during the 
night. When noon now seemed to draw nigh, 
he marched hastily against that camp which 
we have mentioned before; and, at the same 
time, the cavalry began to approach the fortifi- 
cations in the plain, and the rest of the forces 
to make a demonstration in front of the 
camp. 

Cuap. LXXXIV. — Vercingetorix, having 
beheld his countrymen from the citadel of 
Alesia, issues forth from the town; he brings 
forth from the camp long hooks, movable 
pent-houses, mural hooks, and other things, 
which he had prepared for the purpose of mak- 
ing asally. They engage on all sides at once, 
and every expedient is adopted. They flocked 
to whatever part of the works seemed weakest. 
The army of the Romans is distributed along 
their extensive lines, and with difficulty meets 
the enemy in every quarter. The shouts 
which were raised by the combatants in their 
rear had a great tendency to intimidate our 
men, because they perceived that their danger 
rested on the valor of others: for generally all 
evils which are distant most powerfully alarm 
men’s minds. 

Cuap. LXXXV.— Cesar, having selected 
a commanding situation, sees distinctly what- 
aver is going on in every quarter, and sends 


298 CASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


assistance to his troops when hard pressed, 
The idea uppermost in the minds of both 
parties is, that the present is the time in which 
they would have the fairest opportunity of 
making a struggle ; the Gauls despairing of all 
safety, unless they should succeed in forcing 
the lines: the Romans expecting an end to all 
their labors if they should gain the day. The 
principal struggle is at the upper lines, to 
which, we have said, Vergasillaunus was sent. 
The least elevation of ground, added to a 
declivity, exercises a momentous influence. 
Some are casting missiles, others, forming a 
testudo, advance to the attack; fresh men by 
turns relieve the wearied. The earth, heaped 
up by all against the fortifications, gives the 
means of ascent to the Gauls, and covers those 
works which the Romans had concealed in the 
ground. Our men have no longer arms or 
strength. 

Cuarp. LXXXVI.— Cesar, on observing 
these movements, sends Labienus with six 
cohorts to relieve his distressed soldiers: he 
orders him, if he should be unable to withstand 
them, to draw off the cohorts and make a sally ; 
but not to do this except through necessity. 
He himself goes to the rest, and exhorts them 
not to succumb to the toil; he shows them 
that the fruits of all former engagements 
depend on that day and hour. The Gauls 
within, despairing of forcing the fo:tifications 
in the plains onaccount of the greatness of the 
works, attempt the places precipitous in ascent : 
hither they bring the engines which they had 


CHASAR'S COMMENTARIES. 299 


prepared; by the immense number of their 
missiles they dislodge the defenders from the 
turrets: they fill the ditches with clay and 
hurdles, then clear the way; they tear down 
the rampart and breastwork with hooks. 
Cnar. LXXXVII.-— Cesar sends at first 
young Brutus, with six cohorts, and after- 
wards Caius Fabius, his lieutenant, with seven 
others : finally, as they fought more obstinately, 
he leads up fresh men to the assistance of his 
soldiers. After renewing the action, and 
repulsing the enemy, he marches in the direc- 
tion in which he had sent Labienus, drafts 
four cohorts from the nearest redvubt, and 
orders part of the cavalry to follow him, and 
part to make the circuit of the external forti- 
fications and attack the enemy in the rear. 
Labienus, when neither the ramparts nor ditches 
could check the onset of the enemy, informs 
Ceesar by messengers of what he intended to 
do. Cesar hastens to share in the action. 
Cuarp. LXXXVIII.—His arrival being 
known from the color of his robe, and the 
troops of cavalry, and the cohorts which he 
had ordered to follow him being seen, as these 
low and sloping grounds were plainly visible 
from the eminences, the enemy join battle. 
A shout being raised by both sides, it was suc- 
ceeded by a general shout along the ramparis 
and whole line of fortifications. Our troops, 
laying aside their javelins, carry on the engage- 
ment with their swords. The cavalry is sud- 
denly seen in the rear of the Gauls: the other 
cohorts advance rapidly ; the enemy turn thei7 


800 CHASAR’S COMMENTARIES. 


backs; the cavalry intercept them in their 
flight, and a great slaughter ensues. Sedulius, 
the general and chief of the Lemovices, is 
slain ; Vergasillaunus, the Arvernian, is taken 
alive in the flight, seventy-four military stand- 
ards are brought to Cesar, and few out of so 
great a number return safe to theircamp. The 
besieged, beholding from the town the slaugh- 
ter and flight of their countrymen, despairing 
of safety, lead back their troops from the for- 
tifications. A flight of the Gauls from their 
camp immediately ensues on hearing of this 
disaster, and had not the soldiers been wearied 
by sending frequent re-enforcements, and the 
labor of the entire day, all the enemy’s forces 
could have been destroyed. Immediately after 
midnight, the cavalry are sent out and over- 
take the rear, a great number are taken or cut 
to pieces, the rest by flight escape in different 
directions to their respective states. 

Cuap. LXXXIX. — Vercingetorix, having 
convened a council the following day, de- 
clares, that he had undertaken that war, 
not on account of his own exigencies, but on 
account of the general freedom; and since he 
must yield to fortune, he offered himself to 
them for either purpose, whether they should 
wish to atone to the Romans by his death, or 
surrender him alive. Ambassadors are sent to 
Cesar on this subject. He orders their arms 
to be surrendered, and their chieftains delivered 
up. He seated himself at the head of the 
lines in front of the camp, the Gallic chieftains 
are brought before him. They surrender Ver- 


CHSAR’S COMMENTARIES. 301 


cingetorix, and lay down their arms. Reserv- 
ing the /Edui and Arverni, [to try] if he could 
gain over, through their influence, their respec- 
tive states, he distributes one of the remaining 
captives to each soldier, throughout the entire 
army, as plunder. 

Cuar. XC.—After making these arrange- 
ments, he marches into the [country of the] 
/Hdui, and recovers that state. To this place 
ambassadors are sent by the Arverni, who 
promise that they willexecute his commands. 
He demands a great number of hostages. He 
sends the legions to winter quarters; he re- 
stores about twenty thousand captives to the 
/Edui and Arverni; he orders Titus Labienus 
to march into the [country of the] Sequani 
with two legions and the cavalry, and to him 
he attaches Marcus Sempronius Rutilus; he 
places Caius Fabius and Lucius Minucius 
Basilus, with two legions in the country of the 
Remi, lest they should sustain any loss from 
the Bellovaci in their neighborhood. He sends 
Caius Antistius Reginus into the [country of 
the] Ambivareti, Titus.Sextius into the terri- 
tories of the Bituriges, and Caius Caninius 
Rebilus into those of the Ruteni, with one 
legion each. He _ stations Quintus Tullius 
Cicero, and Publius Sulpicius among the /Edui 
at Cabillo and Matisco on the Sadne, to procure 
supplies of corn. He himself determines to 
winter at Bibracte. A supplication of twenty 
days is decreed by the senate at Rome, on 
learning these successes from Cesar’s de- 
spatches. 


ie 


LO ae 


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¥ranslations — Literal: 


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translations wanted — write us. 


Aeschines Against Ctesiphon .......2.. 
Aeschylus Agamemnon .......cecceccce 
Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound & Seven 

Against Thebes ...... «00d sige ptecaie a tains 
——  Amicis’ The Heart of a Boy (Cuore)... 
—— Aristophanes’ Birds and Frogs ......«. 
Aristophanes’ Clouds). «(0 geles cle sccetsetete 
Balzac’s Eugenie Grandet .....-seccee 
Bazin’s Children of Alsace (Les Oberle) 
Caesar’s Civil War ...... sisi suelereretepusiote 
Caesar’s Gallic War, the Seven: Books.. 
Catullusy iis roc e cic Sere ioters ete clove aierehensretonenete 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote — 2 vols..each 
—— Cicero’s Brutus ....... eile ete, sunteneueteterere 
Cicero’s Defense of Roscius ......-e00 
Cicero’s Offices: si. '. sis's:0 «e060 ererere ciabeietate 
Cicero On Old Age and Friendship.... 
Cicero On Oratory and Orators....... 
— Cicero On the Nature of the Gods.... 
Cicero’s Select Orations .....--ececce 
—— Cicero’s Select Letters—2 vols., each 
Cicero’s Letters — Complete, 4 vols., ea. 
— Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations ....s.eee 
—lCorneille’s Le Cid .....cccscccccvecce 
Cornelius Nepos— Complete ....ccoce 
Daudet’s Tartarin of Tarascon.....cse 
—— Demosthenes’ Olynthiacs and Philippics 
Demosthenes’ On the Crown ..ccoocce 
Dumas’ The Black Tulip (La Tulipe 
Notre) ose 'scescte cesses hae sua eeumneie 
Euripides’ Alcestis and Electra..cecccece. 
Bacchantes, Hercules, Furens .ecccora 
Hecuba and Andromache ....e.cccccce 
— Iphigenia, in Aulis, in Tauris ...cccce 
mas Medea ii 0 ste 0 0's 0 00 «ele eels) steelers lejeleielersin 
m—— Butropius .sccccccceccvcocececccsicecee 
Feuillet’s Rom. of a Poor Young Man 
Freytag’s The Journalists .......e.cee 
Galdos’ Dona ‘Perfecta: <7. i <.c.icctenee an 
Galdos’ Story of a Spanish Love (Ma- 
rianela). Wa seidialaie's con 0, nhele @ che el tieteatersme ole 
Gerstacker’s Germelhausen .....eeecee 


Translations — Literal: 
GOetTHEISWIUZMO tere cieicis ols chacciclelele eg. e-e.6i0 
Goethe’s Faust — Part I .....ccccccee 
Goethe’s Faust — Parts I and II...... 
—  Goethe’s Goetz von Berlichingen, Tor- 
quato Tassc, Egmont, Iphigenia, Clavigo, 
Wayward Lover, and Fellow Culprits..... 
Goethe’s Hermann and Dorothea .. .. 
Goethe’s Iphigenia in Tauris ......... 
Goethe’s Poems and Ballads .......... 
—— Halevy’s Abbe Constantin .......... my 
FratitivSe lich terisbe timo sis cielere tke ete sal sae 
Hauff’s Tales: The Caravan, Sheik of 
Alexandria and Inn in the Spessart...... 
Hauptmann’s The Sunken Bell (Die 
RIEESUN CHE. GIOOKE) reo cisiaie sc cle eelsie oe 0 eis si6 
PL GTO Bee OCIS. cca Fisin oes oi 04’h wining) ade Quant 
—  Heine’s Travel Pictures including Tour 
Wripe ete El crzetet Ae icteicdasiclclese (eres a leiticiele’ele cre oa 
—— Herodotus Books VI and VII......... 
— Herodotus Book VIII ........ececeeee 
—— Herodotus Books I to IX..........05- 
Wievse Ss. Lr Agranbiataine «cs eltee sos 'aa pe 
—  Hillern’s Higher Than the Church .... 
Homer’s Iliad —6 Books ....c.ceeeee 
Homer’s Odyssey — 12 Books ......-; 
Horace;— Complete vic « «.««-se,ls-otc,00 8 te 
Hugo’s Hernani, Ruy Blas, etc....... 
—— Hugo’s Les Misérables — Two vols, ea, 
Juvenal’s Satires— Complete ........ 
La Brete’s My Uncle and My Cure 
(Mon Oncle et Mon Cure)....cccescecee 
Beaten gave 6 Gil BIGS” sisal oat we sinled 6 0 me 
pe LESSING S) luitiliaGalOlth sles crs seen cces 


——  Lessing’s Laokoon .......... ASSHS SE GO 
——  Lessing’s Minna von Barnhelm........ 
—Lessing’s Nathan the Wise ....... revels 


—— Lessing’s Miss Sara Simpson, Philotas, 
Emilia Galotti and Nathan the Wise...... 
Livy — Books 1 and Zia) es els Ve sele.e bid oe 


— Livy — Books 1 to 20.....seeseeeeees 
Livy — Books. 21 and 22 ....+...+-.-- 
o—— Livy — Books 21 to 30......ce-sse0es 


——TLoti’s An Iceland Fisherman (Pecheur 
GTSIGNG Cate eae cardial Bie pple stele Dies RCAC. 


Translations — Literal: 
Lucian’s Select Dialogues — 2 vols., ea 
Lucretius On the Nature of Things.... 
— Lysias’ Orations ............ ashe tates 
Martial’s Epigrams— Complete ...... 
Moliere’s Dramatic Works — 3 vols. ea. 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses — Books 1 to 7 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses — Books 8 to 15 
Ovid’s Fasti, Tristia, Pontic Epistles, 
Ibis sand) Haltuticon is sc/s0/colvwia ele slokererestate 
Ovid’s Heroides, Amours, Art of Love, 
Remedy of Love and Minor Pieces ...... 
——  Phaedrus Fables .......cccccsccccece 


Pindar’s Extant Odes 20... 020. Jess ceo 
—— Plato’s Apology, Crito and Phaedo..... 
—— Plato’s Gorgias .......... ei is i 


Plato’s Laches (paper.cover) ....seesece 
Plato’s Protagoras, Euthyphron ....... 
Plato’s Republic ....... east Pisa 
Plato’s Republic, Timeaus and Critias.. 
Plautus’ Captivi and Mostellaria...... 
Plautus’ Comedies, Vol. I — Trinume 
mus, Miles Gloriosus, Bacchides, Stichus, 
Pseudolus, Menaechmii, Aulularia, Cap- 
tivi, Asinaria and Curculio \.)Givccuee eee 
Plautus’ Comedies, Vol. I1— Amphi- 
tryon, Rudens, Mercator,  Cistellaria, 
Trucullentus, Persa, Casina, Poenulus, 
Epidicus, Mostelleria and Fragments...... 
Plautus’ Pseudolus, Miles Gloriosus... 
Plautus’ Trimummus and Menechmi... 
—— Pliny’s Select Letters— Books I to V 
—— Pliny’s Select Letters — Books VI to X 
—— Pliny — Letters of Pliny the Younger 
Quintilian, Books X and XII ........ 
Quintilian Inst. of Oratory, 2 vols, each 
Racine’s “Athalie*i4i0.1c0<\ seca sere errs 
Racine’s Dramatic Works, Vol. I— The 
Thebaid, Alexander the Great, Andro- 
mache, The Litigants, Britannicus....... 
Racine’s Dramatic Works, Vol. II — Ba- 
jazet, Mithridates, Iphigenia, Phaedra, 
Esther and, Athalia’ oi:</cie'e'e cleialehe orto actuate 
Roman Life in Latin Prose and Verse 
—— Rostand’s Cyrano de Bergerac......c6 


Translations — Literal: 
ROStand gil AION... bie k wists de ce etek 
-—— Rostand’s The Princess Far-away (is 
ETINCESOUECINIGIRE) o.oo = ial tyk Gals oe bine 
Sallust’s Catiline and Jugurthine War.. 
Sallust’s Florus and Velleius Paterculus 
—  Scheffel’s Ekkehard ..........c0eeeee . 
—— Schiller’s Ballads ...c.csccsecsccccces 
Schiller’s Don Carlos, Mary Stuart, 
Maid of Orleans and Bride of Messina... 
Schiller’s History of Thirty Years War 


Schiller’s Maid of Orleans ....... rae 
— Schiller’s Maria Stuart ....... Boal wands Wi 
—— Schiller’s Nephew as Uncle ......... Pi 

SChillee Sy MEMS | ois. ketac clelevaclace stcicue's 

Schiller’s Song of the Bell (Das Lied 

DOW GET GAGERE) be dsgasdcsess seas aewe ate 

Wallenstein’s Death .............- asic 
— Schiller’s Wallenstein’s Camp, Piccolo- 

mini, and Death of Wallenstein .......... 

Sscuiier sp vy tliat bell: \. cdr are oic.o, a0 byes ae 

DEHECA ION MS CTEHTS! o'ois adie bie) oltalditcelela 


Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, Electra 
ANd AN tiP OMG, ieiaaioele ty clatieke corte aitiale desc 
Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, Oedipus 

Coloneus, Electra, Antigone, Trachiniae, 

Piya and Pehtostetus | .ic's |. alee solar Speer ae 
=-—— Storm’s Immensee ...........- witha. stad 
e— Sudermann’s Dame Care (Frau Sorge) 
-— — Suetonius’ Lives of Twelve Caesars... 
' -—— Tacitus’ Annals — First Six Books..... 
— Tacitus’ Germany and Agricola...... c 
—— Tacitus’ On Oratory ........ccccceee 4 
Terence’s Andria Adelphi and Phormio. 
—— Terence Heautontimorumenos ........ 
—— Thucydides — Books I to IV......... “ 
—— Thucydides — Books V to VIII...... ° 
— Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War ..... 
——  Verne’s 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea 

(Vingt Mille Lieues sous les. Mers)...... 


— Virgil’s Aeneid — First 6 Books..... : 
Virgil’s Eclogues and Georgics ........ 

— Virgil’s Aeneid — 12 Bks. with Eclogues 
MECN SCOT RICHA Latecie 6\c.n7m 3/6 4,50 6d blastn 5, 6° 0p bese 


Viri Romae eoeeeseeeeeaeteavoet eee eoseoe 


¥ranslations — Literal: 


Xenophon’s Anabasis ...... eaateneleieiene 3s 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, 2 vols.....each 
— Xenophon’s Hellenica ......... See Sees 


—— Xenophon’s Memorabilia ............. 
Xenophon’s Minor Works ..........es 
Zschokke The Broken Jar .......-ce0c 
Translations — Interlinear: 


If you do not find listed here the particular 
translation wanted — write us. 


Caesar's {Gallic {War 2. ye eee sieiese uals 
Cicero On Old Age and Friendship... 
— Cicero’s Orations ...... ond Wigs ahotade ene tare 
Cornelius. Nepos 2)3<i0 ce si a letetecoreievete 
Demosthenes On the Crown ......-eeee 
Hometis;fliad \ ce. op APIS ALY rrr h eA ic 


Horace . isievd c'v.w.s.eveiere 08s oe 0c isi oistamn eateries 
Juvenal. si. 6s s\c 00's 4: 5.0/0 01s aleinie cae erate neg 
Livy, Books 21-22, and Selections from 
Books: 17 t0;01ee0'-'« PE Ween Meh 5 Cy et is 
New Test., Gk.-Eng., without notes... 
New Testament — Greek-English — with 
notes’ (cloth) Wi .<e ese. Scuie State tate rove oteie 
Old Testament — Hebrew-English — 
Vol. I—with notes (cloth) .........0.- 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses — Complete .... 
Sallust’s Catiline and Jugurthine War.. 
Tacitus’ Germany and Agricola ....... 
— Virgil’s Aeneid — First Six Books..... 
— Virgil’s Aeneid — Twelve Books....... 
— Virgil’s Eclogues, Georgics and Last — 
Six Books of Aeneid ....cescescoressccie 
Xenophon’s Anabasis ...cccccesccccsere 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia .......e..eee 
Translations — Parallel Text Translations. 


These translations, rightfully entitled, the 
Teachers’ Parallel Translations, have been 
prepared to include both the Latin text 
and its English translation, so arranged 
as to show the corresponding relation 
which the one bears to the other. The 
Latin, on the book’s left page, is authentic 
and complete. The combination, by estab- 
lishing a definite interpretation for each 
sentence as it is read in the Latin, makes 
translating clear and intelligent. 


Caesar’s Gallic War — First 4 Beeks... 
—— Cicero’s Orations — Against Catiline, 


For Archias and the Manilian Law...... 
e—— Virgil’s Aencid — First 6 Books....... 
Translations — Juxtalinear — paper cover. 
-—+— Caesar, War with the Germans...,.... 
Cicero, Conspiracy of Catiline — Bk, III 
-—— Cicero, Conspiracy of Catiline — Bk. IV 
—— Cicero, In Defence of Aulus Licinius 

ANGIE s Sect ee s Pat ders eck See aisiats ele 
Cicero, The Pardon of Marcellus....... 
—— Cicero, The Manilian Law ........... 
Virgil, Aeneid — Book III ........... 
— Virgil, Aeneid — Book IV............ 
The Fully Parsed Classics: 


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to resolve into its grammatical parts each 
Sentence of the textbooks generally read 
by classical students so that their trans- 
lation into English may be understood in 
every detail. Each book includes in addi- 
tion to the original text and its literal 
translation, the parsing of every sentence, 
the defining of every word and the analy- 
sis of the structure of every idiomatic 


phrase. 
Caesar’s Gallic War, Book 1.......... 
—— Cicero’s Orations Against Catiline, Bk. 1 
Cicero on Friendship .......... Se stele 


Horace Odes, Books 1 and 2.......... 


=——— Virgil's Aeneid, Book |2 cscs ac va x ecoeg 
—— Xenophon’s Anabasis, Book 1......se06 


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THE CLASSICS 
FULLY PARSED 


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resolve into its grammatical parts each sentence 
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understood in every detail. Each book includes 
in addition to the original text and its literal trans- 
lation, the parsing of every sentence, the defining 
of every word, and the analysis of the structure of 
every idiomatic phrase. 


The Series comprises the following : 


C-ESAR’S GALLIC WAR, Book1 . $2.06 


CICERO’S ORATIONS AGAINST 
CATILINE, Book 1) (oi ee 


CICERO ON FRIENDSHIP’ .7 2 .. 2.06 
VIRGIL’S AENEID, Bochk1 . . 9. 2.00 
HORACE ODES, Books 1 and 2 site 2e'00 
XENOPHON’S ANABASIS, Book 1 2.00 


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Students’ Literal Translations 


Caesar’s Gallic War, Seven Books............... $ .75 
Cicero’s Orations .........cceceee Sra aha ae shelve 715 
Cicero On Old Age and Friendship.............. 075 
Virgil’s Aeneid, First Six Books.......... Solork ss treuue 
IOTACES COMDICLE joins oS Scisideiis ce ctelbiciioe seme s -75 


Livy, Vol. I, Bks. I-II, Vol. Il, Bks. XXI-XXII ea. .75 
sed oky, Vol. I, Bks. I- “VII, Vol. II, Bks. VIII-XV 


CHT OM a eto fets chet a eee cae hb alors Biel els Wowie viewer diese lerame 075 
Pliny’ s Letters, Vol. I, Books I-V, Vol. II, Books 
VI-X, each eeoeeeeeeeeeseeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeeeeene Ay 65) 
Tacitus’ Germany and Agricola.............e0e. Ads 
Catullus (Prose and Poetical Translation)....... 75 
Xenophon’s Anabasis .......ccccccccccccee Pere HUY fs 
Homer’s Iliad ........... are Ain tere ale eiwlarbie arsvelel< oianevs, rad 
SSCOUINGS wRIMIMEN SEG ds a ic).cis ais /ovete © o eikic crete atete Siclatenw eral ed 
Hillern’s Higher Than the Church...... Bia's-'oha rae Cad 
Gerstacker’s Germelshausen ..........cccccees eis 
Heyse’s L’Arrabbiata ..... aie shalaiatevetsce ne evelnorcte sr shale 
Freytag’s Die Journalisten............... sin cutee tele 
Halevy’s L’Abbe Constantin.................008 1.50 
Labiche and Martin’s The Journcy of Mr. Per- 
PACMON Gis isc dhe are is cielersie'e dick aio ava eiclcratonc aeeeTarhee -- 1.00 
MMerimes'stColomba’ ./cisss-stcjas slels srece cate dee ene wee 1.50 
Alarcon’s El Capitan Veneno.............cee00. 1.50 
Galdos’ Dona Perfecta.......cccccccccscccsccccece 2.00 
Cin ldoSceM arianelar ‘iis Ge conve cele dlecbicmss eee eee 2.00 
Victor) Hugols Pernanie hes tic's cists 'c siete cicie ale) crete oie 07d 
BVICTOT PLUGO 8 UY lass Cres ote cc ba hale lbe wears 75 
Ritchie’s, The Argonaut3...............c00e esivpritioaO 
Students’ Interlinear Transiations 
Caesar’s Gallic War....... aS aT RGR sine ree ae 2.00 
CAICATO; BS OTALIONIS ES ci ieysic tn olin pict ohtew bia eA Sinre oe ches 2.00 
Cicero On Old Age and Friendship and Cicero’s 
Qrationerors Milo fact. e's ont senierde cts aieiaksteceime 2.00 
MATSUI ATA TCI. cic 5c dic eodin em \8 Meas cate oie e Secs eo 
The Fully Parsed Classics 
Caesar’s Gallic War, Book I............ Sevcuatlchens 2.00 
Cicero’s Orations, Book Pie aiaiateat cies atoneietene le tiatete 2.00 
WireiliseA enecid:. Boole) Voyage sia ccavtiecs « sventiexetviwinlo sustale 2.00 
Menophot s,;Anabasis- 00. 1s odie c ce cee eee 2.06 
Horace Odes) BoolowJIL.. sis. sie hs dake cabs sales ess 2.00 
Teacher s Parallel Text Transiations 
Caesar’s Gallic War...... ip EET NOLEN ENS Po an! NCUA, ee Se 1.50 
Cicero’s Orations ...........- Siar setae roe eieawlabeWer alors 1.50 


War ilsse A CTleI ge cia ain sisldla dais t bie choles wer cve sa Scie a ee. 


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The Latin, on the book’s left page, is authentic anc 
complete; the English, on the right page directly 
opposite, is the exact and literal equivalent. The 
combination, by establishing a definite interpretatior 
for each sentence as it is read in the Latin, makes 
translating clear and intelligent. This convenience 
in having the text and its translation side by side 
when conducting the class recitation has been appre- 
ciated by teachers. 


CAESAR’S GALLIC WAR—The First Four Books 


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Friendship & Pro Milo Ovid’s Metamorphoses 


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Cornelius Nepos Virgil’s Aeneid, First 6 Books 
Demosthenes On the  Virgil’s Eclogues, Georgics 
Crown and 12 Books of Aeneid 
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Horace Xenophon’s Memorabilia 
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iat 
ne = 
hi 


hea Ms 


ALTA 


12199077 


